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Introduction (chapter 1)
The central objective of this report (completed in March 2006) is to identify the
best forms of enhanced economic integration that could be pursued over the next 5-
10 years between the EU and Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, from the
EU perspective.
All of these countries except Russia are partners in the European Neighbourhood
Policy, which is a new framework for the EU’s relations with its neighbour countries.
Russia is not formally part of the ENP, but the four common policy spaces agreed at
the summit in May 2005 amount to a more selective Russian derivative of the ENP,
with the notable exclusion of democracy and human rights. Russia is also to be
included in the operating area of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
(ENPI, the ENP’s budget).
The five countries covered in this report are of medium to large size in terms of
population, but small in economic terms, relative to the EU. They have different
histories of co-operation with the EU, but all have been recipients of substantial EU
financial assistance.
Review of existing forms of economic integration (chapter 2)
Membership in the WTO is a precondition for further trade liberalisation and
economic integration between the ENP partners and the EU. After becoming WTO
members, the neighbouring states and the EU should aim at the establishment of free
trade areas and closer co-operation in selected sectors. This is the most realistic short
to medium term goal for deepening integration.
More ambitious plans, such as participation in certain aspects of the internal
market, are possible forms of enhanced economic integration between the EU and its
Neighbours, albeit on a fairly long time-scale. However, the process of meeting the
conditions for achieving such objectives may already be important and bring visible
gains both to the ENP countries and the EU.
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Executive Summary
Time dependencies between various forms of economic integration
(chapter 3)
The countries covered in this report have achieved different degrees of integration
with the EU: some of them (Algeria, Russia and Ukraine) are not yet WTO members,
while others advanced as far as concluding FTA agreements with the EU and are now
working on their implementation (Egypt and Morocco). Different starting points
suggest that integration will be multi-speed. At the same time, coordination of
integration in different sectors is necessary to achieve full benefits.
Completion of FTAs with Algeria, Egypt and Morocco appears feasible between
2013 and 2018. In the meantime, some liberalisation of service sectors is expected.
Algeria is expected to enter the WTO soon – possibly by 2007. 
Russia and Ukraine may possibly enter the WTO in 2007, which opens the door for
further economic integration with the EU. Soon after this, it is expected that the EU
will begin talks on formation of an FTA with Ukraine. Expiration of PCAs with Russia
and Ukraine opens options for concluding new agreements that take into account the
lessons that have been learned from the functioning of PCAs over the last decade.
Institutional basis for integration (chapter 4)
The institutional requirements for closer cooperation between the EU and ENP
countries are dependent on the exact form and scope of economic integration to be
pursued. As regards the EU-ENP framework, priority should be given to partial
Internal Market integration, where market integration in goods and services would
constitute the two main pillars.
Free Trade Agreements will likely offer the most realistic framework for
deepening trade and market integration in the short to medium term. 
Fostering market integration in services necessitates taking into consideration the
required degree of regulatory convergence for enhancing cross-border trade and
investments as well as the domestic regulatory capabilities of ENP countries. An
obligation to adopt EU policies in all fields as a prerequisite for integration of the
services market should be avoided and more flexibility should be sought. Such an
approach is already embedded in the ENP logic and efforts should be sustained to
actively pursue this strategy.
In several policy areas economic integration can advance without full regulatory
convergence. Examples include financial services, telecommunication and sea
transport. In these areas domestic reforms to enhance the contestability of markets
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are more important. In other areas, such as air transport or electricity markets, the
gradual adoption of the EU acquis can be contemplated. Additionally, creative
institutional measures to enhance labour mobility without harming the labour
markets in the EU and neighbouring countries should also be sought.
The incorporation of incentive mechanisms within the ENPI could be a good way
of enhancing implementation of the ENP and could increase the chances of the ENP
meeting its objectives. The “bonus” allocation of aid would go to those countries that
perform best according to economic and political criteria, evaluated by progress in
committing to and implementing action plans. Such a mechanism is hoped to foster
competition in the field of domestic reforms among the ENP partners, similarly to the
case of the current new EU member states during their EU accession process. 
In the medium to long term perspective two institutional options appear most
promising. One could be dubbed “strengthened bilateralism” and would focus on
significant widening of the coverage of FTAs, particularly to services and agricultural
goods. In view of the importance of FTAs’ coverage, as discussed in the following
chapter, this option is particularly worth promoting. The approach will be necessarily
multi-speed, depending on the progress in domestic reforms.
Another option would be to form a new regional institution providing an
underpinning for EU-ENP market integration. This could be modelled on the EEA,
though institutional capacity constraints on the side of Neighbouring countries imply
much less regulatory harmonisation than in the current EEA. This solution is likely to
be feasible only in the longer term and, depending on political and economic
dynamics in the ENP countries, may eventually cover only some of them. Among
other roles, such an “EEA-light” could be a powerful incentive mechanism and anchor
for consolidation of domestic reforms in ENP countries.
Effects of economic integration (chapter 5)
Trade in goods
The coverage and specific features of agreements such as FTAs are extremely
important for their impact on partners – they can be decisive for whether any
particular FTA brings benefits to ENP countries or is in fact harmful. The existing EU
FTAs usually fall short of truly liberalising trade, but cover many aspects beyond tariff
barriers. The first feature is unfortunate. Protection of agriculture and service markets
significantly limits the economic relevance of FTAs for partner countries and under
some circumstances could even make the agreements harmful. The second feature has
a large, yet somewhat unexplored potential to promote gains for both sides – for
instance by stimulating reform efforts and promoting competition in domestic markets. 
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WTO accession by countries that are not yet members will enable further steps in
trade liberalisation. Its crucial importance – for Algeria, Russia and Ukraine and the
EU – rests in the fact that it will ensure more stable and predictable regimes for FDI
(also in the services sector).
Elimination of barriers to trade in industrial goods would open new markets for
EU manufacturers and at the same time expose them to new competition. Existing
studies suggest that, overall, the direct effects of these processes on the EU would be
positive, albeit very small. In the longer term, the initially small positive effects would
be enhanced by better direct investment opportunities in the European
Neighbourhood. This could be particularly important in the case of Russia, given the
size of its internal market. For this reason, the trade- and investment-related provision
of FTAs (and earlier also WTO accession) are important from the EU perspective.
Current levels of tariffs and other trade protection measures towards various partners
(EU, regional partners and third countries) are an important factor in terms of the likely
impact on ENP countries of creating FTAs with the EU. From today’s perspective the
implementation of the partial EU-Morocco FTA is expected to bring the highest gains
among all the scheduled EU FTAs. In the case of Egypt, reduction of trade barriers
towards third countries is important in order to avoid trade diversion after formation of
the FTA. Full trade liberalisation (FTA covering all goods) would result in a significant
boost to trade between the EU and ENP countries, particularly Ukraine, Algeria and
Egypt. These gains are not necessarily conditional on adoption of the EU acquis.
One issue that stands out when one looks further into the future is liberalisation of
agricultural trade. The effects of substantial progress in this sphere could be quite
pronounced – both in the EU (where the CAP would need major reform) and in particular
for ENP countries. Existing estimates suggest that for ENP countries the impact of
agricultural trade liberalisation could be comparable to liberalisation of trade in services.
Trade in services
Liberalisation of trade in services means fewer restrictions on the movement of
people and capital as well as freedom of establishment. Although supposed to bring
beneficial effects to both sides, it is likely to be resisted by interest groups and has
already proved to be difficult to achieve even among highly developed and otherwise
integrated economies.
The current patterns of trade in services between the EU and ENP partner
countries are typical for trade with less-developed regions. The EU is a net buyer of
services for which market access in the ENP economies is restricted (such as
transport), it absorbs skilled professionals from Neighbouring states and it sells more
high-tech and capital intensive services.
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In the case of the neighbouring countries considered here, easing EU-ENP
barriers in trade in services would mean:
• adherence to GATS commitments (where appropriate),
• approximation of relevant rules to the EU acquis in some sectors where this
is considered advantageous and feasible,
• an increase in the effectiveness of market regulators,
• equalisation of the rights of foreign and domestic firms, and
• simplified establishment of firms in relevant sectors.
Mutual commitments have been made in action plans or relevant documents
regarding the development of the service sector in ENP economies. Besides, some of
the ENP countries have already embarked on domestic reforms to increase efficiency
and competition. All these actions will most likely affect EU-ENP country trade in
services, although the impact will vary by country and by service market. The
expected developments in selected service sectors in the analysed countries are
discussed in section 5.2.5 of this report. 
Migration
There is little direct linkage between the selected forms of economic integration
between EU and ENP countries and any likely ensuing migration flows. In the baseline
scenario migration from ENP countries to the EU is expected to continue at levels
observed in recent years, but the outlook might change – in some cases radically –
depending on political, social and economic developments in the ENP countries and
the migration policies of the EU. Better prospects for social and economic development
in the EU Neighbourhood are likely to translate into migration flows that are most
beneficial for both the sending and receiving countries (legal, often temporary
migration helping to balance labour markets, for example), whereas social tension,
conflict and economic problems in ENP countries would be expected to result in
migration flows that could be difficult for the EU to handle. This is an additional
argument for EU actors to carefully analyse the long-term impact of integration
processes on the ENP partner countries rather than taking a short-sighted perspective.
The economic and social consequences of migration are crucially dependent on
the policies of both home and host countries but have little to do with the intensity of
economic integration between the EU and ENP. One exception relates to financial
integration, which might lower the costs and thus stimulate remittances, therefore
supporting the development of ENP countries and encouraging temporary rather than
permanent immigration to the EU.
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EU Energy Cooperation with Russia, Algeria and Ukraine (chapter 6)
From the EU perspective, overall trade volumes with ENP countries are relatively
small. However, the countries covered in this report are important EU trade partners
in energy commodities. Russia and Algeria account for some 70% of the EU’s gas
imports, for instance. Russia is also a source of some 30% of the EU’s oil imports.
Current forecasts suggest that the EU will be becoming increasingly dependant on
imported oil and gas over the next decades and thus the importance of the analysed
countries in energy security will increase.
The three countries play very different roles in terms of the EU’s energy security.
Russia is clearly by far the most important player. The EU is looking to secure
extensive supplies of gas in addition to its current Russian gas imports – these could
come either from higher Russian exports (i.e. increased domestic production and/or
energy savings leading to lower domestic consumption) or from Central Asia, which
is currently linked to European markets only via Russian gas pipelines. On the
Russian and Algerian sides sales of energy resources to Europe constitute a major
share of overall export revenues. 
Russia and Algeria will have to secure considerable investment flows if they are
to continue both to modernise and expand their hydrocarbon production. These will
require a predictable and favourable investment climate. EU oil and gas companies
could be well placed to play an important role in the future development of the energy
commodities sector in Russia and Algeria, but the scope for their actions will be
determined by the policy framework in place in these countries. The situation in
Russia is a source of concern in this respect as oil and gas sector-related policies often
appear to be motivated by political considerations and result from the actions of
domestic pressure groups rather than being based on rational economic
considerations. In this respect the situation in Algeria is somewhat better and there is
more optimism as to the country’s ability to secure the investment necessary to
enhance production and export capacity. However, in Algeria much will still depend
on domestic political and economic developments.
From the energy security perspective the situation in the gas sector is more
problematic given the limited control over demand growth in the EU, the key role of
pipeline infrastructure and thus limited options for diversification of sources, and the
lower transparency of gas deals relative to oil deals. In the case of Russia, the
monopolistic position of Gazprom and in particular its full control of gas pipelines
and thus also of production potential in Central Asia, puts European consumers in a
disadvantaged position.
An energy dialogue with Russia requires a unified position to strengthen the EU’s
bargaining power and ensure its interests. Relations with all Neighbour countries
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should be centred on market access issues (FDI, EU participation in the sector,
reform and the opening of the gas sector) but also on energy efficiency.
Future EU financial assistance (chapter 7 and 8.2)
This section seeks to draw some broad lessons for the way in which the European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) should be applied in the ENP
countries starting from 2007. The issue is important as the budget for the ENP will be
nearly double the previous level, amounting to close to 15 billion EUR in 2007-2013.
The general and rather obvious observation is that the ENPI should build upon
experience gathered during the operation of previous EU financial assistance
operations targeted at the countries concerned here.
With regard to bilateral relations between EU and ENP countries greater reliance
on incentive schemes, where additional financial assistance could be linked to
progress in the domestic liberalisation of financial services and telecommunication,
would support EU interests. Such actions could boost services trade and create
investment opportunities for EU companies. 
Greater synergy in financial flows to the neighbouring countries is needed
between the ENPI, European Investment Bank, EBRD and World Bank. Both
technical assistance funds and development loans should be more closely related to
the priorities and commitments expressed in Action Plans.
Conclusions and recommendations (chapter 8)
Recommendations are divided into two categories. Firstly, we suggest areas that
could be prioritised in the existing or future action plans. Secondly, we highlight areas
where good business opportunities are likely to open up for EU partners.
However, before moving to the specific prospects arising out of integration in
various segments of the EU and ENP markets the following statement has to be made.
The EU’s generic priority interest is that Neighbouring countries (and the five
important countries covered in this report in particular) build as hospitable business
and political environments as possible, by European standards. This means that the
EU should give a high priority to its political and economic investment in the
Neighbourhood Policy concept. The EU has the unique advantages of an attractive
normative reputation with its Neighbours – from multiple angles, such as honest
business methods, technical modernity, political ideals for Europe etc. This makes it
plausible for the EU to work hard at leveraging its technical and normative standards
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into these Neighbouring states, which if done successfully would effectively extend the
EU’s sphere of economic influence and privileged market area.
Priority areas for EU politics – lessons for the Action Plans
With Russia not formally a part of the ENP, on the one hand it would appear that
there is more room for manoeuvre in terms of possible policy options, but on the other
hand the lack of a familiar framework may make working out integration policies
more difficult. The experience of the previous strategic documents and their
implementation suggests that grand words and ideas should not be overused, while
co-operation should concentrate on practical issues that are relevant for both sides,
such as energy issues, Russia’s WTO accession or negotiations on EU-Russia FTA..
WTO accession should remain a short-term priority of the EU in Ukraine, as it
would help to some extent to push liberalisation, deregulation and more equal
treatment of economic agents. It seems, however, that what remains to be done lies
largely on the Ukrainian side, as the bilateral negotiations with the EU are already
completed. After WTO accession, an EU-Ukraine FTA should be forwarded. The
existence of such an FTA is expected to enhance trade and FDI in less protected
sectors. Importantly, it would also lay the ground for deeper integration in the sphere
of agricultural trade and investment in agribusiness (where Ukraine may possess a
comparative advantage) and for locking-in reforms.
The prioritisation of the EU-Morocco Action Plan should focus on closer trade
integration with the EU, and on measures that would support the implementation of
an EU-Morocco FTA in manufacturing (expected to be formed in 2013), as it is a
precondition for deeper integration in other spheres. In general, any points of the
Action Plan that address either the development of the business climate in Morocco
or the development of the SME sector or promotion of education are also worth
pursuing, as they will tend to limit illegal migration and support the overall
development of the country. Support for social development is also important given
the role of Morocco in immigration to the EU.
During the implementation phase of the EU-Egypt FTA that started in 2004
monitoring of the timing of tariff dismantling and the implementation of supporting
measures should be centre stage. As the consumer goods sector in Egypt will remain
protected for a considerable amount of time, the focus on implementing other trade
liberalisation and reform measures is also of particular importance. Given the
domestic political situation in Egypt, gradually falling public support to the
presidential “dynasty”, and hence uncertainty about the future commitment to further
reforms and the promotion of openness, transparency etc., a political dialogue with
the EU should support economic integration.
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Relations with Algeria will most likely be dominated by energy issues
supplemented by support for the general development of the country. Of the three
Mediterranean ENP states considered here Algeria’s relations with the EU within the
ENP framework are at the least advanced stage. The challenge for the EU remains
helping to improve the political climate without jeopardising economic recovery.
Business opportunities for EU
Gradual lowering of bilateral barriers to trade will most likely lead to increased
exchange of manufacturing products in the short to medium run. This will most likely
result in the following consequences for the EU business sector. Firstly, the ENP
markets for EU products will become more accessible which should result in growing
demand for the EU produce in the neighbouring markets. Secondly, the abundance of
cheaper suppliers from the ENP countries may motivate subcontracting lower-end
products, thus enhancing efficiency and productivity of the EU manufacturing. It is
also possible that some EU manufacturers feel worse off, as a result of increased
competition. Although it seems that these eventual loses have been already
experienced after the recent EU enlargements and competitive pressure from the side
of Asian producers, Chinese and Indian in particular. Overall, these effects will
neither be immediate, nor felt significantly across the EU markets.
Apart from this, business opportunities for EU enterprises arising from market
integration between the EU and ENP countries will depend on the timing and specific
solutions within agreed forms of market integration.
The energy sector is one where there has already been substantial involvement
of EU companies and where a positive political scenario would create more
lucrative options. The scope of new opportunities will be primarily determined by
liberalisation of energy FDI rules and practice and overall improvement of the
investment climate in Russia, progress of reforms in the energy sector in Ukraine
and security developments in Algeria. Thus, the link to chosen forms of economic
integration is indirect, but at the same time there are obvious lessons as to what
elements of co-operation agreements the EU could try to promote to improve
business opportunities in the energy sector. In Russia (and other countries),
opportunities should arise for provision of services and equipment for both
upstream and infrastructure projects.
Another important sector with large potential for business co-operation, foreign
trade and investment is agriculture and food processing. For instance, demand for
modern food processing equipment is expected to remain strong in all the analysed
countries. In other spheres, the nature of emerging opportunities will be determined
by the specific solutions leading to partial liberalisation of trade in agricultural goods. 
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There are very interesting potential opportunities that may open in the services
sector. In financial intermediation, these will largely depend on development of
prudential and other regulations at the national level. Effective domestic prudential
regulation is a pre-requisite for cross-border integration. In view of the above, the
most appropriate method for the integration of financial services is the path of
domestic reform.
In the transport sector, opportunities will gradually expand in the ENP countries
in air transportation, together with liberalisation of services, adoption of European
and international standards and commitments, and opening possibilities for new
connections. Morocco and Ukraine are expected to be the most promising markets in
this sphere. With respect to cooperation with Russia, royalties for flying over Siberia
are expected to be gradually eliminated and disappear by 2013.
There are plans for investment in road transportation, developing national road
networks as part of Pan-European transport corridors and improvement of road
safety etc., which will represent challenges to logistics companies. Morocco and
Ukraine are currently perceived as frontrunners also in this sphere. As far as the
development of water transport infrastructure is concerned the best opportunities will
most likely open up in Morocco, Russia and Ukraine.
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• The central objective of this report is to try to identify the best forms of enhanced
economic integration between the EU and Ukraine, the Russian Federation,
Egypt, Morocco and Algeria, from the EU perspective.
• European Neighbourhood Policy is a new framework for the EU’s relations with
its neighbouring countries.
• The five countries covered in this report are medium to large in terms of
population, but small in economic terms, relative to the EU.
• These countries have different histories of co-operation with the EU, but all have
been recipients of EU financial assistance.
This report looks at economic integration and its prospects between the European
Union (EU) and five of its neighbour countries: Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, Morocco and
Algeria. Of these, all countries but Russia are formally part of the EU’s recent
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) initiative. Russia is not formally part of the
ENP. However, the four common policy spaces agreed at the summit in May 2005
amount to a more selective Russian derivative of the ENP, with the notable exclusion
of democracy and human rights. Russia is also to be included in the operating area of
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI, the ENP’s budget).
These factors, plus its economic importance for the EU and similarities to other EU
neighbour states explain Russia’s inclusion in this report. For simplicity, all five
countries are referred to as “the ENP countries” in this report. 
The central objective of this report is to identify the best forms of enhanced
economic integration between the EU and ENP countries, from the perspective of the
EU. Analysis related to this question takes into account the current levels of economic
development of the ENP countries and the current character and intensity of
integration and institutional capacities on both sides. The report also acknowledges
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1. Introduction1
limitations in policy-making originating in the fact that some elements of economic
integration have already been defined.
The framework for new relations with Eastern Europe and Mediterranean was set
in 2003, in the Communication on “Wider Europe”. Later, in 2004, the European
Commission adopted a Strategy Paper proposing how the benefits of enlargement
could be extended to the EU25’s neighbours. The aim of the new European
Neighbourhood Policy has been to encourage stability, security and prosperity in a
way that is distinct from membership. At the same time, the ENP should prevent the
emergence of new dividing lines, offer the chance to participate in various EU
activities and support security in the European neighbourhood.
The Strategy Paper has been further elaborated on and tailor-made to specific
countries’ needs in individual Action Plans. The aim of the Action Plans is to indicate
crucial reforms agreed upon by the partner country and the EU and in this way to
improve implementation of the Partnerships and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs – for
the countries in Eastern Europe) and Association Agreements (AA – for the
Mediterranean countries) in order to bring these countries closer to the EU. A limited
number of priorities are defined in action plans that should be realised in the medium
term (3 to 5 years). These priorities are in fact in a very large number of fundamental
areas: political dialogue and reform; trade and measures to prepare partners for
potential participation in the internal market of the EU; judicial and domestic affairs;
energy, transport, information society, environment, research and innovation, social
policy and interpersonal contacts. The ENP envisages that after the Action Plans’
priorities are met the EU will offer a new framework for enhanced cooperation to its
partners in the form of European Neighbourhood Agreements, which will replace the
existing AAs and PCAs. It is a matter for speculation at this stage how such
agreements might compare with what some EU member states are advocating under
the name of privileged partnership (e.g. ersatz membership for Turkey). 
The strategic line for the ENP has already been set out in a number of Commission
Announcements (Communication on Wider Europe, 2003, and Strategy Paper, 2004).
The first wave of Action Plans has been drawn up and approved by the European
Council (for Israel, Jordan, The Palestinian Authority, Tunisia, Moldova, Morocco and
Ukraine). In 2005, based on the Country Reports for Egypt, Lebanon, Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia, work started on Action Plans for these countries. Thus,
among the five countries concerned, only Ukraine and Morocco have signed Action
Plans with the EU to date (Spring 2006). 
This report deals mainly with the third of the ENP’s aims, namely underpinning
prosperity beyond the EU’s borders. With this in mind the report concentrates on
economic issues, with priority given to trade relations, and increased financial and
technical support from the EU. The focus is on the likely development of economic
20
Małgorzata Jakubiak, Wojciech Paczyński
CASE Reports No. 71/2007
relations between the EU and the five ENP countries over the next five to ten years
and the economic effects of this closer cooperation. 
The five countries in focus are medium to large sized states in terms of population
(from around 140 million in the case of Russia to just over 20 million in the case of
Morocco). However, in economic terms their size relative to the EU is small – in 2004,
Dutch GDP at current prices was almost equal to Russia’s, while the four other
countries’ combined GDPs accounted for around 45% of Dutch GDP2. 
Thus, economic relations are asymmetric, with rather marginal importance of the
four countries for the EU and much greater interest from the countries in question in
maintaining good economic relations with the EU. Russia – which ranked fourth in
the list of major EU external trade partners in 2004, mainly on the back of oil and gas
trade – is the only exception. Algeria, Ukraine, Morocco and Egypt ranked 19th, 26th,
28th and 32nd, respectively. 
The countries covered in this report are, however, important EU trade partners in
energy commodities. Russia and Algeria account for some 70% of the EU’s gas
imports, for instance. Russia is also a source of some 30% of the EU’s oil imports.
Thus, the energy dimension of economic relations is quite important and therefore a
separate section of this report has been devoted to its discussion (section 5.3).
Since 1997 EU-Russia relations have been governed by the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) that will be in place until 2007 (and beyond in the
absence of any decision to the contrary). Under the terms of the PCA Russia has been
granted MFN treatment, GSP has been applied to a number of products lowering the
MFN tariff rates further, and in 2002 the country was granted “market economy
status”, which increases chances for Russian exporters to defend their interests in the
context of anti-dumping measures. Currently, EU-Russia relations are grouped into
four common spaces: economic (with reference to energy and the environment),
freedom, security and justice, external security, research and education. The
roadmaps for these spaces were signed in May 2005. The EU is by far Russia’s most
important trade partner, accounting for over 40% of both exports and imports.
Russian exports to the EU are dominated by mineral fuels, while machinery and
various manufacturing goods are the mains imports from the EU. Companies from
EU countries are the major foreign investors in Russia. The EU strongly supports
Russia’s efforts to join the WTO, and the EU and Russia agreed bilaterally on the
terms for Russia’s accession to the WTO at the EU-Russia Summit in 2004. With
regard to technical assistance, under the TACIS programme alone over 2.6 billion EUR
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has been allocated to Russia since 1991 to promote the transition to a market
economy and reinforce democracy and the rule of law.
The PCA governing relations between Ukraine and the EU entered into force in
1998. With the most recent enlargement of the EU the country – similarly to Russia –
became an immediate EU neighbour (with 30% of exports going to the EU and around
50% of non-oil imports originating in the EU), and especially after the political
changes of late 2004 has been pressing for deeper integration. The feasibility of
introducing a free trade area between the EU and Ukraine is currently being
investigated, and the final shape of a future agreement is not yet known. In the
meantime, it is envisaged that Ukraine will join the WTO, although this appears
unlikely before 2007. Ukraine became a partner in the new European Neighbourhood
Policy in 2004, and the Action Plan covering mutual commitments in the sphere of
politics, economic integration (including gradual approximation of legislation, norms
and standards with those of the EU) and justice and home affairs was agreed in
February 2005. The EU is the largest foreign donor in Ukraine at present and the
majority of aid is transferred under the TACIS programme (over 1 billion EUR from
1991; 145 million EUR per year on average during 1998-2004).
The Association Agreement (AA) signed between the EU and Egypt in 2001 (the
continuation of previous Cooperation Agreements) has since then governed the
political, security, economic, social and cultural relations between the two parties.
The Agreement entered into force in 2004 and, based on respect for democratic
principles, provides a framework for political dialogue and liberalisation of trade in
goods, services and capital, including the completion of the FTA by 2015-2018. The
country report on Egypt, preparing the ground for the Action Plan, was released in
March 2005. It is envisaged that the Action Plan for Egypt will focus on two broad
areas: 1) democracy and the rule of law, administration of justice and human rights
and certain objectives in the area of foreign and security policy and 2) actions which
will bring the EU and Egypt closer in a number of priority fields such as economic
and social development policy (including sustainable development), trade and an
internal market (including sectors such as energy, transport, environment, maritime
affairs and fisheries, information society, research and innovation, justice and home
affairs and people-to-people contacts). The EU accounts for over 40% of Egyptian
exports (mineral fuels and various manufacturing goods) and nearly 40% of total
imports (machinery and chemicals). Egypt has been one of the main beneficiaries of
EU assistance among its Mediterranean partners. In 2000-2004 over 361 million EUR
was transferred under MEDA. The European Investment Bank committed nearly 0.8
billion EUR in loans in 2002-2004, with a special focus on private sector support.
EU-Morocco relations are governed by the AA that was signed in 2000, and
similarly as in the case of Egypt, was a continuation of previous bilateral
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agreements. The AA provides for the gradual establishment of free trade in
industrial products, for which the EU has already granted free access, whereas
Morocco committed itself to a gradual removal of tariffs by 2013. However, one fifth
of Moroccan exports to the EU consist of agricultural products, and the next round
of lowering EU import restrictions for these goods is scheduled for 2007.
Membership in the WTO since 1995 has facilitated Morocco’s further economic
integration with the EU. The Action Plan for Morocco released in late 2004 has
among its priorities legislative reforms and adherence to human rights, political
dialogue on fighting terrorism, negotiations on liberalising trade in services,
improving the investment climate, reduction of poverty and enhancing employment,
support for education, dialogue on readmission and visa facilitation, improvement
of infrastructure, including energy infrastructure. Given its geographical location
and historical links, the EU is by far Morocco’s most important external trade
partner, with a 70% share in Moroccan exports (mainly labour intensive
commodities) and a 65% share in imports (machinery). France and Spain are its
most important trading partners. Morocco is the leading beneficiary of Community
assistance in the region. Since 1995 1.1 billion EUR has been committed.
The Association Agreement between the EU and Algeria was signed in April 2002,
but ratified only in March 2005. Correspondingly, ENP initiatives on Algeria were
somewhat delayed. These delays reflect basic political situation in Algeria, where the
regime is hyper-sensitive to suggestions of conditionality. The EU is the major trade
partner of Algeria - it accounts for 54% of Algeria’s exports and 55% of its imports.
EU-Algeria cooperation aims to promote more balanced structure of the Algerian
economy and trade. Yet, energy is likely to be a predominant area of cooperation
given EU’s energy needs and Algeria’s resource endowments. The Association
Agreement with Algeria envisages establishment of a free trade area over a
transitional period of twelve years maximum starting from the date of the entry into
force of the Agreement, i.e. the EU-Algeria FTA is expected to come into force by 2017.
The report is structured as follows. The next chapter reviews existing forms of
economic integration, focusing on those that have either been used in EU relations
with other countries or that could potentially provide blueprints for future relations.
Chapter three highlights the time dimension of the economic integration processes.
Chapter four discusses institutional issues that have turned out to be very important for
the functioning of various forms of economic integration. The next chapter is devoted
to analysis of selected effects of integration. It covers the effects of increased trade in
goods and services and migration issues. Chapter six is devoted to energy issues in view
of their importance in some of the ENP countries. The subsequent part focuses on
future EU financial assistance. The concluding chapter contains recommendations that
could be useful in shaping EU policies in the framework of the ENP.
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• Membership in the WTO is a precondition for further trade liberalisation and
economic integration. 
• Establishment of free trade areas and closer co-operation in selected sectors
emerges as the most realistic short to medium term goal for deepening
integration.
• More ambitious goals, such as participation in certain aspects of the internal
market are possible forms of enhanced economic integration between the EU
and its neighbours, albeit on a fairly long time-scale. However, the process of
meeting the conditions for achieving such objectives may already be important
and bring visible gains to the ENP countries and the EU alike.
This section explores the options that could be considered as possible forms of
enhanced economic integration between the EU and its neighbours. The discussion
starts with the forms of integration that are already being implemented and then turns
to proposals of possible further integration that are outlined in the EU documents on
the ENP, and potential further steps that go beyond the currently discussed
framework. The theoretically possible forms of integration are illustrated by brief
descriptions of examples of EU relations with some of its partner countries. The
selection of the models is primarily motivated by their feasibility as potential solutions
for the ENP countries in the perspective of 5-10 years.
2.1. Multilateral trade liberalisation: WTO
Membership in the WTO has become a stepping-stone of trade liberalisation
around the globe. Relations among WTO members are governed by the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause is one
of the basic principles of GATT. MFN treatment is the principle of not discriminating
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2. Review of existing forms
of economic integration
between one’s trading partners. This means that an advantage granted through
negotiation to one country must be extended to all WTO members3. Since 2000, WTO
members started to liberalise trade in services in the frames of General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS). According to the agreement, member countries, inter alia,
should give MFN treatment to service providers from other countries, provide
information on relevant regulations, recognise qualifications obtained in other
countries and not restrict international transfers (all with a range of exceptions).
The EU bases its trade relations with neighbours on the WTO norms and
encourages them to join the organisation. Among countries covered in this report,
only Egypt and Morocco are WTO members. Russia and Ukraine have been
negotiating the accession for many years but their entry appears unlikely before 2007-
2008. Algerian officials also express optimism about the WTO accession date. 
WTO entry is important in thinking about the future prospects for any closer
forms of integration. This is because the WTO membership establishes a set of rules
universally accepted by all parties, thus making negotiation of more ambitious
arrangements easier. Institutional capacity required to successfully enter the WTO
and function within it is not overly high, nevertheless some countries were faced with
problems in this sphere. Prolonged negotiations of the accession of Russia and
Ukraine are in part due to the opposition from pressure groups within the countries
defending their (perceived) interests.
2.2. Enhanced trade preferences
Partly irrespective of the WTO membership, systems of unilateral or bilateral
preferences in economic relations are possible and such schemes have been used by
the EU in relations with less developed countries. At present, cooperation between
the EU and its neighbours is governed by partnership and cooperation agreements
(PCA) in case of Ukraine and Russia and association agreements (AA) in case of
Algeria, Egypt and Morocco. These agreements cover a broad range of policy areas
such as political dialogue, respect for human rights and democracy, trade
liberalisation and economic cooperation, a range of provisions on intellectual
property, services, public procurement, competition rules, state aid and
monopolies. The economic and trade provisions of the PCAs and AAs are based on
the most favoured nation (MFN) treatment. In addition, many of the neighbouring
countries, including all 5 countries covered in this report, enjoy Generalised System
of Preferences (GSP) treatment for a range of products.
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3 There are important exceptions to the rule, such as regional free trade agreements.
2.2.1. Generalised System of Preferences
Generalised System of Preferences is a scheme according to which developed
countries grant preferential tariffs to imports from developing countries. The EU’s GSP
regime grants imports from GSP beneficiary countries either duty-free access or tariff
reductions below MFN levels for many product categories with the exception of
sensitive ones. One caveat is that these are often the products that have large share in
exports of many developing countries, including the five countries studied in this report.
Moreover, some products are excluded from GSP or are subject to safeguard measures.
The GSP follows ten-year cycles and is implemented through Council regulations.
The last cycle ended in 2005 and a new GSP scheme was adopted on 27 June 20054.
According to the regulation, all countries studied in this report can enjoy GSP
treatment, with some exceptions in case of Russia and Algeria (Table 2.1). 
The regulation also defines a list of sensitive products, which broadly consists of
agricultural products and textiles (Table 2.2). For sensitive products MFN tariffs are
reduced only by 3.5 percentage points, while for non-sensitive products – by 30%. 
In addition, the EU applies antidumping and safeguard measures to some
products. For example, as a part of antidumping procedures it introduced higher
tariffs for Ukraine’s and Russia’s steel and chemical products.
In sum, options for preferential EU imports of agricultural, textile, steel and
chemical products are substantially limited due to different exceptions to the GSP
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4 For more details see http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/global/gsp/index_en.htm
Source: Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005.
Table 2.1. Exceptions from GSP: Russia and Algeria
Excluded articles
Algeria S-V Mineral products
Russia
S-VI Products of the chemical or allied industries.
S-X Pulp of wood or of other fibrous cellulose material; recovered (waste
      and scrap) paper or paperboard; paper and paperboard and articles thereof.
S-XV Base metals and articles of base metal.
Source: Compiled based on Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005, Appendix II.
Table 2.2. EU's GSP sensitive products
Agricultural products Footwear
Inorganic and organic chemicals (some products) Ceramic and glass products
Plastics (some products) Non-ferrous metals (exception: nickel)
Leather products (some products) Base metals products
Wood (some products) Machinery and vehicles (some)
Textiles (silk, wool, cotton and products thereof) Optical, medical instruments; clocks
regime. As a result, the actual relevance of GSP for ENP countries might be limited
and there is some evidence that this was the case for the CIS countries, including
Russia and Ukraine (Aslund and Warner, 2003). A quick look at trade statistics of the
ENP countries studied in this report supports this claim. For example, agricultural
exports are important for Egypt, Morocco and Ukraine (they account for 14.3%,
19.1% and 12% of their total exports – Table 2.3). Apparel is the major item in
Morocco’s exports; metals accounts for some 34% of Ukraine’s total exports. 
The above analysis suggests that there is room for further trade liberalisation
within the existing arrangements. This point deserves attention as lifting of remaining
restriction on the side of the EU can be the simplest route to follow without a need for
any new institutional arrangements. The ENP does envisage further trade liberalisation
and enhanced trade preferences between the EU and its neighbours. The strategy
paper on the ENP suggests that the most immediate goal of the ENP is to achieve full
benefits of the existing partnership and association agreements (Strategy Paper, 2004,
p.15). This implies, in particular, concluding free trade agreements (FTAs). Less
ambitious option for further trade liberalisation would be adopting other forms of trade
preferences, for instance similar to the Autonomous Trade Preference regime (ATP).
2.2.2. Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP)
The EU has the Autonomous Trade Preference Scheme with countries of South
East Europe. This regime gives the exports from beneficiary countries non-reciprocal,
customs-free access to the EU market, under the condition that these products
conform to EU standards and requirements. Such an arrangement could be
potentially considered for other neighbours, in particular, as a transitory solution
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Source: WTO coutry time series from www.wto.org
Table 2.3. Composition of merchandise exports to the world, 2004, %
  Indicator Algeria Egypt Morocco Russia Ukraine
1. Agricultural products 0.2 14.3 19.1 7.5 12.0
1.1. Food 0.2 9.8 17.7 3.9 10.4
2. Fuels and mining products 97.9 50.8 12.7 59.9 17.3
2.1. Fuels 97.5 47.7 4.5 49.1 10.4
3. Manufactures 1.2 27.0 68.4 27.5 69.4
3.1. Iron and steel 0.3 8.3 1.0 9.4 34.3
3.2. Chemicals 0.6 5.3 13.3 6.2 8.4
3.3. Machinery and transport equipment 0.1 0.8 14.5 6.2 13.6
3.4. Textiles 0.0 3.9 1.5 0.4 0.7
3.5. Clothing 0.0 3.7 31.0 0.3 2.1
  Other 0.7 8.0 0.0 5.1 1.3
  Memorandum:  
  Total merchandise exports, USD mln 32298 7682 9739 183452 32672
before a comprehensive free trade regime is created. This could be the case of Russia
and Ukraine, for example, which do not yet have free trade arrangements with the
EU. (The Commission proposed this now to another ENP state, Moldova.) The
relevance of ATP-like solution for Russia and Ukraine will perhaps depend on the
perceived prospects of FTA. In case of Mediterranean countries, this solution is
irrelevant, as they are working on implementation of FTAs.
2.3. Free Trade Agreements (FTA)
A free trade agreement in its full form stipulates liberalisation of trade in goods
and services on a reciprocal basis, namely removing tariffs and import quotas for
goods and nationality and market access restrictions for services. At the same time,
FTA members set their own tariffs on imports from other countries. FTA represents
an exception to the basic rules of the GATT and the GATS as it deviates from the MFN
principle. Yet, GATT allows formation of an FTA subject to certain conditions, in
particular, if it involves elimination of all barriers on almost all bilateral trade
between the members, has a “substantial sectoral coverage” in services and eliminates
discrimination against service suppliers of other countries in the group.
The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 provides for establishment of a Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by the target date of 2010. Association
Agreements that the EU has concluded with Mediterranean partners are to serve as
means towards attainment of this goal. The AAs stipulate for free trade in
manufactured goods and progressive liberalisation of trade in agricultural products.
In return, Mediterranean countries are removing barriers to EU imports, usually over
a transition period. PCA with Ukraine also envisages establishment of an FTA,
however, no target date is defined for this. 
The FTAs that have actually been implemented by the EU and other countries are
in practice often rather far from achieving liberalisation of trade in goods in the
majority of sectors that matter for the partners, with agriculture being a prominent
example, not to mention successful liberalisation of services. Table 2.4 makes it clear
that these two sectors are important for ENP economies. 
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Source: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/datapdf.htm
Table 2.4. Composition of GDP, %, 2003
  Algeria Egypt Morocco Russia Ukraine
Agriculture 10.2 16.1 16.8 5.2 14.1
Industry 55.1 34 29.6 34.2 40.3
Services 34.7 49.8 53.6 60.7 45.6
The benefits of removing
barriers to trade in these sectors
are generally found to be
substantial – often outweighing by
a large margin liberalisation of
trade in industrial goods (see
discussion in chapter 5). The
difficulty with these sectors is that
the historical experience clearly
suggests that plans to remove trade
barriers will likely be met with
strong opposition from interest
groups both in the EU and ENP
countries. Also, institutional
requirements for liberalisation in these sectors are somewhat higher, in particular for
the services sector (see chapter 4 for discussion). 
Overall, FTAs appear to offer a realistic option for further (near to medium term)
economic integration between EU and its neighbours. The specific nature of these
arrangements will matter substantially.
2.4. Customs Union
Another possible arrangement that could be considered for ENP countries
(though certainly not in a perspective of 5 years or so) is a customs union with the EU.
A customs union, according to its textbook definition, implies full trade liberalisation
among a group of countries accompanied by an application of a single external tariff.
The customs union is one of the key components of the EU itself. 
In 1995, the EU concluded a customs union with Turkey, which made Turkey the
only country that has a customs union with the EU without being an EU member.
According to the agreement, the two parties gradually eliminated tariff and non-tariff
barriers to each other’s industrial goods (but not agricultural ones) and Turkey adopted
Community’s Common Customs Tariff for imports from the third countries. In
addition, the agreement includes adoption of a wide range of legislation on trade and
standards, participation in several conventions on intellectual, industrial and
commercial property rights, as well as harmonisation according to the technical
standards of the EU. The customs union with Turkey can be seen as a relevant example,
given the similarities in the level of economic development to the ENP countries. The
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Box 2.1. Example of FTA: EFTA (Switzerland)
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) could be an
example of how an FTA with neighbours could be
arranged. EFTA was established in 1960 by Austria,
Finland, Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Sweden
and Switzerland - the countries that were not ready
to proceed with deeper integration within the EEC
at that time. Following formation of the EC Single
Market in 1992, the all EFTA countries except
Switzerland formed European Economic Area
(EEA) on the basis of FTA. Switzerland has however
recently made agreements with the EU that go way
beyond free trade, but fall short of the EEA model
(see chapter 4).
full-fledged union would set rather high institutional requirement on all parties of an
agreement (as common external trade policy needs to be decided either collectively or
asymmetrically, with the EU as the major party effectively deciding unilaterally). The
experience of Turkey suggests that the EU will be very reluctant to enter further
commitments of this type complicating its trade policies. Custom union with Turkey
has in practice turned out to be a very uneven arrangement with a clear leader (EU)
followed by a much smaller partner. Certainly, such a scheme does not automatically
imply negative consequences for partner countries, yet an uneven nature of ensuing
relations needs to be understood by all parties prior to their decisions on opting for
such a form of integration. Chapter 4 discusses the institutional dimension of the
Turkish case in more detail and draws more conclusions for the appropriateness of
customs union as a mechanism of future integration between EU and ENP region.
A serious economic disadvantage of the customs union option can arise between
(say) states A and B, when state B wishes to enjoy free trade with other major trade
partners, which do not have free trade with state A. In this case the constraint of the
common external tariff could be significantly trade diverting. This is not just a
theoretical case, since it would arise in the case of a customs union between the EU and
Ukraine in the event that Russia and the EU do not make also a free trade agreement.
For similar reasons Ukraine has refused to enter into a customs union with Russia.
2.5. Participation in the internal market
The EU made quite an ambitious, yet still only vaguely defined offer in the
formulation of the ENP – a prospect for the neighbours’ “stake in the EU’s Internal
Market” (Communication on Wider Europe, 2003, p. 4). This implies that ENP
countries would be able to become a part of the “four freedoms” - free movement of
goods, services, labour and capital. The institutional, economic and other
requirements for full participation in the internal market are very high and the
prospects of the five countries joining the market are distant. However, partial access
could be considered as it can motivate reform effort in several fields that are crucial
for social and economic development of ENP countries and business options for EU
partners. Precisely for this reason we include discussion of this option in the report.
2.5.1. Internal goods market
To participate in the Internal Market for goods, neighbour countries would have
to adopt the acquis in relevant areas, use European and international standards and
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apply the principle of mutual recognition in non-harmonised sectors. The latter
requires substantial amount of confidence on the side of all the parties – something
that will take time to develop. 
Even though the prospect of participation in the Internal Market may be remote,
it may make sense for the neighbour countries to adopt the Internal Market legislation
in some areas. This will facilitate access of their products to the EU market and vice
versa, because non-alignment with EU regulations often serves as a non-tariff barrier.
Mediterranean countries are already advancing with harmonization of some priority
areas in legislation and regulatory framework based on the Palermo Conference
(2003); legislative harmonization is under way in Ukraine as well. Where neighbours
are not going to adopt the acquis, it may make sense to converge on some main
principles – this will reduce uncertainty and transaction costs. Participation in a
common regulatory policies may also promote cooperation among neighbours
themselves. In particular, it can complement such regional trade liberalisation
initiatives as Agadir Agreement in the Mediterranean.
2.5.2. Complete internal market
Neighbours’ participation in the complete Internal Market (i.e. in free movement
of services, labour and capital in addition to that of goods) is also a possibility,
although even more remote than participation in the Internal Commodity Market. 
Free movement of labour can potentially bring big efficiency gains and also serve
as a good “carrot” for the ENP, but it is a sensitive issue, socially and politically. The
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Box 2.2. Example of participation in the Internal Market: EEA
European Economic Area (EEA) is an example of how participation in the Internal Market
can be arranged. The idea of shaping EU's relations with its neighbours along the EEA lines
has been discussed at the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002-2003, and also as a part
of the development of the EU Constitution (Vahl, 2005). The Commission Communication on
Wider Europe of March 2003 also mentions EEA as a model for relations with neighbours,
saying that the long-term goal of the Wider Europe initiative is to move towards an
arrangement resembling EEA (Communication on Wider Europe, 2003).
The EEA was formed by the EU, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein and assures four
freedoms of movements of: manufacturing goods (agricultural trade is excluded), services,
capital and persons. Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein have rights to participate during the
formulation of European Community legislation, but not the right to a voice in decision-
making, which is reserved exclusively for Member States. Because the countries are very
closely linked to the EU, some of their national legislation is taken over by the EC rules
(connected with trade and movement of people and companies, also about company law) and
their laws, especially those regarding economic activity are harmonised with these of the EU.
ENP’s offer on movement of labour is quite cautious. So, the EC Communication
speaks about “perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons”
(Communication on Wider Europe, 2003, p. 11). chapter 5 of the study discusses the
likely consequences of services liberalisation and migration in more detail.
2.6. Participation in European networks
Yet another model of economic integration of neighbours is participation in
European networks. The basic distinction of this option is institutional inclusion of the
ENP countries. The ENP offers neighbours a possibility of participation in transport,
energy, telecommunications networks and the European Research Area. In
particular, in the energy sector, the EU Strategy Paper on ENP envisages
consideration of possibilities for partners to participate in the Intelligent Energy
Programme and for their gradual involvement in EU’s regulatory practices and bodies
such as the European Gas and Electricity Regulatory fora (Strategy Paper, 2004,
p.17). In transport, the paper suggests further developing pan-European initiatives
such as the Pan-European Transport Network Concept, Pan-European Transport
Conferences, Euro-Mediterranean transport network, etc. Analogous proposals are
put forward for environment protection, communication and research areas. 
In chapter 4 of the report we analyze in detail the existing framework and
opportunities for neighbour’s participation in the European energy network. 
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• Countries covered in this report have achieved different degrees of integration
with the EU: some of them (Algeria, Russia and Ukraine) are not yet WTO
members, others advanced as far as concluding FTA agreements with the EU
and now work on their implementation. Different starting points suggest that
integration will be multi-speed. 
• Coordination of integration in different sectors is necessary to achieve full
benefits.
• Completion of FTAs with Algeria, Egypt and Morocco appears feasible between
2013 and 2018. In the meantime, some liberalisation of service sectors is expected.
• Russia and Ukraine will most likely enter the WTO in 2007, which opens door
for further economic integration with the EU. Soon after this, it is expected that
the EU will begin talks on formation of an FTA with Ukraine. 
The countries covered in this report have achieved quite different degrees of
integration with the EU: while some of them (Algeria, Russia and Ukraine) are not yet
WTO members, others advanced as far as concluding FTA agreements with the EU
and now work on their implementation. Such a difference in starting positions means
that integration between the EU and its neighbours will necessarily be multi-speed.
Different structures of the economies and different levels of institutional development
in these countries also justify differentiated approach. 
In this chapter we look at the issues of sequencing and coordination of different
forms and spheres of integration. Then we review each country’s case to see what kind
of integration is the most feasible in the short to medium term. The summary of timing
of different integration initiatives is provided in table 3.1. As EU’s cooperation with
Algeria, Egypt and Morocco is shaped to a large extent by a common framework of
Euro-Mediterranean partnership, we discuss EU’s policies towards these countries in
the context of this partnership, and then focus on specific country cases. 
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3. Time dependencies between
various forms of economic
integration
3.1. Sequencing of stages of integration
According to a classic theory of economic integration, the usual sequencing is
from free trade area to customs union and then to a common market (Balassa, 1961).
However this conventional view might need a correction when applied to the wider
European area. The thrust of the ENP is in the direction of free trade and internal
market integration, which for transition/developing counties offers potential
advantages for improving domestic economic governance through anchorage on EU
standards and regulatory rules. On the other hand, the feasibility and positive
implications of a customs union is questionable. 
Regarding sequencing of different components of trade liberalisation, it is
acknowledged that removal of quantitative restrictions should be conducted at the
early stages, followed by reduction or elimination of tariffs. Relative to reforms in
other sectors, trade liberalisation should follow after a broad macroeconomic
stabilisation and before capital account liberalisation (Nsouli et al., 2002).
There is some discussion going on about sequencing of trade and monetary
integration, notably, with respect to East Asia (Pomfret, 2004; ADB, 2005). We will
not analyze this issue, as monetary integration between the EU and neighbours is
quite a far-fetched option. 
What is relevant in case of the countries concerned is sequencing of the WTO
membership and regional integration. The major argument for conducting
multilateral liberalisation first is that regionalism can inhibit multilateral
liberalisation due to lobby of inefficient firms against subsequent removal of the
preferential rates (Krishna, 1998). In the case of CIS countries, one study assesses
welfare benefits of different sequencing to conclude that precedence of the WTO
membership over regional customs union brings superior results (Tumbarello, 2005).
It should be noted, however, that these studies focus on regional trade agreements
(RTAs) among developing countries, which have high tariffs and conduct regional
integration instead of multilateral liberalisation.
Proponents of regionalism suggest that because trade (in industrial products) is
already quite free in the major trading economies, few regional liberalisation
initiatives are capable of creating important anti-liberalisation forces (Baldwin, 2004).
This seems to be the case in economic relations of the EU with its neighbours, as they
are based on simultaneous multilateral and regional liberalisation, with WTO
conditions being embedded in bilateral agreements. In sum, there are reasons to
believe that WTO membership should go before other liberalisation initiatives, and
this is exactly what the EU requires in the frames of the ENP5. 
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5 On the other hand the EU was ready to follow regional trade integration route in the case of the Baltic states
and ex-Yugoslavia countries before or in parallel to their WTO accession.
3.2. Coordination of integration in different sectors
There are many reasons to believe that liberalisation of trade in commodities should
be accompanied by liberalisation in services and investment. For example, to realize
gains from trade liberalisation in the manufacturing sector it is necessary to also
liberalise and harmonise such services as transportation and communication. Improved
market access is likely to attract export-oriented FDI in the neighbouring countries,
prompting for integration in the area of investment. This means that to achieve full
benefits from integration, it is necessary to coordinate liberalisation in several sectors. 
Another argument for coordinated or simultaneous integration is that “package
deals” are easier to reach because they generate losers and winners on both sides, as
opposed to sectoral agreements that are likely to generate losers on one side and
winners on the other, making it difficult to make a deal. Package deals are at the heart
of EU decision making, which only strengthens the case for the use of similar
techniques in relations with neighbours.
3.3. Time frame
It has been a general tendency for economic integration initiatives to fall behind the
established time frame. This is the case, for example, with implementation of the FTA in
the Mediterranean: the Barcelona Declaration envisaged establishment of the FTA by
2010; yet, due to delays with conclusion and ratification of Association Agreements, the
FTA is unlikely to be achieved by 2010. Similarly, dates of EU accession of eight Central
European new member states have been delayed (relative to earlier plans), reflecting
that more time than initially planned was needed for both sides to be ready for
subsequent steps. Yet from another perspective, these countries needed only 15 years to
move from economic and political isolation to EU membership. In subsequent sections
we try to figure out realistic time frame of integration initiatives, taking into account the
EU experience with economic integration.
3.4. Country cases
3.4.1. Russia
Russia occupies a special place in relation to the ENP: it does not participate in it
as a target of the policy; rather, it seeks a partnership with the EU on more equal terms. 
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3.4.1.1. Legal framework
The PCA forms the current basis for EU-Russia relations. By 2007, either some
new agreement will need to be signed or the PCA will be automatically extended. The
agreement establishes a partnership between the EU and Russia, which is to serve as
a venue of political dialogue between the parties and to facilitate political and
economic reform in Russia and intensification of economic cooperation between the
parties. According to the PCA, the parties apply MFN treatment to each other’s
products and eliminate quantitative restrictions (PCA Russia, 1997, Articles 10 and
15). The agreement, however, does not apply to trade in textiles, coal and metal
products, which is governed by separate agreements. With regard to the
establishment of companies, the PCA requires treatment no less favourable than that
granted to any third country, and home treatment to subsidiaries (PCA Russia, 1997,
Article 28). PCA also provides for establishment of the institutions to govern the
relations, such as biannual summits at the country head level, a Cooperation Council
at ministerial level and a Parliamentary Cooperation Committee.
3.4.1.2. Trade pattern6
The EU is now by far Russia’s main trading partner: in 2004, it accounted for 40%
of Russia’s exports and 45% of its imports. Russia’s exports to the EU are dominated
by energy commodities (60%), while its imports from the EU mainly consist of
machinery, transport equipment and chemicals. Such an unbalanced trade pattern
illustrates the EU’s dependence on Russian energy supplies, on the one hand, and the
need for raising competitiveness of Russian industry and improving its access to the
EU market, on the other. EU Strategy paper on Russia declares trade promotion and
the removal of access restrictions as the key elements of the EU-Russia cooperation
(Strategy Paper Russia, 2001, Art. 4.2). To this end, the Strategy envisions the launch
of two initiatives - a Common European Economic Space (discussed below) and
Energy Dialogue (discussed in chapters 4 and 6). 
3.4.1.3. Integration and liberalisation initiatives
WTO membership
Russia’s WTO membership is the most realistic step to happen in the nearest
future. In May 2004, Russia and the EU signed a bilateral agreement on Russia’s
accession to the WTO (in a package with Russia’s signing the Kyoto protocol).
Optimistically, membership could be agreed in 2007, but some delay seems more
realistic. As of January 2006, Russia still had to conclude bilateral negotiations with
the United States, Australia, Switzerland and Columbia. Negotiations with the US
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6 See also trade statistics in Tables 3.1A and 3.2A in the Statistical Appendix.
proved to be the most contentious over US demand for Russia’s opening its banking
sector and observing intellectual property rights. 
Russia’s WTO membership is important from the point of view of the European
investors, as it is hoped to encourage market reform in Russia, enhance equal
treatment of foreign and domestic investors and reduce uncertainty, which will lead
to improvement of the investment climate.
Regional and bilateral trade liberalisation 
The PCA envisages creating the necessary conditions for future establishment of a
free trade area between the EU and Russia that would cover trade in goods, as well
as conditions for bringing about freedom of establishment of companies, of cross-
border trade in services and of capital movements (PCA Russia, 1997, Article 1). A
number of studies have been conducted on the assessment of the impact of the FTA
(some of which are discussed in section 5.1), yet the idea has not resulted in any
practical steps so far. According to some Russian analysts and officials advance of free
trade between the EU and Russia was hindered by fears in the EU of competition from
Russian companies (Mau et al., 2004, p. 59; Gref Interview, 2005).
Integrated market
The idea of integration of Russian and European markets was first declared in the
EU Common Strategy for Russia that was adopted in 1999. It envisaged creation of
an FTA, to be followed by common European economic space that is to be gradually
implemented through convergence of legislation and standards. At the EU-Russia
Summit in May 2001 the parties agreed to study a possibility of creating a Common
European Economic Space (CEES) and created a joint group tasked with
investigating such a possibility. 
This initial proposal was quite vague and resembled the EEA arrangement in that
it suggested adopting the EU’s acquis, what became an object of criticism of some
Russian observers. The idea was later transformed into Common Economic Space
(CES) as one of four common spaces (the other three are a common space of freedom,
security and justice; a space of co-operation in the field of external security; and a
space of research and education, and culture). The Moscow Summit in May 2005
adopted a package of Road Maps that outline the actions necessary to make the
common spaces a reality, and the most recent summit in London in October 2005
focused on the implementation of the Road Maps. 
It is important to note that in the process of elaboration, the idea of a common
economic space got substantially transformed. Symbolically, it lost the word
“European” in its title. Its substance has also transformed: it does not speak of Russia’s
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adopting EU’s acquis, but rather about “dialogue” and “approximation”. The Road
Map on CES does not speak about Russia’s access to EU common market, but about
creation of an “integrated market”. The document, however, does not give any precise
picture of what such a market may mean in practice. What the Road Map speaks about
is efforts in standardization, with a possibility of participation of the Russian bodies in
the European standardization, accreditation and metrology organizations (Road Map
on CES, 2005, p. 2). Another major feature of the CES proposal is its emphasis on
creation of common networks in several areas: telecommunications, transport, energy,
space and environment. The focus on networks may reflect Russia’s interest in
institutional participation in policies, which is more feasible in case of Pan-European
networks than in the case of the EU internal market. 
Overall, the new initiative represents a not wholly successful attempt at clarifying
what the Common Economic Space could look like, yet further elaboration of the
concept is needed. At this stage it is unclear how an “integrated market” will look like.
However observers of the Russian policy making scene are beginning to notice that
Russia is in practice going more in the direction of adopting EU standards and
regulatory norms than their political leaders are willing to state in official
communiqués. At the same time, integration in pan-European networks seems to be a
promising concept, in particular in relation to the energy sector.
Energy sector cooperation
Russia-EU relations on energy are developing within the frames of the Energy
Dialogue that was launched in October 2000. The main idea of this partnership is to
enhance the energy security of the European continent by binding Russia and the EU
into a closer relationship. We address this issue in chapter 6.
Conclusions
The most feasible option for Russia to follow during the next 5-10 years is to work
towards a partial but hopefully more comprehensive free trade area with the EU (after
accession to WTO), supplemented by harmonization of legislation and regulations in
some areas of the internal market, as well as participation in a range of European
networks and programs. Chapter 5 discusses the risks of partial trade integration,
which can be relevant. In terms of the time frame, WTO membership is still possible
in 2007. It is difficult to devise any projections for timing of the FTA and integrated
market. Theoretically, FTA negotiations could start immediately after the WTO
membership; yet, there are no plans so far to proceed with the FTA. The idea of an
integrated market has yet to be elaborated conceptually before any projections about
timing of its implementation could be made. 
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3.4.2. Ukraine
3.4.2.1. Legal Framework
EU-Ukraine relations are governed by the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement, which entered into force in 1998 and expires in 2008, but can continue in
the absence of new decisions. The economic provisions of PCA stipulate reciprocal
MFN treatment for goods. There are also specific agreements in particular policy
areas such as trade, science and technology, and nuclear energy. Conclusion of
agreement on steel and textile allowed to gradually liberalise trade in these sectors. 
Ukraine became a partner in the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, and an
Action Plan covering mutual commitments in the sphere of politics, economic
integration (including gradual approximation of legislation, norms and standards
with those of the EU) and justice and home affairs was agreed in February 2005. 
In 2006-2007, after the review of the first year of implementation of the Action
Plan, the parties are expected to start negotiations on the new framework agreement
that will replace the current PCA. According to Ukrainian side, this should be an
Association Agreement7. The EU speaks of European Neighbourhood Agreement but
has not outlined a vision on its substance yet. 
3.4.2.2. Trade pattern 
Ukraine’s trade turnover with the EU has been rising and in 2004 EU accounted
for 33% of total Ukraine’s exports and for 32% of its imports. Metals and energy
accounted respectively for 32% and 25% of the Ukrainian exports to the EU, whilst
machinery, transport equipment and chemical products are major EU exports to
Ukraine. Ukrainian exports to the EU have been inhibited by EU’s protective
measures as Ukraine happens to specialise in goods that are considered “sensitive
products” by the EU: steel, chemical, textile and agricultural products.
3.4.2.3. Integration and liberalisation initiatives
Market economy status
Until December 2005, the EU treated Ukraine as a non-market economy, which
made it easy to file antidumping cases against Ukrainian companies. In 2005, 10
Ukrainian chemical and steel products were subject to EU safeguard measures8.
Granting Ukraine market economy status in December 2005l eased access of
Ukrainian companies to the EU market. 
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7 One of the latest statements on this was made by President Yushchenko in London on October 18, 2005. He
said that an association agreement could be signed within three years. Source: Anton La Guardia, ‘Ukrainian
leader sets sights on joining the West’, The Daily Telegraph, October 18, 2005.
8 http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/publication/content/2276.htm
WTO
Ukraine’s plans to join the WTO have been regularly delayed and it remains to be
seen whether 2007 can be a realistic date. Bilateral protocols with the US and
Australia have not been signed yet because of US demands on intellectual property
rights and Australia’s demand on easing access to Ukraine’s sugar market. Yet, it is
internal political situation that may prove the major factor behind the delay of WTO
accession: during 2005, the bills needed for Ukraine to comply with WTO
requirements were repeatedly blocked by the opposition. 
Those close to negotiations predict that Ukraine and Russia will likely join the WTO
simultaneously. Acquiring WTO membership is one of the priorities of the Action Plan.
FTA
The EU is currently investigating the feasibility of concluding a free trade
agreement with Ukraine. The Action Plan suggests that negotiations on a free trade
agreement can start as soon as Ukraine becomes a WTO member (Chapter 2.3.1 of the
Plan). President Yushchenko declared that the agreement could be signed by 20079.
Yet, it seems more likely that the process will be delayed. However the EU-Ukraine
summit of 1 December 2005 noted that the two parties were willing to move fast with
FTA after WTO accession of Ukraine. 
Access to EU internal market
The Action plan envisages a possibility of Ukraine’s participation in the EU internal
market in selected priority industrial sectors. Inclusion of Ukraine in an Agreement on
Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial products (ACAA) would be an
important step to this end. In December 2005, the parties started elaborating a
timetable for Ukraine’s inclusion in ACAA, which is expected to happen by 201110.
Networks
The Action Plan envisages a possibility of Ukraine’s participation in the joint
development of the Pan-European Corridors and Areas as well as in the TRACECA
program. In the energy sector, the Plan suggests exploring the possibility for
Ukraine’s participation in the Intelligent Energy-Europe program. Currently, Ukraine
participates in INOGATE program, which aims at diversification of energy supplies to
the EU away from Russia. The agenda for the nearest years is likely to be dominated
by energy security issues, in particular, gas transit from Russia to the EU (Ukraine
transits about 80% of Russian gas to the EU). Increasing Ukraine’s energy efficiency
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9 Anton La Guardia, “Ukrainian leader sets sights on joining the West”, The Daily Telegraph, October 18, 2005.
10 http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/news/detail/1417.htm
and independence along with adoption of market rules in gas transit will be the key
tasks in this realm (energy issues are discussed in chapter 6).
Participation in Pan-European networks will likely be the most dynamic area
in EU-Ukraine cooperation in the nearest future, as interests of the parties broadly
coincide and the issue of Ukraine’s institutional participation in such networks
does not invoke a dispute (more on integration of the transport sector can be found
in section 5.2). EU-Ukraine summit in December 2005 gave a new impetus to
Ukraine’s integration in transport, energy and space networks. In particular, a
memorandum on mutual understanding and cooperation in the energy sector was
signed that envisages gradual integration of Ukrainian gas and electricity sector
into the domestic energy market of the European Union; an Agreement on some
aspects of air transport stipulates deeper cooperation in the context of forming a
single air space; and an Agreement on cooperation in the Galileo satellite
navigation system provides for Ukraine’s direct participation in the Galileo project,
its involvement in realization of the first EU Space Program and Ukraine’s
membership in the European Space Agency.
Conclusions
The short-term agenda of EU-Ukraine economic integration is going to be
dominated by Ukraine’s WTO accession (possibly in 2007). This will bring important
steps of liberalisation in sensitive sectors, including on the EU side, since its existing
restrictive quota for imports of Ukrainian steel would be illegal between WTO
partners, and so will have to be eliminated. A possible creation of a free trade area
with the EU will begin soon after, but the level of ambition and timing of entry into
force needs to be worked out, and the concept is currently at the stage of impact
assessment studies. Ukraine’s inclusion in European energy and transport networks
has already started, and in the next several years is to be filled with practical work.
An important event will be renegotiation of the PCA that is to be concluded by 2008.
3.4.3. Euro-Mediterranean partnership
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been the major mechanism for
cooperation between the EU and Mediterranean countries. It was initiated at the
Barcelona Conference on 27-28 November 1995. The Partnership is a wide
framework of political, economic and social relations between Member States of the
EU and Partners of the Southern Mediterranean. It embraces 25 EU Member States
and 10 Mediterranean Partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. 
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The Economic and Financial Chapter of the Barcelona Declaration envisages
construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial
partnership and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area
(EMFTA) by the target date of 2010. The EMFTA foresees free trade in manufactured
goods and progressive liberalisation of trade in agricultural products. EU has been
concluding Association Agreements with each country which should eventually lead
to implementation of the EMFTA. They are to be supplemented by free trade
agreements between the Mediterranean partners. All three Northern African
countries studied in the report take part in the Barcelona process and all three have
concluded and ratified Association Agreements with the EU: Algeria in 2002 (ratified
in 2005), Egypt in 2001 (ratified in 2004), and Morocco in 1996 (ratified in 2000).
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan also signed a Free Trade Agreement between
themselves in Agadir in February 2004.
Recently, the EU has been active in promoting trade liberalisation with
Mediterranean partners. On 11 October 2005, the Council adopted Commission’s
proposals to extend the system of cumulation of origin to Mediterranean countries11.
The system will permit products processed in one or more countries to benefit from the
same preferential access to the EU market as those exported directly from the country
of origin. This decision aims to encourage Mediterranean countries to conclude free
trade agreements with each other so as to speed up the completion of EMFTA.
Furthermore, in November 2005, the Council decided to authorise the European
Commission to open negotiations on the liberalisation of services and investment with
the EU’s Mediterranean partners. Negotiations started in March 2006. 
At the Summit in Barcelona on November 27-28, 2005, the EU presented its five-
year work program which focuses on education, sustainable economic growth,
human rights and democracy. The EU also raised the issues of terrorism and
migrations, which are likely to dominate EuroMed partnership in the years to come
(see section 5.3).
3.4.4. Algeria
3.4.4.1. Legal Framework
Cooperation between the EU and Algeria has been inhibited for years due to the
protracted conflict in the country. Still, the cooperation proceeded based on the 1979
Co-operation Agreement and four Financial Protocols that supplemented the
agreement, the Barcelona Declaration and the MEDA program. The Association
Agreement was signed in April 2002, but ratified only in March 2005.
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11 Source: EC Press release, October 12, 2005, Reference: IP/05/1256.
Correspondingly, ENP initiatives on Algeria were somewhat delayed, and as of the fall
2005 the EU did not have a country report on Algeria and an Action Plan as a part of
the ENP. These delays reflect basic political conditions in Algeria, where the regime
is hyper-sensitive to suggestions that conditionality on the part of the EU might be
reminiscent of still bitter memories of French colonialism. Indeed the kind of policy
conditionality which the EU applies to the Balkan states is rejected on principle by
most Mediterranean Arab states.
3.4.4.2. Trade pattern
The Algerian economy is very dependent on exploitation of its oil and gas, which
make up 98% of its exports, 30% of GDP, and bring 65% of the state budget’s revenues.
The EU is the major trade partner of Algeria - it accounts for 54% of Algeria’s exports
and 55% of its imports. EU-Algeria cooperation aims to promote more balanced
structure of the Algerian economy and trade. Yet, energy is likely to be a predominant
area of cooperation given EU’s energy needs and Algeria’s resource endowments. More
on the cooperation in the field of energy can be found in chapter 6.
3.4.4.3. Integration and liberalisation initiatives
WTO
Algeria, despite applying to GATT back in 1987 is still in the process of negotiating
the WTO membership. The last meeting of the working group took place on October
21, 2005. The negotiations have been proceeded rather slowly, although Algerian
authorities have been consistently optimistic in expecting accession in the near future.
Regional and bilateral trade liberalisation 
The Association Agreement with Algeria envisages establishment of a free trade
area over a transitional period of twelve years maximum starting from the date of the
entry into force of the Agreement, i.e. the EU-Algeria FTA is expected to come into
force by 2017.
Energy sector cooperation
The Barcelona declaration names energy as one of the priority sectors of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. The EU hopes to create a stable climate for energy
investment and supply security, and the Mediterranean partners see the Partnership as
a privileged channel for investment and technical assistance. Algeria, together with
Libya and to a lesser degree Egypt, is the main target of the policy due to its role in the
hydrocarbons supply. The Association Agreement envisages creation of partnerships in
oil and gas exploitation and modernisation and development of Algerian energy
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networks for their linking to EU networks (Article 61). Chapter 6 of the report
addresses the issues of energy security and trade in hydrocarbons in more detail.
Conclusions
In the short-to medium term, Algeria’s integration agenda with the EU is likely to
be dominated by the WTO accession and implementation of the free trade provisions
of the Association Agreement (by 2017). The energy sector is likely to see some joint
initiatives, including creation of integrated networks. Beyond this all depends on
whether the Algerian political regime can evolve in directions more compatible with
European values. 
3.4.5. Egypt
3.4.5.1. Legal Framework
EU relations with Egypt are governed by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
that is implemented through the EU-Egypt Association Agreement (signed in 2001 and
came into force in 2004). The Agreement provides a framework for political dialogue,
liberalisation of trade in goods, services and capital, including the completion of the
FTA by 2015 (2018 for a very limited number of industrial goods). In March 2005, the
European Commission issued a Country Report on Egypt in the framework of the
ENP, and the drafting of an Action Plan started in the fall of 2005. 
3.4.5.2. Trade pattern
The EU accounts for over 34% of Egyptian exports (energy, textiles, metals and
agricultural products) and nearly 28% of total imports (machinery, transport
equipment and chemicals; see tables 3.1A and 3.2A in the Statistical Annex).
3.4.5.3. Integration and liberalisation initiatives
WTO
Egypt has been a WTO member since 1995 (it joined GATT in 1970).
Regional and bilateral trade liberalisation 
Under the EU-Egypt Association Agreement, the EU is to dismantle tariffs on
industrial imports from Egypt in three years, and Egypt is to do the same in 12 years.
Liberalisation of trade in agricultural products is governed by a separate agreement,
according to which the EU grants a range of concessions to Egypt.
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Energy sector cooperation
Due to its oil and gas resources, Egypt is one of the important partners of the EU
in the area of energy sector cooperation. Thanks to sizeable discoveries of gas, Egypt
is becoming an important gas producer. Egypt also lays an important role in energy
transit, with Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean pipeline serving as major routes
for transiting Persian Gulf energy resources to the European market. Egypt
participates in several new projects on gas pipelines that will help to create a
Mediterranean gas ring involving Southern Mediterranean countries and the EU.
Conclusions
Egypt is likely to go along a similar path to Algeria, but faster due to a less brittle
political relationship. However, Egypt is also extremely resistant to ideas of
introducing more political conditionality into the relationship with the EU. The
agenda for the nearest years will include elaboration of an ENP Action Plan, the
gradual implementation of the FTA provisions (by 2015-2018), as well as participation
in network projects, notably, on energy. 
3.4.6. Morocco
3.4.6.1. Legal Framework
The EU-Morocco relations are governed by the Association Agreement that came
into force in 2000. In 2004, the EU issued the ENP Action Plan for Morocco that is to
serve as a policy guide for the next 3-5 years.
3.4.6.2. Trade pattern
The EU is by far the most important Moroccan external trade partner with share
in Moroccan exports of 74% (mainly food and textiles) and 56% share in imports
(machinery and textiles; see tables 3.1A and 3.2A in the Statistical Annex). France and
Spain are the most important trading partners. 
3.4.6.3. Integration and liberalisation initiatives
WTO
Morocco has been a WTO member since 1995 (it joined GATT in 1987).
Regional and bilateral trade liberalisation 
The Association Agreement provides for the gradual establishment of free trade in
industrial products, for which the EU has already granted free access, whereas
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Morocco committed gradual removal of tariffs until 2013. In agriculture, there is to be
progressive and reciprocal liberalisation. The Agreement also commits Morocco and
the EU to explore ways in which to liberalise trade in services beyond WTO obligations. 
The Action Plan foresees, among other things, negotiation of an agreement on
liberalisation in services, development of favourable investment climate, improving
management of migration flows (conclusion of readmission agreement), and integration
of Morocco into Trans-European transport and energy (electricity) networks. 
Migration is going to be at the forefront of the EU-Morocco relations, as
substantial number of African illegal migrants use Morocco as a transit country on
their way to the EU.
Integration in Pan-European networks
The Action Plan foresees application of the Protocol of the Rome Agreement of
December 2003 stipulating for progressive integration of Maghreb countries into EU
internal market for electricity. 
In the area of transport, the Plan suggests developing of regional transport
systems and their integration into Trans-European Transport Network (more can be
found in section 5.2).
Conclusions
Economic integration between the EU and Morocco is, together with the case of
Tunisia (not studied in this report) going to be something of a pace-maker for
integration processes with other Mediterranean countries. This will include gradual
implementation of FTA (optimistically by 2013), and integration into Trans-European
networks and a relatively constructive political dialogue over Morocco’s political
liberalisation and civil society development.
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Source: Own elaboration.
Table 3.1. Realistic timing of integration initiatives
Russia Ukraine Algeria Egypt Morocco
2006
Start of talks
on services and
investment
liberalisation
Start of talks
on services and
investment
liberalisation
Start of talks
on services and
investment
liberalisation
2007
WTO accession
(?)
PCA expires;
new agreement
possible
WTO accession
(?)
Start of FTA
talks (optimistic)
WTO accession
(?)
2008
Start of talks
on FTA possible
PCA expires,
new agreement
expected
2009
2010
2011
Inclusion
in ACAA
(optimistic)
2012
2013 FTA completion
2014
2015
FTA completion
in majority of
industrial
products
(optimistic)
2016
2017
FTA completion
(optimistic)
2018
FTA completion
in all industrial
products
• The institutional requirements for closer cooperation between the EU and ENP
countries are dependent on the exact form and scope of economic integration to
be pursued.
• As regards the EU-ENP framework, priority should be given to partial Internal
Market integration where the market integration in goods and services would
constitute the two main pillars.
• Free Trade Agreements will likely offer the most realistic framework for
deepening of trade and market integration. Customs union would set too high
institutional requirements for the EU (effective power sharing).
• For fostering market integration in services, a methodology taking into
consideration the required degree of regulatory convergence for enhancing cross
border trade and investments as well as the domestic regulatory capabilities of
ENP countries should be devised. A requirement to adopt EU policies in all
fields as a prerequisite to services market integration should be avoided and
more flexibility should be sought. 
• In some policy areas, economic integration can advance without full regulatory
convergence. Examples include financial services, telecommunication and sea
transport. In these areas domestic reforms to enhance the contestability of
markets are more important.
• In other areas such as air transport or electricity markets, the gradual adoption
of the EU acquis can be contemplated.
• Creative institutional measures to enhance labour mobility without harming the
labour markets in EU countries should also be sought.
• The incorporation of incentive mechanism within the ENPI should help in the
implementation of ENP. Such mechanism should lead to competition in
domestic reforms among the ENP partners.
• In the longer perspective establishment of a new regional instrument to provide
the institutional underpinning of EU-ENP market integration should be
envisaged. The EEA provides useful blueprint in this respect which, however,
should be adjusted to the capacities of Neighbouring countries. Such regional
institution would also fulfil the role of an anchor to accelerate and consolidate
domestic reforms in ENP countries.
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4. Institutional basis for integration
4.1. Institutional requirements for alternative models of economic
integration
The question of institutional requirements related to alternative models of
economic integration has two dimensions: external and internal. The external
dimension relates to the specific institutional setup which will underpin the
economic integration between the EU and ENP countries. The internal dimension
relates to the domestic political, regulatory and administrative structures which
will drive the internal changes for achieving economic integration. There is
generally a link between the two: more ambitious external structures targeting
more comprehensive forms of integration would necessitate a more developed
domestic framework. For the ENP, the challenge is to find the appropriate model
for the external institutions taking into account domestic institutional capacity. In
the longer term, the nature of the external institutional setup will have an impact
on domestic structures but it will be the present state of development of domestic
structures which should determine the short and medium term objectives for
economic integration. Table 4.1 provides a summary of the main aspects of the
institutional setup of the agreements covered in this section.
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Source: Own elaboration.
Table 4.1. Institutional dimension of selected EU integration models
EXTERNAL DIMENSION
INTERNAL
DIMENSION
Political
Institutions
Technical
Committees
Supranational
/Intergovern-
mental
Dispute
Resolution
Policy dialogue
format
Regulatory
harmonisation
Onus
on domestic
institutions
WTO
Ministerial
Council;
General
Council
WTO
Secretariat
+ various
committees
Intergovern
-mental
Own dispute
settlement
body
Multilateral
negotiations
No Lowest
EU FTA
Association
Council
Association
committee 
Intergovern
-mental
Association
Council
+ panel
No decision
shaping ability Partial
Low for trade
in goods; High
for market
integration
EU-Turkey
customs
union
Association
Council
Association
committee
Customs
Union
Committee
Intergovern
-mental
Association
Council
Participation
of national experts
in Commission
committees
+ Exchange
of draft legislation
Partial Medium
EU-
Switzerland
Joint
committees
Intergovern
-mental
& Supranational
for air transport
Joint
committees
ECJ for air
transport
Participation
of national experts
in Commission
committees
+ Exchange
of draft legislation
Depends
on the sector 
High
EEA EEA
Council
EEA Joint
Committee
Sub
committees
Supranational ECJ
Participation
of national experts
in Commission
committees
+ Exchange
of draft legislation
Complete Highest
From a different perspective, this question is also of interest as regards the
development of the EU’s foreign policy. Membership policy might be reaching its
limits. There is a need for an alternative policy, especially with regard to countries
that do not have the vocation to become a full member, that would nonetheless tie
these countries to the EU. Terms such as “virtual membership” or “privileged
partnership” are used to describe this new policy. Yet a consensual and satisfactory
identification of what exactly these policies should entail remains so far lacking. The
review of alternative institutional setups for ENP can therefore contribute to the
debate on the privileged partnership option. As such, the ENP itself could possibly
provide the answer to this elusive question. 
This chapter will elaborate on the nexus between the external and the domestic
dimension for ENP countries. The domestic implications of the integration models set
out in chapter 2 will be reviewed with a view to determine the most appropriate forms
of economic integration between the EU and ENP countries.
The main challenge at this stage is the identification of realistic models of
economic integration12 between the EU and ENP partner countries. The following
sections evaluate different external institutional setups that can be contemplated for
EU-ENP economic integration. Two aspects are discussed: the requirements placed
on domestic institutional and regulatory capacities and the scope of actual economic
integration that could realistically be achieved.
4.1.1. WTO membership
The initial option for some of the ENP countries (Russia, Ukraine and Algeria) is
WTO membership (see chapter 3 for details). The objective is to improve the degree of
contestability in different sectors of the economy. In addition, the modernisation of
the economic legislation in particular in areas such as the protection of intellectual
property is also being sought. The institutional requirement of WTO membership can
therefore be defined as the ability of a candidate country to implement all the specific
liberalisation measures and the improvements in the economic legislation agreed in a
round of bilateral negotiations.
The economic integration impact of WTO membership is, however, limited for a
number of reasons. The market opening commitments undertaken by the candidate
countries are limited by the fact that liberalisation measures agreed during bilateral
50
Małgorzata Jakubiak, Wojciech Paczyński
CASE Reports No. 71/2007
12 The term “economic integration” combines in fact a number of linked and yet different concepts. Economic
integration comprises trade integration to be defined as the elimination of tariff barriers and market
integration which in addition requires the elimination of barriers to cross border investments and additional
measures to eliminate non tariff barriers such as technical standards and policy induced obstacles. The
second aspect is synonymous with “deep integration”.
negotiations subsequently apply on a global scale via the MFN rule. This fundamental
characteristic creates a natural disincentive for ambitious market opening measures.
The strategy of aspiring members is to give the minimum amount of concessions
which will satisfy current members. Secondly, once WTO membership is obtained, the
economic integration impact of WTO membership depends on the outcome of global
rounds of trade talks. As a result, the WTO should be viewed as a strong external
anchor for inducing domestic structures to carry out the initial set of market opening
measures linked to the requirements of membership but a relatively weak anchor in
terms of ensuring the continuation of trade and investment liberalisation.
4.1.2. Free trade area
In its simplest and textbook form, an FTA aims at the liberalisation of trade in
goods by eliminating tariff barriers. In the EU practice, the term free trade area refers
to agreements varying in terms of their scope and ambition as discussed in section 2.3
and in chapter 3. An important positive side of such FTAs, is that they include a
number of provisions targeting market integration. Typical EU-partner country FTA13
covers, on top of trade liberalisation:
• competition provisions with limits on state aids,
• transparent and fair public procurement,
• rights of establishment beyond GATS commitments,
• liberalisation of capital flows,
• harmonisation of standards,
• dispute settlements,
• political dialogue, scientific cooperation, respect of human rights, migrations,
money laundering etc. (Francois et al, 2005)
From the standpoint of domestic structures, the requirements for free trade in its
simplest form (liberalisation of trade in goods) are rather low and can be summarised
as the capacity to reform the domestic import regime coupled with the existence of a
functional customs administration. The level of development in terms of state building
and the application of the rule of law in the countries covered in this report are
generally sufficient to guarantee the sound implementation of bilateral free trade
agreements. However, what is strictly necessary for the implementation of a free trade
agreement may not be sufficient for deriving most of the benefits from free trade. In
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Box 4.1. Deep integration: where do they stand ? Competition rules, intellectual property and
technical barriers to trade
All countries covered in this report have adopted competition legislation, but its application
is marred by several problems and there are still major obstacles in this field for successful
deepening of integration with the EU (Geradin, 2004). One problem is the lack of political
independence. The competition authorities in the region are not distanced from the executive
power. It makes the implementation of competition legislation difficult in practice. The second
structural deficiency relates to the inability of these institutions to recruit and retain qualified
people whereas the application of competition rules requires a highly educated staff with a
thorough understanding of complex and intertwined disciplines such as law, economics and
business practices. On the other hand, we believe that competition policy is one of the areas
where full regulatory harmonisation should be avoided for the simple reason that the EU has
recently adopted a new competition regime, which after 40 years of centralised
implementation, allows for a significant degree of decentralisation. The new EU regime relies
on the existence of a competition law culture which was nurtured by the old system. Therefore
given the youth of the competition culture in ENP countries, the regulatory model more
suitable for the needs of those countries is believed to be the former EU system with its
mandatory notification rules for the granting of individual exemptions to agreements.
As regards the protection of intellectual property, it has to be stated that following their
accession to the WTO, the ENP countries have overhauled their system of intellectual property
protection. The countries in question (Morocco, Egypt) became signatories to numerous
multilateral agreements on the protection of intellectual rights. Egypt for instance adopted a
new Intellectual Property Protection Law in 2002 to bring its legislation in line with its
obligations under TRIPS. Apart from enlarging the scope of IPR protection, the law also
enhances the level of enforcement by stipulating higher fines and prison sentences for
convicted violators (USTR, 2005). The government is apparently putting significant resources
and effort in ensuring a more serious application and respect of the law (FEMISE, 2004).
Morocco seems to be in a different situation with a commendable enforcement practice. It is
contended that Morocco "presently possess a competent legislative and repressive arsenal and
implementation measures that are as efficient as those of the OECD countries" (Handoussa and
Reiffers, 2002). In Russia and Ukraine, the ongoing process of WTO membership also
contributed to an improvement in the legislative framework of intellectual property rights but
implementation remains a problem. Ukraine and Russia remain on the priority watchlist of the
Office of the United States Trade Representative. In Ukraine the main problems relate to
optical media piracy in addition to counterfeiting of pharmaceuticals and consumer products
(USTR, 2005). In Russia, problematic areas are listed as copyright piracy (films, videos, sound
recordings, books and computer software) and counterfeiting of patented and trademarked
goods especially for consumer goods, distilled spirits and pharmaceuticals (USTR, 2005). The
weak link in the IPR regime of all these countries appears to be the area of enforcement.
In the area of technical barriers to trade, the most visible remaining barrier relates to
standards and conformity assessment. The application of mandatory standards and lack of
transparency in the rules governing existing standards, technical regulations and conformity
assessment procedures act as disincentives to trade. In addition, the implementation of the
other words, trade policy liberalisation should be accompanied by reforms in other
areas if the full benefits from free trade are to be obtained.
The question acquires a different dimension when the FTA’s scope is enlarged, as
in the case of AAs with the Mediterranean ENP countries, so as to cover market
integration (or deep integration) measures. In light of the above, the situation in ENP
countries is somewhat disparate. There has been very little progress in the service
sectors, while the introduction of basic competition rules was achieved in all of the
ENP countries14. As can be seen in the Statistical Annex based on the World Bank
doing business database (World Bank, 2005) compared to the world average,
Morocco has a more flexible regime in areas related to the contestability of markets
such as the conditions for starting a business whereas Egypt scores below global
averages. In areas related to red tape in foreign trade, Algeria and Ukraine are outliers
on the negative end, while Morocco perform relatively better.
The FTA approach stands as the most realistic and – at least in the short to
medium term – the most suitable path to foster the economic integration between
the EU and ENP countries. The current ENP strategy vis-à-vis Mediterranean ENP
countries is already in tune with this objective. The conclusion of a free trade
agreement with Ukraine is contemplated in the wake of this country’s accession to
the WTO. The most interesting issue in this respect is the determination of the
specific scope of the FTAs with ENP countries. The FTAs will and already do target
the liberalisation of trade in manufacturing commodities. But what to do with
regard to remaining market integration measures and other sectors such as
services and agriculture? This is the question which will be reviewed in the
following sections.
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14 It should be stress that these are very basic rules. In general, large part of economies in question remain
monopolised, subsidised and protected.
rules gives rise to discriminatory practices between local and imported products. The existence
of a range of mandatory standards is a concern and creates non tariff barriers . There are for
instance 4500 standards in Egypt, 7% of which are mandatory. The figure for Russia is 22,000,
30% of which are claimed to be compliant with international norms (USTR, 2005). In Ukraine,
the non tariff barriers stem from a lack of coordination amongst the multiple certification
agencies which leads to onerous and extraneous testing requirements. Morocco fares better in
this respect as the usage of international standards and criteria (ISO, FAO, WHO) is more
prevalent. EU policy towards the ENP partner states is to encourage them to voluntarily adopt
European standards.
4.1.3. Customs union
Compared to the free trade area, the main advantage of a customs union would
be the elimination of the risk of trade diversion. Adoption of common EU external
tariff can lower protection for third countries. Conversely, under the FTA protection
towards third countries may remain high, directing “too much” of the ENP countries’
trade to the EU, with a loss to domestic consumers. The EU as the “hub” would then
be the main beneficiary to serve the “spoke” markets.
The practical obstacles regarding a customs union scenario are essentially twofold.
The external institutional difficulty related to the customs union involves the establishment
of the proper political institutions between the EU and the countries concerned ensuring
smooth functioning of the customs union. The establishment of a common decision
making or even decision shaping body to decide on the rules and regulations related to the
common commercial policy would be a challenging task. As the example of the EU-Turkey
customs union showed, common decision making is difficult to achieve in practice.
The internal difficulty of the customs union scenario relates to its fiscal and
political impact. Since the customs union would require ENP countries to adopt the
Common External Tariff, a loss of tariff revenues would ensue. In the short term, this
may have a negative impact on fiscal balances. In the longer term, as the economy
would adjust to the new competitive pressures the fiscal balance could nonetheless
improve on account of increased productivity and economic activity. Finally, the loss
of independence over trade policy may be politically difficult to accept for some of the
countries and particularly for Russia.
To conclude, the custom union option for ENP countries seems to be difficult to
realize in view of the significant institutional problems that it contain.
4.1.4. Partial Internal Market integration
The partial internal market integration involves measures to enhance labour
mobility and liberalisation in services trade.
4.1.4.1. Labour Mobility
The integration of labour markets is a difficult aspect of the economic integration
between the EU and ENP countries. In realistic terms, the issue of labour mobility
comes to the fore in connection with the liberalisation of services trade. Under GATS
rules15, one of the four recognised methods for the supply of services is the cross
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15 More on GATS rules can be found in section 5.2.
border movement of service suppliers which is denoted as the “supply mode no 4”. As
such, the liberalisation of trade in services should lead to some liberalisation
regarding the movement of labour. In fact, this is exactly the issue that Southern
Mediterranean countries are raising under the Euromed trade liberalisation agenda
(Hoekman, 2005). The quid pro quo for the lifting of protection in services by
Euromed countries is the easing of restrictions by the EU on the temporary movement
of Euromed service suppliers. Labour mobility can easily be incorporated in the
institutional models for services trade liberalisation mentioned in the previous
section. Already the existing templates such as the EEA, the ECT (Energy Charter
Treaty) or NAFTA incorporate provisions to that effect. EEA rules are arguably much
more ambitious and aim at the integration of labour markets. ECT rules are more
restrictive and focus on the temporary movement of workers. NAFTA rules also focus
on the temporary movement of business people but allow for more flexible
arrangement for this specific category of service suppliers. Annex 1 presents NAFTA
provisions related to labour mobility in more detail.
If ENP countries are to be gradually integrated in the European Single Market,
the question of the temporary movement of workers must be addressed within a more
appropriate framework. There are many constraints on the movement of naturalised
persons, most of which stem from the fact that there is no separation between
temporary and permanent labour movement. At present, the temporary movement of
labour comes under the purview of EU immigration legislation and labour market
policy rather than that of international trade. It should be possible to establish a
predictable, harmonised and transparent system with the overall objective of allowing
the necessary mobility of service providers on a temporary basis without
compromising immigration policy. 
4.1.4.2. Services trade liberalisation
As regards services trade two broad options are available. The first one, which we
shall denominate as the GATS option, rests on services trade liberalisation
characterised by the principles of non discrimination and national treatment. This
option does not require regulatory harmonisation16. The second model, which we
shall denominate as the EEA option, is based on regulatory harmonisation. It is
essentially the EU model and necessitates the adoption and implementation of the
internal market acquis. As discussed above, the EU in its external relations has
actually gone both ways. With EFTA countries, the services trade liberalisation was
conditioned on the adoption of the EU acquis. With Switzerland, services trade was
liberalised in one area (land transport) on the basis of the mutual recognition of
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16 Regulatory harmonisation refers to the adoption of the EU sectoral policies in the area of services by partner
countries.
legislation17, whereas in another area (civil aviation) the adoption of the EU acquis
became a requirement. Finally under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), a GATS-like
approach was adopted.
Services industries are in general more regulated than traditional industries.
Domestic regulations often act as a non tariff barrier to trade in services. The identification
of the most realistic path towards services trade liberalisation in the EU-ENP setting
should start with the identification of how regulatory differences will be addressed. 
The starting point would be to remark that different types of regulation may be
appropriate for partners at different levels of economic and institutional development
(Hoekman, 2005; Mueller-Jentsch, 2005). Secondly, the objective of regulatory
convergence should be the removal of non tariff barriers in services trade. Thirdly,
regulatory convergence should only be sought where its benefits outweigh the costs of
compliance. This is all the more important where the countries concerned suffer from
institutional deficiencies. Finally, regulatory convergence makes sense if the common
standards are in line with international best practice. Otherwise convergence will lead
to suboptimal policies. For the case of the ENP partner countries, the initial
hypothesis is that harmonisation with EU rules for its own sake should be avoided
(and this indeed has been recognised in the ENP construction). 
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17 Under mutual recognition, although there is no policy or regulatory harmonisation, the two parties agree to
lift mutual barriers to services trade based on the assumption that the level of regulatory oversight practiced
by each party is sufficient to protect the general interest.
Box 4.2. The Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Community Treaty
The Energy Charter Treaty is a multilateral institution which rests on the principle of the
adoption of a core set of rules by the parties. This set of rules comprise rules on trade, transit,
investment, movement of key personnel and dispute resolution within the field of energy. Of
the countries analyzed in this report, Ukraine has ratified the Treaty, Russia is a member of
the Energy Charter Conference but has not yet ratified the Treaty, Algeria and Morocco have
the observer status to the Energy Charter Conference, and Egypt is not involved. The ECT
does not require the adoption of EU rules but nonetheless goes further than simple free trade
agreements by incorporating specific elements of the four fundamental freedoms. It allows the
application of WTO rules in the energy sector in some aspiring WTO members. In addition it
introduces a novel dispute settlement mechanism for private-state disputes which contributes
to the protection of foreign investments in the energy sector. Finally it provides for a regional
forum for dialogue on energy policy.
The Energy Community Treaty for Southeast Europe is a very recent regional instrument
which covers the EU and nine countries or territories of South East Europe. The major difference
between the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Community Treaty stem, in addition to the
geographical coverage, from the approach to regulatory convergence. The Energy Charter Treaty
does not foresee any regulatory harmonisation while the Energy Community Treaty is based on
the adoption of the EU acquis in the field of energy by the partner countries.
As a result, the identification of the most realistic option for ENP countries will
necessitate a closer examination of the following parameters for each sector: 
• Is the adoption of the EU acquis necessary for the liberalisation of trade and
investments?
• What are the main regulatory barriers to cross border trade and investment?
• What alternative measures to enhance economic integration can be available? 
The suggestions concerning the usefulness of EU acquis and potential role of
alternative solutions are given in the sections 4.2 and 4.3. Estimates of future
conditions for service trade are in section 5.2.
4.1.5. Full Internal Market participation: the EEA option
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Table 4.2. Pros and cons of selected integration models for EU-ENP
Pros Cons
WTO
Increases transparency of trade
and investment policy; allows for
gradual elimination of residual
protection
Limited liberalisation in services;
limited ability to lift barriers to cross
border investments; weak anchor
for deep domestic reforms
EU FTAs
Liberalises manufacturing trade.
Regulatory convergence in some
key areas competition and IPR policy
Need for rules of origin. Potential
market integration remains limited
to manufacturing goods. Requires
accompanying web of regional FTAs
to prevent a hub and spoke structure
leading to trade and investment
diversion.
EU-Turkey
customs
union
Liberalises manufacturing trade,
allows for regulatory harmonisation
in key areas (trade, competition and
IPR policy); eliminates need for rules
of origin; concerns of trade diversion
Political asymmetry in decision
making; lack of coverage
of agricultural trade and trade
in services; no investment
liberalisation; high institutional
requirements
EU-
Switzerland
Partial market integration achieved by 
way of mutual recognition of legislation
Presumes a high level of mutual trust
ECT
Adoption of core set of rules on energy
trade, transit, investment, movement
of key personnel and dispute resolution;
increases transparency of energy
policies and opportunities for cross
border trade and investment;
No requirement for regulatory
harmonisation eliminates political
sustainability risk
Limited (one sector) coverage
EEA
Ensures participation in the EU's
Internal Market
Onerous regulatory harmonisation
requirements
The EEA option would allow ENP countries to achieve almost full internal market
integration. But the domestic requirements for adopting the EEA blueprint are very
high in terms of local institutional and regulatory capacity. The history of regulatory
and other reforms in the ENP countries and their level of institutional and regulatory
development suggest that full participation in the Internal Market is not really
realistic even in the much longer perspective. 
The following table recapitulates the advantages and shortcomings of alternative
models of economic integration reviewed in section 4.1.
4.2. Prospects for regulatory convergence in service sectors
Since full participation in the EU’s Single Market is precluded at this stage, the
identification of the most appropriate form of partial internal market integration will
necessitate a case by case analysis. The best and the most realistic model for integration
will depend on the characteristic of the sector in question and the progress achieved by
specific countries in terms of de-regulation and liberalisation. The rationale for choosing
between full regulatory harmonisation and some regulatory convergence would be
based on the assessment whether services trade in a specific sector can be liberalised
without full regulatory harmonisation. To the extent that full regulatory convergence is
not indispensable, alternative measures to enhance opportunities for cross border trade
and investment are to be identified. This study focuses on the tradable backbone services
defined as financial services, energy, transport and telecommunications18.
4.2.1. Financial services
The EU acquis in this sector are amongst the most developed and the most
meticulously detailed sections of the internal market acquis. They aims at the
regulatory oversight of a highly competitive and highly complex sector. In addition,
the EU acquis are also in the midst of change. The Financial Services Action Plan is
still being implemented. Finally the acquis rest on the single passport and home
country prudential control principles which necessitate a very high degree of mutual
trust in partner countries’ institutions.
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18 There is also substantial effort involved in harmonisation of technical standards that a country integrating with
the EU is expected to undertake. Harmonisation of technical standards relates mostly to trade in goods. As
the EU integration has shown, it has been gradually happening alongside liberalisation lowering tariffs for
good (on basis of FTAs). As this type of regulatory convergence is relatively better covered in the literature,
we restrict this section to opening up of sectors that are rather more challenging in terms of regulation.
It is worth recalling that unlike other service industries where a higher degree of
regulatory convergence is essentially needed to boost cross border trade, in financial
markets the onus will be on prudential regulation at the national level. An effective
domestic prudential regulation is a pre-requisite for cross border integration. There
will however be less need for regulatory convergence.
In view of the above, the most appropriate method for the integration of the
financial services is actually the path of domestic reforms. There does not seem to be
either the need or a sizeable benefit in the complete and quick adoption by the ENP
countries of the relevant acquis. On the contrary, the EU legislative framework may
in this instance be counter productive by straining the regulatory capacity as well as
by focusing regulatory oversight out of the most important spheres.
The timing and the sequencing of the introduction of foreign competition and the
strengthening of the capacity of banking supervision is, however, critical. A sound
regulatory framework is indispensable before the introduction of a full fledged
competition. Therefore, properly designed regulatory reform and the introduction of
competition is of crucial importance here.
Possible institutional models to enhance integration
We believe for all those reasons that the EU acquis may not be the most relevant
template for the ENP countries. Developing countries would need a different
regulatory framework than one designed for developed countries (Hoekman, 2005;
Mueller-Jenstch, 2005). A case in point is the observation that the EU acquis contain
very detailed rules about securities market legislation while the need for ENP
countries lie elsewhere, essentially in the development of an appropriate regulatory
framework for the banking and insurance sectors which are obviously at a different
level of development. Similarly the onset of Basel II is also a case in point. The risk
evaluation and control approach reflected in Basel II has been tailored in
accordance with the needs of highly sophisticated financial markets. In contrast, if
there is to be regulatory convergence for ENP countries, the needs of those
countries would better be served by an approximation of legislation where the
target would be the soon to be replaced Basel I regulations. 
The role of foreign direct investment in the banking sector is also of key
importance as demonstrated by the experience of the new EU member states. The
inflow of FDI in the banking sector and the acquisition of domestic banks by
international banks would contribute to the improvement of prudential security and
the introduction of modern banking practices (outlook for financial services in the
ENP countries for the next few years can be found in section 5.2).
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4.2.2. Energy
The energy sector in ENP countries is still largely organised according to the
traditional model. Utility companies remain state owned and vertically integrated.
With the exception of Egypt, independent regulatory authorities are lacking and tariff
policies are determined by the executive bodies where energy price subsidies are used
as an industrial policy tool. In short, the situation is comparable to the pre-
liberalisation situation in EU countries. As such, the EU acquis would provide a
valuable reference point for the policy reform process in the energy sector of ENP
countries. However, given the difficulties in achieving regulatory convergence, the
optimal path in the medium term should be that of domestic reforms.
As to the prospects of cross border integration and an eventual participation in the
Internal Market, it needs to be pointed out that unlike many other services sectors, the
energy sector and particularly the electricity sector require a physical infrastructure to link
the trading regions. This is indispensable for cross border trade. There are several
interconnection projects completed in recent years but the capacity of many
interconnections is still low. Capacity expansions should therefore be planned (Mueller-
Jentsch, 2005). Furthermore, the increasing need for interconnection brings to the fore the
question of the technical compatibility of systems as well as regulatory convergence issues.
Possible institutional models to enhance integration
There are already two multilateral19 and one bilateral instrument in this area
(Energy Charter Treaty, Energy Community Treaty20, Energy Dialogue). The
Energy Charter Treaty aims to accomplish some if not most of the above mentioned
tasks. Therefore, the primary aim for the ENP countries should be to fully
participate in the ECT. In the medium term, ENP countries that are members of
the Energy Charter Treaty could “graduate” to the Energy Community Treaty
which requires a more ambitious approach in terms of regulatory convergence.
The ensuing domestic reforms would then pave the way for a smoother path
towards integration with the Single Market. In the longer term, we believe that EU
rules could provide a basis for the integration of energy markets. Cross border
integration can provide a valuable support to domestic liberalisation as illustrated
by the EU experience. Private investors are more willing to invest in larger markets
especially if investor protection schemes have been made available through the
regional institutional setups mentioned here. In addition, the enlargement of the
potential market facilitates the implementation of measures such as the
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19 The term plurilateral is used to describe regional institutions as opposed to the term multilateral which denotes
global institutions.
20 See box 4.2 on Energy Charter Treaty and Energy Community Treaty.
introduction of competition and the unbundling of the activities. Otherwise the
small market size acts in many ways as an obstacle. 
The case of Russia merits a special mention in view of the importance of this
country as an energy provider. Russia has so far been very reticent to get fully
involved in the Energy Charter Treaty. The limitations that full membership of the
Energy Charter Treaty would impose on Russian energy policy have so far been
considered too high price to pay. Therefore in the short and medium term, the EU-
Russia relationship on energy matters is likely to be pursued under the
institutionalised Energy Dialogue between the two parties (A more detailed analysis
of this situation is provided in chapter 6).
4.2.3. Transport
We believe that in the area of air transport, the adoption of the EU acquis for
further trade integration seems to be indispensable for two reasons. Firstly, the
liberalisation of air traffic requires an overhaul of the existing structure of agreements
between the ENP countries and the EU. The present system is based on bilateral air
service agreements (ASA) between governments. These ASAs regulate market access
on cross border routes according to the Chicago Convention of 1944. The EU system
calls for abolition of the ASAs for internal trade. That is how an internal market can
be created. Secondly, unless this option is implemented, there is very little scope in
extending free trade essentially because in an area where security concerns are of
essence, regulatory harmonisation seems to be indispensable for the enjoyment of full
liberties in air travel. Therefore the liberalisation of trade in air transport between the
EU and the ENP countries can be based on the Swiss-EU bilateral agreement model
where the trading parties take on the EU acquis. 
It can be maintained, however, that full regulatory convergence would not be
needed for sea transport. The main structural deficiencies can be remedied by
domestic reforms that would concentrate on eliminating the inefficiencies in port
management (more on this in section 5.2). 
Possible institutional models to enhance integration
Given the importance of the adoption of the EU acquis, the EU-Swiss bilateral
agreement can be suggested as a model for the ENP countries in air transport. In
this respect, it is worth pointing out that the European Commission is slated to
start new negotiations with Balkan countries, which are not yet candidates, for
open sky agreements that require acquis compliance. This would imply the
conclusion of a sectoral agreement covering regulatory principles as well as air
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traffic liberalisation21. A regional multilateral option would be the establishment of
a common transport area based on the adoption of EU rules for air transport and
the identification of a core set of common rules for other transport services. At
least one of these options is necessary for the granting of cabotage rights as well as
rights to fly domestic routes to EU companies (outlook for the transport sector in
the EU Neighbourhood for the next few years can be found in section 5.2).
4.2.4. Telecommunication
In telecommunications, full policy harmonisation is not really needed for the
enhancement of cross border trade and investment. The establishment of a market
friendly domestic regulatory framework aiming at the introduction and protection of
full and fair competition and the presence of an independent regulator to oversee
sectoral developments are arguably more important. Therefore the institutional
framework for integration between the EU and ENP countries in this sector should
not necessarily imply full regulatory harmonisation. Domestic reforms could
nonetheless take into consideration the early experience of the EU Member States and
the EU policies of the early 1990s which were designed to address the essential
question of the introduction of competition in hitherto state dominated markets. It
should also be pointed out that, just like in financial services, openness to FDI is the
best fast track method for securing a competitive telecommunication market. One key
condition is that the entry for competitors is not protected.
Possible institutional models to enhance integration
Unlike in other sectors, in telecommunication the GATS framework provides a
suitable institutional basis for the advancement of economic integration between the
EU and the Southern Mediterranean ENP countries. The reason is that there exists a
separate agreement covering the telecommunication sector under the GATS which
allowed for a more ambitious liberalisation outcome. This Basic Agreement on
Telecommunications is moreover complemented by a “Reference Paper” which was
the first instance where multilateral disciplines included explicit provisions on
domestic regulatory principles. Therefore the Basic Agreement and the Reference
Paper constitute a suitable and stronger policy anchoring framework when compared
to other sectors covered by GATS. Therefore, the improvement of the ENP countries’
commitments such as the lifting of monopoly rights in fixed line telephony under the
Basic Agreement should be sought.
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21 It is known that Morocco has expressed interest in the “open sky” agreement.
4.3. Deeper integration options between ENP countries and the EU
4.3.1. Strengthened bilateralism
An assessment of the institutional requirements for deeper integration between
ENP countries and the EU should start with an evaluation of the prevailing ENP
strategy. As discussed in chapter 3 and section 4.1, the currently pursued economic
integration strategy rests on the implementation of the free trade agreements with
Mediterranean ENP countries and the PCAs with Russia and Ukraine. The analysis
carried out in chapter 5 shows that the enlargement of the scope of the FTAs would
bring about considerable benefits for ENP countries. In particular, the gradual
incorporation of agriculture and the services sectors should be targeted. In addition
to these measures which will focus on liberalisation of trade, accompanying measures
to address impediments to market integration and to eliminate non tariff barriers to
trade and cross border investments should also be considered. 
The approach will necessarily be multi-speed, depending on the progress in
domestic reforms. The question is whether this approach, that can be called
“strengthened bilateralism”, can be strong, credible and effective enough to enable
implementation of necessary domestic reforms given the nexus between the external
institutional setup and domestic structures. The difficulty in this regard is the political
feasibility of domestic reforms; namely whether reforms can actually be implemented
and consolidated under current conditions. Given the remaining challenges in ENP
countries in terms of market liberalisation, as illustrated in the preceding section, the
feasibility of domestic reforms remains an open issue. What transpires from the
analysis of the previous section is that the majority of domestic political dynamics of
these countries did not, in the past, create the right conditions for market
liberalisation measures. This is where an external anchor might be needed to ensure
a more consistent progress towards economic integration.
The following suggestions can be made to enhance the ability of the bilateral ENP
approach to act as a more effective anchor for domestic reforms in ENP countries:
a) Stronger conditionality. The EU could contemplate stronger use of conditionality in
carrying the ENP. This could specifically refer to financial support provided under
ENPI. The disbursement of funds can be more closely linked to the achievement of
ENP countries of specific milestones or benchmarks to be determined and specified
in advance. The evolving nature of the action plans can be particularly helpful.
Periodic reviews can provide the opportunity to assess both the implementation and
the overall adequacy of the measures.
This proposal is clearly not without problems. One issue linked to the transposition
of the conditionality approach to the ENP strategy is the difficulty of actually
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implementing the conditionality from the donor’s (EU) side. It all looks good while
there is progress on the ground but if and when reforms stall, the decision to suspend
aid becomes nonetheless very controversial. Given the possibly remaining
differences in national foreign policy objectives among Member States with regard
to ENP countries, difficulties may arise in building a consensus among Member
States for this politically sensitive decision. The second difficulty related to increased
conditionality is the “image” problem that this linkage may trigger. An overt
“conditionality” will, no matter how noble the goal is, come to be resented by the
ENP domestic constituencies. A case in point is the image of the IMF in developing
countries. This is where the political shortcoming of the bilateral approach with its
lack of a common political vision or goal acquires significance. Conditionality works
better, as illustrated perfectly by enlargement strategy, if there is a common political
goal embraced by the domestic public opinion as well. To conclude, we believe that
the incorporation of a strengthened conditionality component in the ENP could at
least merit an in-depth analysis which would look at the potential gains but also take
into consideration all the mentioned potential difficulties.
b) Motivating competition between ENP countries. The logic behind “conditionality”
element is that best reformers among ENP countries receive additional incentives.
ENPI would therefore be structured so as to have a regional component which
would influence national allocations on the basis of specific benchmarks set to
determine the pace and effectiveness of domestic reforms. This approach would
aim to transpose the impressive results obtained in the accession process from
generating competition between the candidate countries.
c) Reliance on existing institutions. The above propositions would be based on existing
EU institutions, with a governance facility within the future ENPI.
4.3.2. “EEA Light“
Economic integration movements do not happen in a political vacuum. A sense of a
common political vision is generally needed for more ambitious forms of economic
integration. As an alternative to the “strengthened bilateralism” approach and with a
view to improve the political attractiveness of the ENP, a multilateral institutional
approach can be contemplated. The effectiveness of the ENP in terms of constituting a
credible external anchor for domestic reforms would thus be improved, especially if
“conditionality” is to acquire a more visible dimension. This instrument would supply
the relevant actors with a sense of political common goals, which may be necessary to
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avoid discouragement on the difficult road to closer economic integration. The lack of a
genuine political partnership could potentially lead to a loss of momentum of the whole
ENP process when the initial era of easy economic reforms in ENP countries comes to
an end and political leaders are faced with far more difficult and sensitive choices. 
We believe that a combination of the institutional aspects of the EEA and of the
Energy Charter Treaty to create an “EEA Light” can be envisaged. The extension of the
scope of the EEA – coverage of services and market integration measures as well as
agricultural trade liberalisation – can be accompanied by the institutional structure of
the Energy Charter Treaty22. For sectoral policies, unlike in the EEA and in the Energy
Community Treaty, there would not be any automatic requirement for full regulatory
harmonisation. The degree of regulatory harmonisation would be decided on a case by
case basis in view of the characteristics of each sector. For instance, full regulatory
harmonisation could be targeted for air transport. On the other hand, the adoption of a
common set of rules introducing the national treatment principle for intra regional
operators, opening the market to intra regional competition, protecting cross border
investments and eliminating all discriminatory practices could provide the basis for
market integration in such areas as telecommunication and energy. These rules can be
augmented if needed by additional sectoral provisions. That would be the case for
instance for financial services where common rules for prudential supervision can also
be envisaged. The establishment of a regional political institution (an “ENP Council”) to
oversee economic integration would also alleviate concerns about policy dependence
and therefore provide a sound political basis for further economic integration.
4.4. Conclusions
To conclude, the fostering of economic integration between the EU and ENP
countries requires a more creative institutional setup. This chapter identified possible
options. The key points are threefold:
• WTO membership. A first step for Russia, Ukraine and Algeria. 
• Strengthened bilateralism. The scope of the FTAs should be enlarged to include
additional trade and market integration measures. In particular, the gradual
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22 The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is not generally seen as a success story. That is essentially due to the failure
of the ECT’s overarching political goal of tying Russia to WTO disciplines in energy. But the institutional
structure of the ECT provides an interesting blueprint for the ENP. It goes beyond WTO commitments by
introducing new disciplines such as competition rules, private-state dispute settlement for investment
disputes, increased flexibility for the movement of key personnel etc. In addition it creates a political platform
for policy dialogue. It shies away from creating a policy taker/follower framework, a characteristic of the EEA
which stipulates the adoption of the EU acquis. As such, the ECT model creates a politically more acceptable
framework for ENP countries. Unlike the EEA however, it has a mono-sectoral ambit.
incorporation of the services sectors and agriculture is essential. Furthermore,
the institutional structure of ENPI should be reviewed with a view to strengthen
the principles of conditionality and inter ENP competition.
• “EEA Light”. Alternatively, the creation of a new plurilateral instrument
combining the coverage of the EEA (plus agriculture) and the institutional setup
of the Energy Charter Treaty can be envisaged. The need for harmonisation
would be lower than in the current EEA. This would help to foster the political
dimension of the ENP which stands out as the main shortcoming of the bilateral
approach. However, it does not seem to be a possible near-term solution.
Future deeper integration options going beyond WTO agreements are depicted on
Figure 4.1 below.
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Source: Own elaboration.
Figure 4.1 Future deeper integration options between the EU and Neighbouring countries
Feasible Long-term
Strengthened bilateralism
=
Stronger conditionality
Motivating competition
between ENP partner states
“EEA Light”
=
Less regulatory
harmonisation than
in the EEA
Politically and economically
attractive for the ENP
partners
5.1. Trade in goods – assessment of selected integration modes
• The coverage and specific features of agreements such as FTAs are extremely
important for their impact on partners – they can be decisive for whether any
particular FTA brings benefits to ENP countries or is actually harmful.
• The existing FTAs usually fall short of truly liberalising trade but cover many
aspects beyond tariff barriers. The first feature is unfortunate. Protection of
agriculture and service markets significantly limits the economic relevance of
FTAs for partner countries. The second feature has a large, yet somewhat
unexplored, potential to promote gains to both sides – for instance by
stimulating reform effort and promote competition at domestic markets. 
• WTO accession by countries that are not yet members will not have substantial
direct economic impact on bilateral trade. Its crucial importance – for Algeria,
Russia and Ukraine and the EU rests in that it will ensure stability and
predictability for FDI (also in the services sector) and will enable further steps
in liberalisation of economic relations.
• Implementation of the partial EU-Morocco FTA is supposed to bring the highest
gains from all the scheduled EU FTAs.
• Fully functional trade liberalisation would result in significant boost to trade
between the EU and ENP countries, particularly Ukraine, Algeria and Egypt.
These gains are not necessarily conditional on adoption of the EU acquis.
This section discusses evidence on the consequences of various trade integration
models. The impact on both the EU and ENP countries is analysed.
5.1.1. The importance of coverage of trade agreements
While discussing the expected effects from any form of trade integration, such as
an FTA one needs to take into account the difference between an ideal version of it
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5. Effects of economic integration
(full liberalisation) and the much more common versions where only some sectors
(e.g. manufacturing goods) are covered. The difference between the two scenarios can
be substantial, and in particular the coverage of an FTA can be decisive for it being
advantageous or disadvantageous for less developed EU partners.
Generally speaking, for a country possessing comparative advantage in food and
agricultural production, typical EU FTA covering trade in manufacturing goods may fall
short of creating free trade. The exchange of food and agricultural products remains
highly restricted, with the very complex system of concessions and tariff and non-tariff
barriers in place in the EU. EU partner countries, in turn, typically also set up rather
substantial protection in agriculture, often higher than that of the EU23, to counteract
the subsidisation of food production in the European Union. In this way, potentially
most profitable exchange for both parties remains shielded from international trade.
Moreover, often the exchange of labour intensive commodities is nearly through all the
transitional period when the FTA is implemented (10 years or more) bounded by quotas
or other restrictive measures. This is to say, that producers of labour intensive
commodities from the ENP countries (in which the region also possesses comparative
advantage vis-a-vis the EU) can wait as long as 10 years to get an access to the EU
market. This is another potentially most beneficial area, where gains from trade for both
parties are being eroded over time due to remaining restrictions.
However, an important positive side of FTAs signed by the EU, is that they typically
include a number of provisions (e.g. related to capital flows, standards, political
dialogue, etc.) that could lower non-tariff barriers to trade, as discussed in section 4.1.
Provided that the whole liberalisation program is attractive and strict but realistic
timetable is set, such wider in scope FTAs could bring substantial gains. Namely they
can support reforms in less developed EU partner countries, similarly as they did in
the case of current new Eastern European member states. The last EU enlargement
has shown that wholesale adoption of modern European governance rules and
standards can bring gains (and costs) in excess of benefits from pure external
liberalisation. For example, it can overcome such deficiencies as monopolised
markets and corrupted administration found in much of the EU’s post-communist and
Arab Mediterranean neighbourhood.
5.1.2. WTO accession, FTA formation, domestic liberalisation – empirical results
This section reviews some of the recent empirical literature looking at the impact
of particular trade liberalisation measures involving the countries covered in this
study. While such estimates are necessarily subject to wide error margins they are
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23 See Table 5.2.
important to understand the magnitude of effects and to make comparisons between
likely consequences of particular forms of trade integration24.
The estimates gathered here were obtained as results of simulations within
general computable equilibrium models (CGE). These tools allow for modelling of
producers and consumers behaviour, take into account the underlying structure of
production of trading partners, and allow for estimating effects on production,
income, employment and trade flows in the short and longer run. The elimination of
tariffs (or export taxes or non-tariff barriers) works through the change of import and
export prices, and has an effect on domestic prices, which in turn impact demand and
production. Here, we focus mainly on welfare effects.
Effects for the EU
Elimination of barriers to trade in industrial goods would open new markets
for EU manufacturers and at the same time expose them to new competition.
Existing studies suggest that overall direct effects of these processes on EU would
be positive, albeit very small (see table 5.1)25. In the longer term, initially small
positive effects can be enhanced by better direct investment opportunities in the
European Neighbourhood. Precisely for this reason trade-related provisions of the
FTAs or even obligations connected with WTO entry of Algeria, Russia and
Ukraine are very important from the EU perspective. On top of this, labour costs
differences between the EU and its Neighbourhood will stay large, and domestic
demand in the ENP states will continue growing. These two features will improve
long-term investment prospects.
Effects for the Neighbouring countries
The magnitude of effects for the ENP partners will be more pronounced. The entry
of Russia into WTO is estimated to be domestically welfare improving on the back of
lower import tariffs and also through phasing out of non-tariff barriers and easier
dispute settlements.
The implementation of a the typical EU “partial” FTAs will lead to important
welfare gains for countries such as Morocco that has large proportion of trade with
the EU, and is expected to realise productivity gains in labour-intensive sectors such
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24 Here, we ignore the benefits arising from deep integration.
25 If any shrinkage of the EU production can be expected, this will most likely occur in the labour-intensive
sectors such as textile production, as predicted by the model of Augier and Gasiorek (2001). However, given
the fact that they modelled simultaneously integration between the EU and the whole Mediterranean
(including Turkey, Cyprus and Malta among others), and some of which already happened, it is reasonable
to expect that the effect of FTAs analysed here on the EU production levels will be small (as predicted by
Francois et al, 2005)). Overall effect is expected to be welfare improving, due to improved consumer welfare
and other industries-effect.
as textiles or chemicals very quickly, once the access to the EU market is given. Thus,
even a partial EU-Morocco FTA can be significantly welfare improving.
FTA between the EU and Egypt envisages on Egyptian side faster elimination of
tariffs on capital goods and intermediates, that were initially less protected anyway, and
much more gradual removal of protection of domestic production of consumer goods. On
the back of this provisions, Francois et al (2005) got the result that Egyptian domestic
price distortions during the transitory period can lead to inadequate preparations to the
competition with the EU producers once FTA is implemented (2018). As a result, partial
FTA can be welfare reducing for Egypt (while negligible for the EU), and lead to
manufacturing plant closures. It seems that under current provisions, only the full FTA,
covering also agricultural trade, can increase domestic welfare.
Finally, the simulations of future EU-Russia (together with EU-Ukraine) FTA lead
to the conclusion that welfare gains under the typical “partial” FTA are not certain,
however even the partial FTA can lead to increased domestic production in Russia.
Similar effect should be expected for Ukraine. However, full FTA could be more
beneficial not only to Russia or Ukraine, but could be also of some importance for the
EU. For Russia, removal of industrial and agricultural tariffs coupled with
liberalisation of services would bring incentives to regulatory reforms, and boost
agricultural and services trade.
Longer-term concerns
Looking more into the future, liberalisation of trade with ENP countries that are
characterised by substantially lower wage costs will facilitate sectoral changes in the
EU, with relative losses for labour-intensive sectors. However, this process should be
treated as a natural long-term consequence of globalisation. In particular,
competition from the side of Asian manufacturers seems to be of much higher
importance than evolution of trade relations with ENP countries. 
Another important issue is liberalisation of agricultural trade. While this issue is
not covered in detail in this report, as political considerations (primarily linked to the
functioning of CAP) make substantial progress in this sphere unlikely over the next
few years, one should remember that the impact of measures liberalising trade in
agricultural products could be quite pronounced, particularly for ENP countries.
Conforti and Velazques (2003), for instance, estimate that 45% reduction of EU export
subsidies would boost agricultural supply of Mediterranean countries across all
categories of agricultural products26. On average, Mediterranean ENP countries
welfare gain from extending FTA to agricultural products could be in the range of
0.5% of GDP, a similar magnitude to services liberalisation (IARC, 2005). 
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26 Yet, the same paper shows that full liberalisation, while boosting output of some agricultural products even
further, can cause lower production of some others.
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Notes: table contains references to static welfare gains
* – slightly different approach; partial equilibrium analysis
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 5.1. Welfare gains from liberalisation of trade – selection of empirical results
Country (study)
Gains for the EU
(% change of national income)
Gains for ENP countries
(% change of national income)
Notes
WTO accession
Russia
(Rutheford et al,
2005, Jensen
et al 2004)
n/a 3.3-3.4%
Russia
(Manchin, 2004)
Negligible welfare change
and marginal decrease
in production
(very close to 0)
High welfare improvement
and increased production
Welfare change for the
EU greater if coupled
with gas prices
increases for Russian
domestic users
Former Soviet
Union
(Vinhas de Souza,
2004)
Welfare improving for EU15,
welfare reducing for some
new member states and 0%
change in production
Marginally welfare reducing
and no change in production
Ukraine*
(Eremenko
and Lisenkova,
2004)
n/a
Welfare gain of 1.1% of GDP
from bringing the steel
production to WTO rules
– elimination of subsidies
and opening for external markets
EU-ENP Free Trade Agreements
Algeria, Egypt,
Morocco
(IARC, 2005)
Net consumer welfare gain
of 0.2% of GDP from free
trade in industrial goods;
Potentially important
long-term gains in services
(investment effects);
Negative social impact from
agricultural liberalisation
Welfare gain of 0.8% on average.
Services and agricultural
liberalisation could add 0.5%
of GDP, each
The numbers
are averages
from a number
of other studies
Egypt
(Francois et al,
2005)
No change in welfare
and production
(0.1% with full FTA)
-1.1%
(0.5% with full FTA)
Comparing actual FTA
with full trade
liberalisation
Egypt
(Augier, Gasiorek,
2001)
welfare: 0.75% 
manufacturing production:
-10.07%
Morocco
(Augier, Gasiorek,
2001)
welfare: 0.04% 
manufacturing production:
-1.43% welfare: 13.5% 
manufacturing production:
97.6%
Actual FTAs happening
simultaneously
(liberalisation of tariffs,
some harmonisation,
lowering domestic
distortions – allowing
for productivity
improvement
in the ENP countries)
Russia (Manchin,
2004)
Marginal fall in welfare
and marginal increase
in manufacturing production
(slightly welfare improving
with full FTA)
Negligible fall in welfare
and increase in production
(but highly welfare improving
under full FTA)
Typical EU FTA
Former Soviet
Union
(Vinhas de Souza,
2004)
Welfare improving and negligi
ble
increase in production
Welfare improving and 0.2%
increase in production
Ukraine (Emerson
et al 2006)
negligible
4-7% welfare gain through
lowering of non-tariff
barriers to trade
“deep” FTA
Trade openness and tariff rates
The empirical results of CGE models should be treated with caution due to various
limitations inherent to the modelling approaches and data availability. The results
reported above can be supplemented with the simple, straightforward evaluation of
estimated gains from regional trade integration. In general, the integration of the
neighbouring countries with the EU will be productivity-increasing if:
• tariffs in the Neighbourhood for the third parties are low, limiting the possibility
of trade diversion (buying higher-cost production from the EU, instead of lower-
cost production from a third party, with a loss for domestic consumers);
• high percentage of trade is being carried out with the EU, increasing probability
of trade creation (shift from the consumption of higher-priced domestic
production to cheaper imports);
• trade is initially a small share of national production.
The summary data gathered in Table 5.2 confirm the results obtained in the CGE
models. FTA between the EU and Morocco seems to be the most welfare improving.
The EU is a “natural” trading partner for Morocco, and high Moroccan tariff
protection calls for its lowering. FTAs to be concluded with Russia and Ukraine have
the potential to bring important productivity gains, especially for Ukraine, given its
smaller size. In case of Ukraine, there is almost no risk of trade diversion, as the
country has concluded FTAs with its other important partners from the CIS block. In
fact, tariffs weighted by all industrial imports in Ukraine27 are half the size of the MFN
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27 Weighted by imports: a) qualifying and b) non-qualifying for MFN treatment.
Note: * – simple average rates
Source: WTO trade statistics, WTO Trade Policy Reviews (Egypt, Morocco), WB (2005c; Ukraine), Tarr et al
(2005; Russia).
Table 5.2. Trade openness and tariff rates
Algeria Egypt Morocco Russia Ukraine EU
share of trade in GDP 60% 42% 71% 59% 112% -
share of trade with
the EU25 (2004)
54% 30% 62% 42% 33% -
year 2003 2005 2002 2003 2002 2004
total trade 18.7* 20* 33.4*     14.5 9.7 -
agricultural
products 23* 66.4* 53.2*     16.0 37.6 16.6
import
-weighted
MFN
tariff
rates non-agricultural
goods 18.1* 12.8* 30.1* - 5.9 3.7
probable effects of FTA
with the EU
probably
positive,
after
tariff
cuts
risk of trade
diversion
if third
party
protection
stays high
positive
probably
positive
probably
positive
-
rates (World Bank, 2005c), signalling very low protection towards third countries
(CIS). Removing the remaining restrictions on imports of final goods from the EU
would stimulate stronger competition on the Ukrainian market.
Perhaps it is too early to estimate welfare gains from the EU-Algeria FTA, but given
the current trade shares and high protection, it may easily be welfare improving,
provided that the FTA locks in necessary reforms and that Algeria lowers its overall
import protection before FTA enters into force. The risk of trade diversion exists in the
case of Egypt, unless the country lowers trade barriers towards third-countries.
5.1.3. Reduction of import duties – fiscal impact on ENP countries
Reduction of import tariffs will normally lead to a decrease in government revenues,
at least in the short run. The negative impact on the fiscal stance will be more important
for countries where tariff revenues represent a non-trivial part of government revenues.
Among analysed countries total tariff revenues amounted to around 1% in Ukraine and
Russia, between 2 and 3 % of GDP in Morocco and Algeria but close to 5% in Egypt.
Given that integration with the EU will lower import duties only on imports from the
EU and that the process normally takes several years (such as in the case of the EU-
Egypt FTA) one should not expect direct fiscal effects of foregone revenue from import
duties to be particularly important in the debate. Moreover, increased economic activity
and tax reforms that are likely to be triggered by an EU-ENP FTA can result in higher
tax collection, mitigating the effect of lower tariffs revenues.
5.1.4. Potential imports from ENP countries
In this section we provide some quantitative estimates of the potential for trade
between the EU and ENP countries. These estimates are based on the gravity trade
model where the potential intensity of trade is determined by the respective economic
size of partners and the distance between them28. In other words, the approach allows
estimating the amount of bilateral trade that would happen under “normal” trading
conditions29, as opposed to the current situation when trade is heavily distorted by
high tariffs and non-tariff barriers.
The approach presented in this part is complementary with the outcomes from
computable general equilibrium models presented earlier. For example it does not
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28 The gravity approach to foreign trade was pioneered by Jan Tinbergen, Dutch economist, winner of the first
Nobel prize in economics (Tinbergen, 1962). It has since gained popularity thanks to its empirical and
theoretical appeal.
29 Such as among highly developed economies.
take into account the effects on other (non-EU) trade partners of ENP countries, does
not explicitly model behaviour of economic agents, and the focus is exclusively on
trade flows. Still, it is interesting to compare the magnitude and direction of effects
using different methodology.
Concerning ENP countries, the latest gravity analysis has been carried by Peridy
(2005). He carries out a traditional gravity equation estimation based on two different
scenarios. The first scenario assumes liberalisation and the adoption of the EU acquis
by the ENP countries. The second scenario is limited to trade liberalisation. Export
potential is defined as the difference between estimated exports and actual exports as
a percentage of estimated exports. The results are summarised in Table 5.3. 
Among the countries covered in our study, Ukraine followed by Egypt and Algeria
stand to benefit most from trade liberalisation30. The results suggest that Moroccan
and Russian exports to the EU are already not too far from the potential. This may be
due to the fact that Morocco has benefited from preferential access to EU markets
since 1960s and Russian exports are dominated by products (hydrocarbons), where
the EU does not protect its market. One other significant result of this estimation is
that the difference in potential trade under the two scenarios is not as large as one
would tend to think. This may be due to the fact that other barriers to trade, such as
distance tend to dominate the effects of legislative adaptation. This implies that even
without adopting the acquis, ENP countries may capture gains from increased trade
with the EU, provided they can liberalise their trade regimes. By the same token, the
EU could ensure similar gains provided it eases access to its markets and motivates
ENP countries to carry domestic liberalisation policies.
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30 Tochitskaya and Vinhas de Souza (2005) come to similar results for Ukraine, which they find to “under-trade”
with the EU, using the same methodological approach.
Source: Peridy (2005).
Table 5.3. ENP export potential to EU15
Actual exports to EU 15
Potential gain in exports
to the EU15 (%)
Potential gain in exports
to the EU15 (%)
million USD (2003) with EU acquis without EU acquis
Russia 48038 14.2 4.7
Ukraine 3314 37.1 30.2
Algeria 13483 24.4 18.1
Morocco 6153 7.6 12.1
Egypt 2977 27.8 24.2
5.2. Trade in services
• Liberalisation of trade in services means fewer restrictions on movement of
people and capital as well as freedom of establishment. Although supposed to
bring beneficial effects to both sides, it is likely to be objected by interest groups
and has already proved to be difficult to achieve even among highly developed
and integrated economies.
• Current pattern of trade in services between the EU and ENP partner countries
is typical for trade with less-developed regions. The EU is a net buyer of services
to which market access in ENP economies is restricted, absorbs skilled
professionals from neighbouring states and sells more high-tech and capital
intensive services.
• Mutual commitments have been made in action plans or relevant documents
regarding development of service sector in ENP economies. Besides, in some of
the ENP countries governments have embarked on domestic reforms to increase
efficiency and competition. Some other policies were announced. They will most
likely affect EU-ENP countries trade in services, although the impact will vary
by country and by service market.
5.2.1. Full liberalisation of trade in services: freedom of movement
and establishment
Freedom of movement of services within the internal market (“some parts” of
which are to be offered the ENP countries) means freedom to provide services and
freedom of establishment. For the ENP countries it would mean that based on the
principle of reciprocity, selling specific services would not be restricted neither in the
EU nor in an ENP economy. Similarly, neither an ENP country nor the EU should
restrict the establishment of a company or a subsidiary with respect to the nationality
of owners or providers of services.
5.2.2. Effects of liberalisation are likely to be positive for both parties
There are numerous positive effects of liberalisation of trade in services. It is
estimated that welfare gains within the EU15 from creating fully functioning internal
market for services would range from additional 0.3% to 1.8% of GDP growth and up
to 2.5 million new jobs, stemming mainly from higher productivity and price
convergence towards the best performers (Vogt, 2005). While the effects of a partial
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liberalisation of trade in services with the ENP countries31, with some restrictions
especially regarding employment of workers from the ENP, would be positive, they
are likely to be marginal for the EU.
Given the small size of the service sectors in the ENP countries (see table 2.2 in
chapter 2) and their relative technological and managerial gap vis-à-vis the EU, it is
expected that welfare gains from the liberalisation of trade in services would be
important for them. One OECD study underlines that welfare gains from the
liberalisation of trade in services for less developed countries are likely to be positive
and much higher than the effects of liberalizing trade in goods (OECD, 2005a).
Additionally, liberalisation of some services trade (like transport, financial and
insurance services etc.) can support FDI inflows, which are badly needed in these
economies and can provide interesting business opportunities for the EU companies.
5.2.3. But: liberalisation of trade in services is difficult to achieve even within
the EU15
Irrespective of estimated likely gains from free trade in services, even the EU15
has not yet managed to establish
fully functioning internal services
market. There are still large barriers
to trade among the old EU
countries, and the most important
are: monopolies restricting the entry
of foreign providers (as in postal
services, energy utilities,
distribution networks), quantitative
restrictions (on number of service
points per geographical area,
quotas), territorial and residency
restrictions, rules designed to
ensure independence or autonomy,
professional regulations, company
tax regimes, price regulations,
restrictions on opening bank
accounts, accounting rules,
payment and reimbursement of
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31 The perspective of full liberalization of trade in services between the EU and the ENP partners lies beyond the
scope of this report (see preceding chapter for details).
Box 5.1. GATS
The GATS is the first and only set of
multilateral rules and commitments within the
WTO covering government measures which affect
trade in services. It has two parts – the framework
agreement containing the rules, and the national
schedules of commitments in which each member
specifies the degree of access it is prepared to
guarantee for foreign service suppliers.
• The GATS covers all services except
government services and air traffic rights.
• Negotiations on GATS are viewed as relatively
easy, because of the significant degree of
flexibility. Each member's government
determines the level of obligations a country
will assume.
• Developing countries are expected to liberalise
fewer sectors and types of transactions, in line
with their development situation.
Source: WTO.
VAT, etc. Transport, followed by retail trade and telecommunication are the most
regulated sectors in the EU15 (Vogt, 2005).
Barriers in services trade between the old and new EU members are even greater.
Therefore, the possibility of significant liberalisation of trade in services between the
EU and the considered five ENP economies during the next five years are not very
realistic, but limited progress in certain services is possible and should be sought. For
the majority of the considered countries, the likely threshold possible to attain within
the five years time are the provisions negotiated under the GATS. For Algeria, Ukraine
and Russia that are not yet WTO members even binding future commitments will be
an important step forward in liberalising trade in services.
5.2.4. What liberalisation of trade in services means in case of ENP countries
The concept of provision of services across national borders is very broad. The
whole “services trade” groups together services that require or do not require
presence abroad, and this presence may mean either presence of natural persons or
commercial presence or both (see box 5.2).
Depending on the type of service, trade barriers may be of different character. For
example, if commercial presence abroad is not required, and the sale of services
abroad is executed by phone, internet, fax etc., the most likely obstacles to trade is
services are business regulations in a provider’s country. Similarly, if the presence of
natural persons is required abroad in order to provide specific type of service, the most
likely barriers may arise from visa regimes and employment regulations in host
countries. When commercial presence abroad is needed, then host country regulations
regarding the establishment of a
business and its activity will play an
important role.
The current extent of trade in
services between the considered
economies and the EU is not
significant. Taken together Algerian,
Egyptian, Moroccan, Russian and
Ukraine – EU service trade flows
accounted for less than 5% of the
overall EU-rest of the world service
flows, as of 2003. The pattern of
trade in services between the EU
and ENP partner countries is typical
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Box 5.2 Major service categories used in balance
of payments statistics
1. Transportation
2. Travel
3. Communications services
4. Construction services
5. Insurance services
6. Financial services
7. Computer and information services
8. Royalties and license fees
9. Other business services
10. Personal, cultural and recreational services
11. Government services not included elsewhere
(not included in the GATS coverage)
Source: WTO.
for trade with less-developed regions. The EU is a net buyer of transport services,
which mainly reflects bad infrastructure in the ENP countries and restricted
market access (also, in sea transport lower costs of ENP partners). As for travel,
Russians and Ukrainians are net buyers, while development of tourism make North
African countries net sellers. Communication services are not an important subject
of EU-ENP trade, however, here the EU is a net buyer. The EU sells ICT-intensive
services like financial and computer services, as well as capital intensive services
such as construction both in North Africa and in Eastern Europe. The EU is also a
net seller of merchanting, professional and technical services to North African
countries, while at the same time imports this kind of services from Eastern
Europe. This last feature probably reflects mainly outflow of high-skilled workers
from Eastern Europe (for details see Table 5.2A in Statistical Annex).
In this report, we concentrate on the description of changes in the service trade
that are most likely to affect relations between the EU and ENP countries over the
next five years. Leaving aside freedom of movement of people and employment
rights (discussed in chapter 4 and in section 5.3), it often reduces to liberalisation
or approximation of regulatory norms in specific sectors. Given high regulatory
burden in the five ENP countries and at the same time ineffectiveness of local
administration and regulatory bodies, relative to the EU’s, easing EU-ENP barriers
in trade in services will mean:
• adherence to GATS commitments (where appropriate),
• approximation of relevant rules to the EU acquis,
• increase in the effectiveness of market regulators in five ENP countries,
• equalisation of rights of foreign and domestic firms and
• simplified establishment of firms in relevant sectors.
5.2.5. Outlook for 2006-2010: relaxation of barriers to trade in selected
service sectors
This part presents the outlook of changes in the service trade that are most likely
to affect the relations between the EU and the ENP partners within the next five years.
The focus is on transport and financial intermediation sectors32. As the
telecommunication sector is also an important service sector, and at the same time
important infrastructure indicator, we additionally include it in the analysis. The
choice of the sectors was motivated by:
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32 As not being central for his study, we left aside travel and construction services. The analysis of “other business
services” category that groups together merchanting and trade-related services, professional and technical
and R&D services and the like lies beyond the scope of this report.
• the magnitude of service flows,
• potential and needs of analysed countries,
• commitments expressed in action plans and relevant materials.
The presentation is organised according to the main service sectors (transport,
financial services, telecommunication) and by individual ENP countries. This section
primarily discusses actions that are committed in the mutually agreed action plans
(Morocco, Ukraine). If action plans are not ready yet, the focus is on EU commitments
expressed in indicative programmes, and on initiatives announced by national
governments. Conclusions on expected changes within these sectors are developed also
on the basis of the current state of development of each sector and regulatory barriers.
Transport
Russia
National indicative programme for 2004-2006 specifies EU commitments and
objectives within the transport sector for end-2006:
• civil aviation: improvement in air safety, Russia’s participation in European
organisations like Eurocontrol or the new European Aviation Safety Agency, and
industrial co-operation. It is expected that royalties for flying over Siberia will
be gradually phased-out to disappear by 2013.
• maritime transport sector: improvement of maritime safety, maritime training,
liberalisation of the sea-river transport services in Russia, co-operation in
research and development, use of Automatic Identification System on board
vessels, co-operation in the field of maritime transport security (implementation
of recently agreed maritime security legislation in International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) and co-operation within the G8 context). It should also be
added that the conclusions agreed at the Council of Transport Ministers of
December 2002 include an “agreement” which stipulates that heavy grade of oil
should only be transported in double-hull tankers.
Additionally, progress in the cooperation within the spheres of: (1) transport
strategies and public-private partnership (PPP), (2) transport security and (3) road
and rail transport is expected over 2005-2007. In October 2005, the EC-Russia
intergovernmental group on transport dialogue revealed in October 2005 that it
designated working groups in these spheres.
It is expected that in the transport sector barriers in trade with Russia for the EU
agents will be gradually reduced, although no sudden changes are foreseen. The
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sector will most probably remain relatively protected, although safety and
infrastructure will be gradually improved.
Ukraine
No common EU-Ukraine action funded by the EU is scheduled until 2006 in the
transport sector. However, Ukraine declared in the action plan that it would work on
national transport strategy, improve transport safety, cooperate closely with relevant
European bodies with regard to rail trail, maritime, and inland waterways transport,
and both parties will identify financing options for transport infrastructure
development. Taking into account these declarations, the years to come should see
lifting of barriers (restructuring of state-owned ports and integration into Pan-
European aviation structure should be put on the agenda, in particular) and some
improvement of infrastructure.
Egypt
Reforms aimed at “all modes of transport”, also directed towards harmonisation
of standards as well as safety and security were indicated as necessary and EU
financial support for 2005-2006 was committed for this. However, it is hard to asses
at this stage what exactly will be supported and how much from the EUR25 million
technical support will go to improving Egyptian transport sector. 
Morocco
Morocco declared its readiness to work on the national transport strategy in the
view to enhance EU-Moroccan transport capacities during the next 5 years in the EU-
Morocco action plan. Once the priority infrastructure areas are identified, the EU
offered its assistance both in identifying and granting funds. For the moment, MEDA
funding is arranged for planning of the Euro-Mediterranean transport networks and
for the participation in the new satellite navigation project.
With regard to the specific types of transport the EU-Morocco action plan gives
priority to the following:
• granting easier access to road transport services and improving road safety and
road infrastructure until 2010 (in the northern area, the EU supports road
construction with EUR34 million in 2005),
• promotion of the multi-mode railway transport and improvement of railway
infrastructure,
• improvement of airports infrastructure, liberalisation of airport transport (both
regular and charter flights) including possibilities of new EU-Moroccan
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connections, and explorations of possibilities of Morocco entering the Single
European Sky,
• enhance competition in the maritime transport and among Moroccan ports by
granting easier access and privatisation, introduce an independent maritime
regulator, approximate maritime law to that of the EU, improve safety and
reduce pollution (gradually remove single-hull oil tankers), fight with maritime
terrorism. It is expected that Morocco will take part in the MEDA regional
project on maritime safety.
Taking into account far-reaching provisions of Moroccan obligations to reform its
transport sector, it is expected that costs of transport services will fall and entry of the
EU logistics companies will be significantly facilitated. It is also expected that ENPI
funds will be directed further towards the development of transport infrastructure.
Financial intermediation
Russia
The EU-Russian cooperation supported by the EU funds within the financial
sector will focus on the technical advice in the following areas (NIP 2004-2006):
• consolidation of a sound and effective financial sector in Russia, combining
competitive and efficient banking and investment institutions, the stock market
and insurance services,
• fight against money laundering, implementation and enforcement of related
international conventions to boost confidence in the Russian financial system;
• promotion of investment in small and medium enterprises, in close collaboration
with relevant international financial institutions.
This is supposed to bring the following effects before 2007:
• enhanced efficiency, performance, financial transparency and credibility of a
restructured financial sector;
• Reduced incidence of financial abuse and money laundering;
• further approximation and convergence of relevant EU and Russian legislative
and regulatory frameworks;
• guaranteed equal terms of competition for economic operators (“level playing field”);
• increased investment flows into the economy across a wider range of
productive sectors;
• further development of small and medium entrepreneurship.
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However, as the recently declared strategy of the central bank states, no
significant changes in the sector such as large privatisations (state still owns majority
of the capital in the banking sector and non-residents own only 6% of the total
banking sector capital) are expected at least until 2008.
Ukraine
Mutual EU-Ukraine assistance programmes supported by the EU funds until 2006
will focus on:
• improvement of operational capacities in the banking sector,
• introduction of up-to-date mechanisms and tools for banks,
• fostering the development of the regulatory framework and supervision of
financial markets equivalent to that existing in the EU,
• effective implementation of independent and well-trained supervisory authorities
in accordance with internationally recognised standards, especially in insurance
services (NIP 2004-2006, Action Plan for Ukraine).
In addition, Ukraine declared that it would continue easing restrictions on
movement on capital, especially with regard to transfer of investment money or
investment income, which is also of interest for agents present in the Ukrainian
financial market. Some relaxation of restrictions on capital account happened already
in autumn 2005.
Additionally, more foreign banks are expected to enter before 2010, which will
strengthen competition. At the moment, less than 20% of the sector is foreign-owned,
and this share will surely increase very soon, judging from declared strategies of some
EU international players. This all means that the banking sector in Ukraine will
develop considerably over the next few years, and entry and operating conditions for
the EU financial institutions will become easier.
Egypt
Although no common EU-Egypt actions regarding its financial sector are
scheduled in the indicative programme for 2005-2006, the current government plans
to deregulate and privatise banking sector. If successful, this could open door to new
EU funding supporting its development. Currently, the majority of Egyptian banking
sector (representing 80-90% of domestic financial market) is owned by the state, and
the profitability is low. The central bank is working with banks to comply with Basle
II standards by 2006.
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Morocco
There have been two major priorities for action until 2010 related to the
Moroccan financial sector, listed in the EU-Morocco action plan, namely:
• development of competent supervisory body, modelled after EU financial
supervisors,
• strengthening of independence of supervising authority according to
international standards.
Additionally, liberalisation of capital account was declared, especially when it
comes to protection of foreign ownership, rights of closing down the business and
removing restrictions on repatriation of earnings. After reaching this stage, the
involvement of Moroccan side is expected in the dialogue on removing remaining
restrictions on the capital account. Some of the EU funds scheduled for support of
implementation of the AA with Morocco in 2005-2006 are to help in liberalisation of
capital account.
Telecommunication
Russia
Common economic space provides for future cooperation in the telecommunication
sector. However, full details are not yet known. Indicative programme for 2004-2006
suggests the need for cooperation on legislative and regulatory convergence in the fields
of telecommunication and electronic commerce and for implementation of an
appropriate investment framework that would allow for development of infrastructure
in Russia. The EU secured funds for supporting policy dialogue and granting policy and
legal advice in these two areas. However, given the general formulation of these
objectives, and the fact that they are in the same budget category as support of energy
and transport dialogue, it is hard to draw any conclusions as to whether the EU will
support development of Russian telecommunication.
During the next few years, harmonisation of the telecommunication rules with
those of the EU (including market access) will depend on the Russian side. It is
reasonable to assume that no changes more binding than GATS commitments (that
again depend on Russia and take time to be implemented) will occur in the Russian
telecommunication sector, although easier access for foreign firms and less
discriminatory treatment will have to be assured after Russia enters WTO.
Ukraine
EU-Ukraine action plan sets rather general priorities for cooperation in the field
of telecommunication. It basically reduces to declarations by the Ukrainian side about
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adopting regulatory legislation, establishment of an independent regulator, and
ensuring fair competition. This last point is especially hard to attain as markets are
monopolised and competition authority is not willing to act against big domestic
players. However, the sale of the large state-owned telecom operator is scheduled to
happen soon (after several delays over the last years).
Following the general nature of commitments in the action plan, no EU funds to
support the liberalisation of the telecom sector in Ukraine are scheduled until 2006,
and most probably none will be directed at least until 2010, unless Ukrainian
government takes serious steps towards deregulation.
Egypt
Although no common actions backed by the EU funds are scheduled until 2006,
the country is supposed to allow for more competition at the fixed and mobile
telephony markets. State fixed telephony enterprise was partly privatised in end-2005
and lost its monopoly on international calls from the beginning of 2006. Granting of
the third mobile operator license is expected during 2006. 
Morocco
As listed in the EU-Morocco action plan, the following moves in the Moroccan
telecommunication sector were agreed and are expected to happen until 2010:
• EU support for gradual liberalisation of fixed telephony market,
• liberalisation of market for mobile telephony (two operators at the moment),
• strengthening of the capacity of the regulatory body (ANRT) and enhancing its
cooperation with agencies from other Mediterranean countries and the EU,
• improving existing networks and enhancing investment in new ones,
• encouraging internet-based communication, also in relations with the
government and implementation of relevant legislation (electronic signature,
protection of personal sites, name of domains etc.).
No funds for telecommunication sector reforms were provided under indicative
programme for 2005-2006. Together with continued liberalisation of telephony
market, the access should be easier, costs lower, and network infrastructure more
developed. If Morocco adheres to the above commitments, the EU is expected to
support the liberalisation of Moroccan telecommunication market starting from 2007
using ENPI funds.
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5.3. Migration
• There is little direct link between selected forms of economic integration of EU
and ENP countries and ensuing migration flows.
• Migration from ENP countries to the EU is expected to continue at levels observed
in recent years, but the outlook might change depending on political, social and
economic developments in the ENP countries and migration policies of the EU.
• The economic and social consequences of migrations are crucially dependent on
policies of home and host countries but have little to do with the intensity of
economic integration between the EU and ENP partners. One exception relates
to financial integration which may lower the costs of and thus stimulate
remittances, therefore supporting development of ENP countries and
encouraging temporary rather than permanent migrations to the EU. 
This section attempts to shed some light on the questions on the likely links
between various forms of economic integration and migration flows, and the impact
of migrations on both host and home countries. It should be noted that there is hardly
a consensus on the factors determining migrations and their social and economic
consequences. Additionally, statistical base for migration analysis is not sufficient,
despite some recent progress in compiling more reliable databases (OECD, 2005b;
Fargues, 2005; see also Eurostat, 2005).
While there certainly is an economic dimension to migrations, which can be
important in some instances, there is little relation between economic policies
affecting migrations and trade and investment policies which are the focus of this
report. As discussed by Boeri and Brücker (2005) existing trade models suggest that
trade integration can both stimulate and mitigate migration flows depending on
additional assumptions. We emphasize the importance of the following factors:
• the policy towards legal migration, i.e. visa regimes, residence and work
permits, etc.,
• the policy towards asylum seekers and illegal migrants, strictness of asylum
practice, border controls, other controls aimed at detecting illegal migrants,
deportation policies,
• economic developments in (potential) home and in host countries, and in
particular labour market conditions.
While the above list is clearly not exhaustive it enables to highlight the likely
consequences of some policy choices facing the EU. All else equal, one should expect
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that more “liberal” policies towards legal migrations will result in higher inflows of
migrants. Moreover, there is scope for implementing policies that will encourage
inflows of people with specific characteristics, such as highly skilled specialists.
Indeed, some of the OECD countries have been introducing measures making it easier
for highly skilled foreigners (e.g. foreign students) to get jobs and stay in OECD
countries (OECD, 2005b). The impact of tougher policies towards asylum seekers and
illegal migrants is subject to more controversies, and it is not clear that they can be
very effective in reducing migration inflows (Monheim, 2005 and references cited
therein). All else equal, the larger gap in the attainable standard of living between
home and host countries, the larger the incentives for migration. The situation of the
labour market is particularly important. Better employment prospects in the host
countries might induce more immigration and at the same time stronger positive
effects of labour migration. On the other hand, Boeri and Brücker (2005) argue that
rigid labour market in the host countries might imply negative externalities affecting
native populations in the receiving countries. 
5.3.1. Recent migration flows
The EU has historically been an attractive place for migrants and has attracted
large migration inflows over the recent decades. Table 5.4 presents recent trends in
migration inflows to selected EU countries. One immediate observation is that
several EU countries experienced large volatility of inflows. While, the early 1990s
were characterised by large immigration related the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and war and instability in the Balkans more recent years saw particularly strong
increases in immigration to South European countries. Also, these figures indicate
a continued increase in immigration to the EU25, a trend which is not fully
confirmed by another set of statistics compiled by the OECD (2005). OECD data
indicate that after increases up till 2001 or so, 2002-2003 witnessed stabilisation of
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Note: Annual averages in the first two columns.
Source: Eurostat (2005).
Table 5.4. Net migrations to the EU, 1992-2003 (persons per 1000 inhabitants)
  1992-95 1996-2000 2001 2002 2003
EU-25 1.9 1.6 2.9 3.8 4.6
EU-15 2.4 2.0 3.5 4.5 5.4
Belgium 1.6 1.3 3.5 3.9 3.4
Germany 6.0 1.9 3.3 2.7 1.7
Spain 1.5 4.6 10.5 15.8 17.6
France 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.1 0.9
Ireland 0.1 5.7 10.0 8.3 7.8
Italy 0.5 1.0 0.8 6.1 10.4
Netherlands 2.0 2.5 3.5 1.7 0.4
United Kingdom 1.4 2.5 3.1 2.1 4.4
migration inflows to several European countries, with declining number of asylum
seekers and growing relative importance of labour migration.
The distribution of total immigrants from specific ENP countries among EU
member states is fairly stable, at least over shorter time horizons. This is because the
costs of migrations to particular countries/regions tend to decline when larger diaspora
are present in these countries/regions. For example a closer look at the foreign-born
population of the Netherlands reveals that four countries are home to above 40% of the
whole foreign-born population. Morocco is home to above 160,000 people or almost
10% of the total, while the share of populations born in other countries covered in this
report are small. The figure for whole former Soviet Union area is just 30,800. For
details see Figure 5.1. Absent of unexpected shocks to social and economic
developments and migration policies, the recent patterns and intensity of migrations
can be regarded as best predictors for the developments over the next decade or so.
Migration stock data are even less reliable due to large differences in definitions.
One interesting indicator can be provided by the numbers on foreign-born population.
In countries such as Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Norway or Sweden the share of
foreign-born population has been around 10% in recent years with a slow tendency to
rise between 1993 and 2002 (OECD, 2005b). For comparison – in the US, respective
share increased from 8.2% in 1994 to 11.8% in 2002. 
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Source: OECD (2005b).
Figure 5.1. Foreign born population in Netherlands, 2002 (thousand of people)
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5.3.2. Future migration flows
Forecasting total migrations flows has been an extremely difficult task and any
scenarios crucially depend on the set of underlying assumptions, both the ones
influenced by policies (on the side of potential home or host countries) and exogenous
factors. Also, there are in fact many different forms of migrations responding to diverse
incentives: Okólski (2004) proposes identification of seven categories, including
migration for settlement, labour migration, incomplete migration, and flows of asylum
seekers and refugees. In the case of the ENP countries analysed in this report, domestic
economic and political developments will play a crucial role in determining the
willingness of their citizens to migrate to the EU. Under the plausible assumption that
forced migration (e.g. due to political instability) or migrations motivated by
particularly harsh economic conditions are more problematic for receiving countries,
the better the domestic political and economic situation in ENP countries, the less
problems and more advantages the EU can expect from migration flows. Consequently,
the proper evaluation of the EU policies towards ENP countries should take into
account long term development impact on the latter group of countries.
The long term migration forecasts should be treated with great caution and are
best thought of as providing benchmarks for comparing migration responses to
alternative scenarios. Actual point estimates are necessarily subject to wide error
margins. Below we rely on the results emerging from the on-going project on the
migration impact on demographic trends in Europe carried at the Central European
Forum for Migration Research (Bijak et al., 2004 & 2005)33. The advantage of this
work is that it utilises the most recent available data and provides quantitative
scenarios for migrations to the EU27 (current EU plus Bulgaria and Romania which
are likely to join the Union in 2007) in the 20 and 50 years perspective. Main sources
of external (extra-EU) migration are expected to be former Soviet Union region (with
Russia and Ukraine being the most important countries due to the size of the
populations, geographical proximity to the EU and already existing diasporas).
Existing networks of immigrants from this region imply that eastern parts of the EU,
particularly Germany and Poland are likely to remain the main target EU countries.
The second source region of potentially large population inflows is Northern Africa
(and Turkey). Migrants from this region are expected to be concentrated on Southern
and (to a lesser extent) Western countries of the EU. China and some other Asian
countries will form the third major source of EU immigrants. 
Migration flows to the EU27 under various scenarios are shown in table 5.5. Base
scenarios imply slight increases in annual net immigration to EU27. Share of new
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33 For more information on the project and full list of publications see www.cefrm.pan.pl
migrants in the labour force is unlikely to surpass 10% by 2020 and in the base
scenario it increases to around 20% by 2050.
5.3.3. What matters for gains and losses from migration?
One important question is whether the forms of economic integration with ENP
countries are likely to significantly impact on the distribution of gains and losses from
migrations for the parties involved. We argue that such impact should be expected to
be negligible compared to other factors, primarily domestic policies towards
migrants. Let us concentrate on four factors: social tensions in host countries related
to the presence of migrants, contribution of migrants to economic growth in host
countries, and in the case of the sending countries the consequences of “brain drain”
on the one side and remittances on the other side. 
The roots of social tensions involving migrants that have recently erupted in
violent outbreaks in some EU countries (France and the Netherlands for example)
appear to be related to social exclusion, and economic inequalities34. International
relations between countries from where the migrants come from and those where
migrants currently reside are unlikely to offer solutions to these problems. However,
it is worth remembering that employment can be a very important mechanism for
social inclusion of immigrants. The record of some of the EU countries in this respect
is not particularly encouraging. For example, despite strong increases in foreign
employment during 2000-2003, in 2003 unemployment rate among non-OECD
foreigners in the Netherlands stood at 14%, compared to 7% unemployment among
foreigners from OECD countries and 4% unemployment rate among nationals
(OECD, 2005b). The gap between unemployment of foreigners and nationals is only
slightly less pronounced in countries such as Belgium, Denmark or France. While the
underlying reasons for lower employment of immigrants may vary from one country
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34 The analysis of other important factors lies beyond the scope of this report.
Note: Base scenario assumes stable socio-economic situation, a long-term convergence in income levels and
a gradual increase in mobility in Europe over the next 50 years. High and Low scenarios are intended to
provide uncertainty bands rather than specific trajectories of migration flows. 
Source: Bijak et al. (2005).
Table 5.5. Net external migration to the EU27, annual averages 2002-2052 (thousands)
2002 2012 2022 2032 2042 2052
Change
2002-52
% of labour force originating
from external migration
during 2002-2052
Base 1060 1143 1173 1184 1188 1191 131 20.0
High 1060 1895 2203 2316 2357 2382 1322 32.0
Low 1060 610 444 383 361 348 -712 8.7
to another it is clear that addressing the problems related to this phenomenon could
greatly enhance the gains and limit the costs of immigration to the EU. Ultimately, EU
would benefit most if immigrants were able and ready to take up productive jobs and
were not endangered by social exclusion.
Similarly, the migrants contribution to economic growth in host countries and the
scope of potential negative externalities on domestic workers is little affected by trade
relations, but can be strongly dependant on the flexibility of domestic labour and other
markets in the EU countries (World Bank, 2005b; Boeri and Brücker, 2005). 
One migration-related issue that has been hotly debated recently is the impact of
high-skilled out-migration on their home countries – the question of “brain drain”
(World Bank, 2005b; Baldwin-Edwards, 2005). The gains for receiving countries from
“importing” high skills are quite obvious. However, the impact of such trends on ENP
countries should be taken into account. In particular, deficit of highly skilled workers in
ENP countries can slow their development and thus contribute to slowing down of the
catch-up process (with all the potential negative consequences). Again, the net effect of
high-skilled migration is hardly linked to general nature of economic and political
relations between countries but can be influenced by some policies on the side of both
receiving and sending countries. While declining entry to highly skilled migrants might
not be a solution (as those willing to leave their home countries are anyway likely to find
a place of work / residence elsewhere) specific policies could mitigate potential negative
externalities for ENP countries. In particular, temporary and “circular” migration might
be promoted with some support for highly skilled nationals of ENP countries willing to
return home. Also, one potentially effective EU policy could be supporting upgrade of
educational services in ENP countries. This would help in meeting rising demand for
educational services as returns to education are increasing. Additionally, promotion of
student mobility is certainly worth continuing.
Remittances can be a very important factor stimulating economic growth in ENP
countries. It is now widely recognised that government policies can affect flows of
remittances. What matters for remittances are the transaction costs (lower for legal,
registered transfers), tax, custom, and exchange rate policies of the countries receiving
remittances, and financial integration of the sending and receiving country (see World
Bank (2005b) and references cited therein for an in-depth discussion). Financial
integration between EU and ENP countries can thus play a role in encouraging
remittances flows. In turn, remittances are believed to have an additional effect of
providing migrants with incentives to return to their home countries. Thus, closer
financial integration between EU and ENP countries might, other things equal,
encourage more of temporary labour migration relative to total migrations.
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• There are no detailed programmes for achieving a joint vision of energy security
that would embrace Russia, Algeria, Ukraine as well as the EU. What does exist
is a disparate array of programmes.
• The three countries play very different roles for the EU energy security. Russia
is clearly by far the most important player. The EU is looking to secure from
Russia extensive supplies of gas in addition to its current Russian gas imports.
On the Russian side, sales of energy resources to Europe constitute important
share of all export revenues.
• Russia and Algeria will have to secure considerable investment flows if they are
to continue both to modernise and expand its hydrocarbons production.
• The energy dialogue with Russia requires a unified position of the EU to
strengthen the bargaining power and to ensure EU interests. Relations with all
neighbour countries should be centred on market access issues (FDI, EU
participation in the sector, reform and opening of the gas sector) but also on
energy efficiency.
EU energy cooperation with the two of three countries covered in this section – and
indeed, with all the partner countries in the Mediterranean area and most of the
Neighbourhood countries to the east – is essentially concerned with general structures
of macro economic stability and economic liberalisation. The exception is Russia,
where energy is quite clearly one of the core elements in a two-way dialogue. With
regard to Algeria and Ukraine, however, specific programmes for either energy reform
or the attainment of individual energy objectives by either the EU or the partner and
neighbourhood countries are less important than overall macroeconomic reform.
Moreover, although energy is one of the most important issues confronting the EU
– and although it plays a major role in all three countries under specific study in this
section – there are no detailed programmes for achieving a joint vision of energy
security that would embrace all three countries as well as the EU. What does exist is a
disparate array of programmes, ranging from the broad based regeneration agenda of
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6. EU Energy Cooperation
with Russia, Algeria and Ukraine
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona process) to concepts such as the Putin-
Prodi initiative intended to work out a structure for EU-Russian energy cooperation.
In sum, because the three countries in this section concern the European Union
in very different ways so energy issues concerning Russia, the Ukraine and Algeria are
addressed by the EU in very different ways. Such differences mean that it generally
makes sense to pursue this country-specific approach, so long as the EU also pursues
clear overarching policies for energy security, which can then be addressed in
bilateral dialogues with Russia, Ukraine and Algeria. In one specific case, the role of
Ukraine as an energy transit corridor from Russia to the EU, careful consideration
has to be given as to whether a trilateral approach, seemingly the obvious solution,
might actually prove counter-productive from an EU perspective.
6.1. EU concerns
The overall EU concern is energy security. At its simplest, the quest for energy
security is an attempt to strike a balance between the following elements: diversity of
energy use and energy supply – which essentially means diversification of fuels and
diversification of supply sources; security of transit mechanisms – which embraces
both flexibility of systems for delivering energy to the EU and protection of supply
infrastructure; and security in terms of production – embracing both the operational
conditions of EU companies producing energy outside the EU and the stability of
countries on which the EU relies for its fuel imports, principally those of oil and gas.
And all this then has to be placed in a context of perhaps the most complex of issues
– the price to be paid for energy, whether in a secure or insecure form.
The more the EU moves towards the establishment of single markets for oil, gas and
electricity, the greater the EU’s own direct involvement in negotiating access terms for
those seeking entry into European markets. However, the development of the energy
infrastructure used to import oil, gas and electricity is essentially organised on a
national basis (sometimes, with groups of EU member states). There is a major potential
weakness in this: pipelines or import facilities developed on an essentially bilateral basis
may squeeze out pipelines and facilities intended to serve multiple suppliers and
multiple customers, which have a greater potential for lower import costs. 
One of the EU’s main concerns is its increasing reliance on energy imports,
which, at least until recently, had been widely expected to become dependent on
imports for 81% of its gas in 2030 and for 94% of its oil (see Table 6.1). 
There is a major need for the EU, both collectively and at member state level, to
understand the fundamental differences between the problems the EU faces with
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regard to oil and gas. At first, it would appear to be oil that is the more significant
issue. The EU needs oil – or liquid fuels derived from gas and other alternatives, to
fuel its transport industry (with the death of steam trains, we no longer run any
routine form of transport on anything but liquid fuels). 
In fact, it is gas that poses the more significant problems, especially with regard to
its relations with Russia, the Ukraine and Algeria. There are several factors involved:
I. Demand Control. The EU has less of an interest in controlling gas demand than oil
demand. Gas is a more environmentally friendly fuel than oil and there are good
reasons why the EU and its member states should wish to continue to increase gas
consumption at the expense of both coal and oil. As well as environmental reasons,
these include the fact that gas is available from a greater diversity of suppliers than
oil. In addition, the EU possesses a much greater ability to control demand for oil
than for gas. Were the EU to adopt the International Energy Agency’s World
Alternative Policy Scenario (WAPS), oil demand in 2030 would actually fall a little
by comparison with today’s levels. This would free up incremental oil production for
such developing economies as China and India. There is also every reason to believe
that EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy and Transport favours
adoption of the broad range of measures envisaged in WAPS; the UK Government’s
current policies are already based de facto on a WAPS-based approach. 
II. Import volumes. Reducing demand, switching fuels and developing alternative
forms of liquid fuels can all help to mitigate the impact of increased oil imports.
According to the IEA’s main reference scenario, oil imports would rise from 492
million tonnes (mt) in 2002 to 698 mt in 2030; by comparison, under the WAPS,
this 206 mt increase is more than halved, amounting to just 98 mt.35 For gas,
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35 The reduction is almost certainly understated. It assumes that EU net oil production under the WAPS scenario
is the same as that under the Reference Scenario; in practice, it could well be higher, thus further reducing
import requirements.
Note: TPES stands for Total Primary Energy Supply.
Source: IEA (2004).
Table 6.1 Scenarios for EU Primary Energy Demand, 1971-2030 (million tonnes of oil equivalent
– MTOE and billion cubic meters)
1971 2002 2010 2020 2030
Annual growth
rate 2002-2030 (%)
EU TPES Reference Scenario (MTOE) 1,211 1,690 1,848 n/a 2,048 0.7
Net oil import dependency (%) 76 85 91 94
Net gas import dependency (%) 49 60 n/a 81
Gas consumption (bcm/y) 471 567 684 786 1.8
Gas imports (bcm/y) 233 342 n/a 639
EU TPES Alternative Scenario 1,211 1,690 n/a 1,881 1,872 0.4
however, the prospect is of gas imports rising from 233 bcm in 2002 by no less
than 406 bcm to reach 639 bcm in 2030 under the Reference Scenario, whereas
even the WAPS postulates an increase of 305 bcm/y to 538 bcm.36 This remains a
massive increase and, given the classic bilateral nature of gas deals, will require
persistent EU attention. The prominence of Russia and Algeria as EU suppliers
ensures that particular attention will have to be paid to these two countries, and
to the Ukraine as a gas transit country.
III. Supply availability. Oil remains an essentially fungible commodity. If the EU
doesn’t buy it from one source, it will buy it from another. Essentially, its purchase
is a matter of price and the EU can afford to purchase even expensive oil – and that
is what the EU is likely to face, not because of a lack of oil in the ground but
because of limits to physical production caused by investment constraints in the
major producing countries. Because oil is fungible, the crucial issue in this regard
is not EU relations with Russia or Algeria, but its relations with the oil producing
world as a whole, and that really means the Middle East. Gas, despite advances
made in the spot market by liquefied natural gas (LNG), is far less fungible than
oil, although it is available from a greater variety of sources. 
IV. Transparency. Oil deals have well-established commercial mechanisms. They are
probably more transparent than longer-term gas deals. Gas deals generally require
long-term take-or-pay agreements which often include greater or lesser degrees of
government-to-government commitments. With regard to Russian gas sales to some
EU purchasers, these deals have not always been fully transparent. There may be
requirements for payments to be made to third parties as part of the conditions of
sale, raising questions concerning corruption. The political input to contract
negotiations may also pose problems. For example Russia’s Gazprom is a state-
controlled entity offering contracts intended to serve state interests37. Were it to
operate on purely commercial lines, its terms for gas sales to the EU might be very
different. Were there to be a split amongst Russian policy makers concerning the
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36 This figure also underestimates potential import savings, since it makes no allowance for increased EU or,
more to the point EU/Norwegian gas production as a result of altered economic conditions. One of the key
points that needs to be borne in mind in considering EU oil and gas issues is whether Norwegian production
should be considered to fall outside the EU rubric (since Norway is not an EU member state) or whether its
production should be included within an EU framework, since Norway is a member of the European
Economic Area (EEA).. In the opinion of the authors, Norway is more inside than outside the EU umbrella
and, moreover, its role as a supplier of gas to the EU – an issue with obvious consequences for both Russia
and Algeria – appears under-estimated. As of late 2004, the EU was anticipating imports from the North Sea
– i.e., from Norway, as totalling around 110 bcm in 2030.
37 This is almost openly admitted even by Gazprom bosses – see e.g. ‘Natürlich ist das, was wir tun, politish’,
interview with Gazprom vice-president Alexander Medvedyev, Welt am Sonntag, 22 January 2006.
issue of state control of Gazprom, as there has been in the past, EU purchasers would
have to consider whether to involve themselves in an issue with potentially profound
repercussions for the EU in terms of both price and conditions of supply, or whether
to refrain from involvement, arguing this was a purely internal Russian matter.
V. Transit issues. Russia’s reluctance to sign the Energy Charter Treaty’s Transit
Protocol, which would, inter alia, govern the transit across Russia of non-
Russian gas, poses acute policy questions for the EU and its member states. The
protocol has the potential to end Russia’s pipeline monopoly, which ensures that
Russia can demand that new European customers pay as much as $250 per
thousand cubic metres ($250/tcm) for its own gas, whilst importing gas from
Central Asia at prices which it hopes to keep as low as around $50/tcm. This has
profound implications for current and prospective gas producers in
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan ad Kazakhstan. These countries have alternative
options for securing access to world markets for their oil but Russia’s continued
monopoly or near-monopoly over their access to world gas markets concerns the
EU, since the EU’s member states are major potential purchasers of Central
Asian gas, with IEA Chief economist Fatih Birol estimating the EU might seek to
purchase up to 51 bcm/y of gas from this source by 2030 (See Table 5.4). 
None of these points are intended to challenge or even question Russia’s reputation
as a remarkably reliable supplier in terms of its deliveries to EU member states (it has,
however, used supply cutoffs and the threat of supply cutoffs to put political pressure
on former Soviet republics). But such issues do raise profound questions concerning
both the process of negotiation and the terms negotiated for gas contracts with the
EU’s biggest single gas supplier. Once Russia signs a contract with an EU customer, it
delivers; it is the terms of its contracts that pose problems for the future. 
To a lesser extent, some of these issues also apply to Algeria. But Algeria’s position
in terms of negotiating with prospective EU customers is not as strong as Russia’s. It
is more dependent on EU investment in the first place and its exports are subject to
far more regional competition than Russia’s. In addition, Algeria’s trade performance
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Source: Birol (2004).
Table 6.2 EU Additional Gas Supplies 2000-2030
Countries/regions Supplies
Russia An extra 79 bcm/y 
Central Asia An extra 51 bcm/y 
Middle East An extra 157 bcm 
West and North Africa An extra136 bcm 
Americas (mainly Trinidad & Tobago) An extra 18 bcm/y 
is intimately connected with the EU, since the EU takes majority of Algeria’s exports
and supplies majority of its imports.
What has also changed is the sharp rise in energy prices since 2004. It is beyond
the scope of this paper to provide what it is now increasingly obvious, that any deep
study of EU energy security requires consideration of a wide range of scenarios
spanning a wide range of alternative price, supply and demand assumptions. The
drive for energy imports from Russia and Algeria (Table 5.3), and for transit security
across Ukraine, should be seen against this kind of a backdrop, with its options for EU
demand management to ensure an eventual decline in oil demand and limitations on
the increase in gas consumption. Moreover, it would be prudent for the EU to assume
that there will be severe investment constraints for major energy producers, including
Russia and Algeria, and that this will ensure high energy prices (at least by
comparison with pre-2004 price levels) for the foreseeable future.
6.2. The Importance of Russia, Ukraine and Algeria in European markets
The three countries play very different roles in the EU markets and in the EU
energy security equation. In this regard Russia is clearly by far the most important
player in terms of supply. In 2004, the EU produced 215.2 bcm of gas; and consumed
some 466.9 bcm meaning that net imports, including those from Norway, amounted
to 251.7 bcm. Essentially, all these imports came from just three countries: Russia,
around 125 bcm (all by pipeline); Norway, around 75 bcm (all by pipeline); and
Algeria, 51.6 bcm (33.8 bcm by pipeline and 18.8 bcm as LNG). The aggregated EU
figures mask major differences in EU member states reliance on energy sources (and
thus potentially differing priorities in energy policies). For example in 2004, imported
Russian gas accounted for more than 80% of all consumed gas in the Czech Republic,
Finland, Greece, Lithuania and Slovakia, while Algerian gas accounted for above 50%
of consumption in Portugal and Spain. On the other hand Netherlands produces
much more gas than it consumes (BP, 2005).
6.2.1. Russia
Russia is thus supplying around half of all EU gas imports – and around 30% of
all EU oil imports – and Algeria just over 20% of EU gas imports38. Moreover, the EU
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38 Oil and gas imported from Russia plays an important role in many other European countries, some of which
are likely to join the EU over the next decade or so. In 2004, above 40% of Europe’s (including Turkey)
imports of gas and oil came from Russia.
is looking to secure from extensive additional supplies of gas from both countries.
Indeed, the International Energy Agency has estimated that the increase in Russian
supplies might total as much as 79 bcm in 2030, which would account, on the IEA’s
mainstream Reference Scenario, for one-quarter of the projected 315 bcm/y increase
in EU gas imports by that date. While such import levels seem large, they would, in
fact, actually dilute Russia’s share of the EU import market from around 50% in 2004
to around 41% in 2030.
Although this constitutes a high rate of dependency on a single supplier, Russia is
also vulnerable, since its energy exports to Europe currently account for around half of
total Russian export. In contrast, Russian energy imports to the EU constitute only 2.5%
of overall EU imports. In terms of the relative importance of these figures, the issue is
whether it is easier for the EU to diversify its sources of supply or for Russia to diversify
its markets. The anticipated reduction in Russia’s share of the EU import market would
seem to indicate that the EU’s position is stronger: The EU can look to alternative
suppliers in an arc stretching from Central Asia through the Middle East to North
Africa, and then beyond these to West Africa and the Americas. Russia’s prospective
non-EU export markets lie in the Far East, notably China, although the practical
feasibility of export diversification will depend on the costs related to building of the
transport infrastructure. The EU has estimated Russia’s energy investment
requirements between 2003 and 2030 as totalling no less than $735 bn, an average of
$27.2 bn a year. Significant FDI or (partial) privatisation of state owned energy
companies will be needed to ensure finance for such investments. From this perspective,
the position of the EU is stronger as its affluence suggests that the price to be paid for
transport infrastructure needed for import diversification would not be beyond reach.
In 2004 and 2005, Russia pumped oil at record post-Soviet rates of up to 9.5 mb/d;
almost as much as Saudi Arabia. Despite recent output declines, there is little doubt
that Russia will continue to produce at more than 9 mb/d for many years, with most
of this being exported, so long as its oilfields will bear the strain. The extent of the
country’s reserves remains a subject of some controversy, although that largely
reflects revisions both to Soviet era data and methodology. Official figures show that
since 1994 new discoveries have failed to offset oil production, but BP, for example,
is still showing a year-on-year increase in the reserve base. What does seem clear is
that new field discoveries are increasingly smaller, and a growing portion of
remaining reserves falls into the ‘difficult-to-recover’ category. The bottom line,
however, is that while it is useful for the EU to have a major flow of oil coming into
the union from its next-door neighbour (and vice versa) it is not essential for either.
Whether Russia produces as much oil as the EU might hope it will produce is an issue
whose consequences are essentially felt by the world as a whole, not the EU in
particular. The oil market is global, not regional.
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6.2.2. Ukraine
The Ukraine’s principal role in both EU and Russian energy affairs is as a transit
country, although it is also a significant importer of Russian gas in its own right.
Russia routinely exports well over 100 bcm a year (more than three-quarters of all
Russian gas exports) to European customers via Ukraine. The overwhelming bulk of
this is bound for the EU, but such totals also include most of the 24 bcm shipped to
non-EU European countries. Despite remaining spare capacity of the Ukrainian
pipeline network Russia would like to develop alternative export routes that would
reduce its dependence on transit through Ukraine for both financial and political
reasons. November-December 2005 witnessed Russian-Ukrainian clash over gas
pricing and transit which at some point resulted in Gazprom reducing its exports to
several EU member states. The agreed solution is only transitory and one can expect
the issue to return again. Apart from economic ones, there are substantial political
interests involved in the conflict.
Ukraine counts among the most energy-wasteful economies in the world,
consuming several times more energy per unit of GDP than EU countries. This
deplorable state of affairs has been sustained by the cheap supplies of gas from
Russia, which (partly) came to an end in early January 2006 after the well-publicised
crisis negotiations. While Russia’s bargaining tactics can certainly be criticised, for
Ukraine the main point now is that the country has to adjust to becoming an energy-
efficient economy. This will imply serious restructuring of the steel and chemical
sectors, as well as in household electricity consumption. Even with drastic
restructuring Ukraine is going to have to diversify its production into more light
industry and service sectors, which makes the complete opening of the economy with
a free trade agreement with the EU all the more relevant.
6.2.3. Algeria
In 2004, Algeria produced 82.0 bcm of gas, of which 60.9 bcm was exported, with
51.6 bcm going to the EU (BP, 2005). The IEA (2005) considers that Algeria might
well be in a position to export as much as 144 bcm in 2030. While much of this would
be LNG, and therefore available for sale to markets as far afield as the United States,
most would be likely to go to Europe. It is thus not unlikely that Algerian exports to
the EU will double by 2030. The energy commodities dominate the Algerian economy.
Hydrocarbons accounted for 36% of GDP, 98% of exports and 70% of budgetary
revenues in 2003 (IMF, 2005).
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6.3. EU investment concerns
6.3.1. Russia
From an EU perspective there are serious concerns regarding Russia’s required
energy investment levels, even in an era of comparatively high prices. As noted above,
the EU anticipates that total Russian energy investment needs over 2003-2030 could
total as much as $735 billion. IEA (2003) considers that “cumulative investment needs
in the Russian gas sector are projected to total just over $330 billion, or $11 billion per
year, over the period 2001-2030.” Of this, the IEA adds, “one third of cumulative
investment will be in projects for export to OECD countries.” The IEA report also notes
that Russia’s own national energy strategy postulates an investment requirement of
between $170 billion and $200 billion for the period 2003 to 2020, with specific
investment levels ranging from $9.4 billion to $11.1 billion a year. The UK Government
appears to have been drawing on such figures when it cited estimates that “investments
of US$170 billion may be required to develop gas production in Russia alone to 2020”
– in effect, around $10bn a year (HMSO, 2003). Sourcing this investment remains
unclear. Economic and Trade Minister German Gref said in June 2004 that private
capital would be necessary to finance oil pipelines (Oil & Gas Monitor, 2004).
But there are doubts whether investment on such a scale will be forthcoming. One
prominent oilman, Ray Leonard, former vice president for exploration with Yukos
and now with Hungary’s MOL, anticipates that current investment problems in oil
will cause Russia to face an oil production crisis in the next four or five years. Leonard
argues that Russia will need to secure considerably increased investment after 2008
to maintain output at roughly current levels. “The crisis will come at the end of the
decade when lack of investment during 2005-2010 needed to maintain future levels of
production by development of new areas becomes apparent – unless current policies
are changed.” Leonard says (Leonard, 2005).
There are also investment questions related to gas transit routes and Russia’s
policies in this respect. Transit issues have profound repercussions for the EU.
Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on securing access – on monopoly terms
– to Central Asian gas supplies, which it can then use to serve its own domestic,
subsidised, customers, leaving Gazprom free to export Russian gas to international
customers at world prices. This policy has the great advantage, for Russia, of
delaying the necessity for major investments to expand Russia’s own capacity to
meets its export commitments. The question then arises as to whether, instead of
supporting Russian monopoly power and enabling Russia to avoid much of the
necessity for reform of its bloated domestic energy sector, it would might prove
more beneficial in the long run for the EU to invest directly in development of
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Central Asian gas – which means developing a non-Russian route for delivery of
Central Asian gas to world markets or else securing Russian acceptance of the
Energy Charter Secretariat’s Transit Protocol.
The argument here is that a Russia committed to domestic energy reform, with
all its energy operations essentially placed on a commercial basis, becomes a better
partner for the EU than a Russia which bases much of its energy policy, and not a
little of its political relations, with its neighbours on its ability to exercise monopoly
powers in terms of energy purchases and transit. There are major opportunities for
EU investment in Russian energy, particularly in terms of the development of
Russian gas reserves in the Yamal peninsula and other Arctic regions, but pouring
investment into a country which is still so wasteful of its own energy use, and which
uses its powers to restrict other countries’ access to global markets, may not prove
to be the best use of EU investment facilities. 
6.3.2. Algeria
Similarly to Russia, Algeria will have to secure some very considerable investment
flows if it is to continue both to modernise and expand its hydrocarbons production.
The IEA considers Algeria will have to raise no less than $114bn between 2004 and
2030 to satisfy the investment requirements of both upstream and downstream oil and
gas, along with electricity generation, transmission and distribution. In particular, the
IEA considers Algeria will need to find $35bn for upstream gas development; $24bn
for downstream gas development, $27 bn for upstream oil development and $10bn for
refining if Algeria is to play its role in meeting global demand in accordance with the
Agency’s Reference Scenario. This amounts to close to $5bn a year, far more than
Algeria itself, with a GDP of around $82bn in 2004, can be expected to finance from
the state budget. Even under the IEA’s Deferred Investment Scenario – under which
the MENA producing countries only move slowly and in a notably delayed reactive
manner to increase energy investment in general and upstream oil and gas investment
in particular – Algeria would still be expected to invest some $24 bn in oil exploration
and development and around $53 bn in overall gas development.
For the EU, the crucial issue remains the pursuit of macro-economic reform and,
in particular, the development of an attractive investment climate for international
energy companies. There are encouraging signs that, although the security situation
in Algeria remains far from perfect, the economic situation is starting to change.
Between January and November 2005, Algeria has received at least $5.19 bn in FDI,
compared to just $301.2 million in 2004 and $916.5 million in 2003. Were FDI to
continue to flow in at a similar level and on a similar basis – most to energy-related
projects – Algeria would be able both to meet consumer expectations of increased oil
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and gas production capacity and its own governmental priority, a five-year (2005-
2009), $55bn public investment programme targeted at infrastructure development,
including roads, railways, dams and desalination plants, as well as investment in
public education and health (The Banker, 2005).
The turnaround in the Algerian economy, and in the management of the economy,
is perhaps the main reason why the IEA, which remains sceptical of Russian ability
to meet investment targets, is more hopeful with regard to Algeria. Even before
parliament approved a new hydrocarbon law last summer, the IEA considered Algeria
possessed “a relatively attractive investment climate”, while the law itself, which
allows foreign companies to challenge state-owned Sonatrach for domestic contracts,
could significantly enhance the investment climate. The IEA notes that other items in
its favour include the country’s geographical proximity to Europe, Algeria’s efforts to
comply with EU environmental regulations and long-standing relationships
established with European buyers, are major advantages. In addition, the
development of a series of pipeline and LNG connections should make for a relatively
smooth expansion of export volumes to Europe. Overall, the IEA argues, “Algeria is
unlikely to face major difficulties in financing the projected gas production and export
capacity expansions.” In such circumstances, while the European Commission will
doubtless continue to press for further macro-economic policy reform (and for
fulfilment of reforms already initiated), it is for the EU’s companies to come up with
the investments required to satisfy the EU’s prospective appetite for Algerian gas. The
resource base, the desire for foreign investment and the market for additional
production are all present; the only issue that could pose a real problem is security.
But then, of course, perhaps the best way to bolster Algeria’s domestic security is to
improve its economic well being.
6.4. The concerns of the ENP countries
6.4.1. Russia
Russia itself has made clear that its own energy security concerns include worries
that it may be over-reliant on gas in its own domestic fuel mix (IEA, 2002). In 2003,
Russia was able to produce 578.6 bcm of gas, but it actually consumed 405.8 bcm,
slightly more than the EU-15. However, it should be noted that Russia is an inefficient
user of energy. Its domestic energy saving potential could well total 120 bcm/y,
equivalent to current Russian exports to Western Europe. Russia currently eases its
own gas balance by importing gas from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan under long-
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term contracts and very low prices for domestic use. Since this gas, with only modest
exceptions, can only go to Russia or reach other markets by means of transiting
Russia, Russia’s Gazprom has effectively locked up most Central Asian gas export
potential. The availability of this gas on terms largely dictated by Gazprom has helped
to delay domestic reforms in Russia, in particular of the energy pricing system and the
restructuring of Gazprom itself. Russia’s official policy, set out in the Main Provisions
of the Energy Strategy to 2020, anticipates a significant switch from gas to coal between
2000 and 2020. The share of coal in the Russian energy mix would increase from 16%
to 22%; gas would fall from 50 to 42-45%. Nuclear would go up from 5% to 6% while
oil’s share would be almost unchanged. It is hard to see how implementation of such
a strategy can be squared with Russia’s obligations under the Kyoto accord, and this,
in turn, raises questions about the coherence of Russian energy policy and the current
objectives of the Russian government and its state energy companies.
For Russia, the goal is to continue to be able to operate in an essentially
monopolistic manner, facing relatively little competition and controlling both the flow
of its own oil and gas to Europe, but also most of the prospective oil and gas exports
from other FSU producers in the Caspian, notably Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
Russia’s determination to continue operating in such a manner continues to put
obstacles in the way of such key initiatives as the Energy Charter Secretariat’s Transit
Protocol, which, inter alia, aims to ensure a level playing field for Caspian producers
securing access to the Russian pipeline network. The importance of this is highlighted
by the fact that while Turkmenistan was selling its gas to Russia for around $44/tcm
in 2005 – and was seeking an increase to $60/tcm – Russia has been able to sell its gas
to Turkey for around $130 - $133/tcm with some 2005 gas sales into the EU hitting
$250/tcm. It is not transit costs but the Gazprom monopoly that accounts for most of
the difference between the amounts Turkmenistan and Russia receive for their gas.
6.4.2. Ukraine
Very low energy efficiency and monopolisation and lack of transparency in the
energy commodity markets are major issues in Ukraine. The gas pipeline
infrastructure, while still underutilised, is nevertheless ageing and in need of
upgrading. Ukraine’s economic concerns are strongly linked to political developments
and in particular the relations with Russia on the one side and the EU on the other
side. The necessary restructuring of the coal sector and energy intensive heavy
industries will undoubtedly be strongly opposed by groups and regions affected by this
creating internal social and political tensions. 
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6.4.3. Algeria
Algeria’s main concern is to improve the political climate without jeopardising the
economic recovery. The EU obviously needs to offer political support for
reconciliation efforts between the government and opposition, and to encourage
European companies to continue their operations in, and trade with, Algeria. 
6.5. The way in which the EU addresses energy issues in Russia,
the Ukraine and Algeria
Russia is a power in its own right, which means a very high level essentially
bilateral dialogue is maintained with Moscow, both by the EU as a body and by
leading individual member countries. Since energy is an increasing EU concern, this
has naturally brought energy to the forefront of the dialogue. With Algeria, although
oil and gas revenues are the motors that largely drive the Algerian economy, and in
particular, its government revenues and exports, energy is, in fact, subsumed into a
much broader approach. By and large, it is hard to find cases of strategic thinking on
energy in EU programmes concerning Algeria. That is not to say there is no such
thinking, but it does not seem to manifest itself in current programmes concerning
Algeria. This may well be because EU-based companies, along with those of major
non-EU nations, already play a major role in Algerian energy development.
Ukraine is dealt with in a separate manner again. The EU’s prime concern, as
with Algeria, is with overall political, economic and social stability. The EU wants to
see a successful reform process in Ukraine that will encourage the same kind of
transformation that most of the former communist states of Eastern Europe, and the
Baltic countries, have undergone in the last 15 years. Energy developments play a
rather different role in this process than they do in Algeria. From an EU perspective,
Ukraine’s role in EU energy security is that of an absolutely vital transit country
through which major oil and gas pipelines carry Russian and Caspian hydrocarbons
to markets in the EU and Mediterranean. 
6.6. Russia – energy policies, prospects and EU relations
It is with Russia that the EU possesses the best opportunity to develop an energy
partnership based on the common pursuit of a clear programme of specific energy
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projects intended to boost both Russian and EU energy security. The core concept of
long-term commitments for EU investment in Russian energy in exchange for long-
term Russian commitments to supply energy to the EU remains unassailable. The
problem is that to make this work requires strategic thinking of the very highest
calibre since, in essence, the European agents in this would largely be private
companies seeking commercial deals whereas their Russian partners would either be
state-owned (notably Gazprom) or potentially state influenced (notably Lukoil). In the
five years since EU-Russia Energy Dialogue was initiated by Presidents Putin and
Prodi, there has been no real resolution of this dichotomy. Russia’s energy industry
has become less, not more, liberalised.
Operating conditions for foreign investors in energy have become less favourable.
Whether BP can make a success of its TNK-BP venture, and whether Shell (and indeed
non-EU companies such as Exxon-Mobil) can make a success of their development
programmes in Sakhalin, is still open to question. There are enormous potential
opportunities in Russia, notably above the Arctic Circle, but it will require perhaps
unprecedented political input by both the EU as an organisation and the governments
of its leading member states to ensure the development of a genuine energy
partnership. In the absence of such a partnership this does not mean that the next five
to ten years would bring an end to EU-Russian energy cooperation, but it would
essentially limit that cooperation to commercial exchanges, notably EU purchases of
Russian oil and gas and Russian purchases of EU technology and energy services.
What has survived so far from the original Putin-Prodi initiative is the concept of
creating a Common European Economic Space, intended to boost the movement of
goods and services, and also people, between the EU and Russia. The CEES was not
originally intended to embrace energy, but discussions in 2003 included then
possibility that it should be extended to cover energy. Were the CEES concept to be
extended to cover energy, Russian energy exports would benefit from the effective
transfer to another part of a tariff-free market. But the EU would want to know that
Russian gas was entering its territory on both a competitive and transparent basis.
And that would require a sound regulatory framework. 
It will be difficult for the EU to put direct pressure on Russia to make it easier for
foreign companies to operate there, particularly in the energy sector. Still, the EU
leverage towards Russia rests on financial and technology that EU companies can
bring to develop the oil and gas sectors in Russia and on the monopsony position in
gas and the access to the EU common market that is very important for Russia. 
First, the energy partnership could include agreements that cover EU upstream
investments in Russia in exchange for Russian downstream investments in the EU.
Second, the EU should stick to the policy of ruling out destination clauses in energy
contracts. The objective should be that once Russian gas enters the EU territory, it can
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be freely traded on the common market. This implies continued effort for fully
effective gas market liberalisation in the EU. This will not please Russia, since it will
reduce Gazprom’s negotiating power, but it is a core principle that needs to be
upheld. It will also show that the EU means business.
Third, the co-operation on addressing energy inefficiencies in Russia can be
attractive for both sides. Fourth, the European Commission should directly
address the question of how to make Russia itself wish to become a more
competitive supplier – i.e., one less reliant on its monopoly status either to secure
sales or to penalise neighbouring gas producers reliant on its transit system. One
way that this might be done is through encouraging a more rapid expansion of gas
imports from non-Russian suppliers – even if this means the rapid development of
fresh infrastructure to facilitate such imports. The Commission might care to
ponder the proposition that construction of a new pipeline to carry non-Russian
gas to the heart of the EU, such as the Nabucco pipeline from Turkey to Austria or
the Interconnector intended to link Turkey, Greece and Italy, need to be
considered as strategic pipelines implying EU support for these projects (even if
only political). In addition it may be useful to discus with Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan on re-opening the earlier plan for a trans-Caspian gas pipeline.
Azerbaijan is now complaining at Russia’s energy power play, and sooner of later
Turkmenistan must appreciate how it is now being ripped off by the Kremlin and
Gazprom. The very existence of alternatives, perhaps regardless of the volumes of
gas they may bring into Europe from new suppliers, will have an impact on the
price and terms under which Russian gas is exported to the EU. Certainly, EU
could insist on a Central Asian element in its bilateral dialogue with Russia. The
problem is that the consumers who stand to gain from paying less for Russian gas
are unlikely to be the same people or groups as those who might be called upon to
finance alternative pipelines. The Commission might wish to investigate ways of
squaring this circle since it is quite feasible, particularly in an era of comparatively
high energy prices, that the cost-savings on long-term Russian gas imports might
well exceed the costs associated with constructing or expanding infrastructure to
serve non-Russian suppliers. In particular this means investing in LNG
technologies, which are becoming increasingly cost-effective, and provide a
plausible escape route from the Gazprom network monopoly.
It is in both the EU’s interest, and in the interest of various Central Asian
producers, for Russia to sign the Energy Charter Secretariat’s Transit Protocol. The
problem is convincing Russia that this would also be in Russia’s own interest, since it
would demonstrate to the world Russia’s understanding that reliance on monopoly
power is, or should be, outdated. 
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6.7. Ukraine – energy policies, prospects and EU relations
In the case of Ukraine, the EU could call for and support transition to less energy
wasteful economic model. This implies support for the difficult yet necessary process
of bringing energy prices to market levels and necessary adaptation measures on the
side of industry and households. Also, demonopolisation of the energy sectors should
be supported. Such objectives, while consistent with long-term development agenda
of Ukraine may nevertheless be quite difficult to sell politically in view of the
(transitory but substantial) social and economic costs involved in adaptation to
market rules in energy. 
Also, EU specific thought might be given to helping Ukraine to diversify its
sources of gas imports. Construction of a spur to Ukraine from the planned Nabucco
pipeline between Turkey and Austria would be an obvious medium-term option. In the
short-term, directed EU investment into broad based industrial redevelopment and
assistance to the Ukrainian coal industry, both to improve productivity and to reduce
carbon emissions through introduction of ‘clean coal’ technology should reap both
economic and political dividends.
6.8. Algeria – energy policies, prospects and EU relations
In 2005, there were major developments in both Algerian energy development
and in Algeria’s relations with the EU. In April, after four years of controversy and
debate – including fierce trade union opposition) – parliament adopted a new
Hydrocarbons Law under which production sharing contracts will be made available
through transparent bidding rounds. On 1 September 2005, Algeria’s political and
association agreement with the EU came into effect. Of these two developments, the
former is by far the most important, even though the latter does specify the desirability
of energy sector cooperation.
The hydrocarbons law (which was only actually published in July 2005) is
considered crucial to Algerian chances of securing access to international capital to
pursue energy-led economic growth. In its absence, the deferred investment scenario
would doubtless have become the normal and that would have had a major impact
on Algerian export prospects. The law, which is aimed at overcoming two decades of
ineffective resource management – encourages transparency, competitiveness and
efficiency and offers higher shares to private investors in production sharing
contracts (PSC). In effect, as one specialist publication has noted, it marks a shift in
the role of Sonatrach, the state oil & gas monopoly, “from organiser to equal
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participant in licensing rounds, and an end to the monopoly ownership and
management of oil and gas pipelines”. 
Although Algeria is clearly a major partner in any process intended to enhance EU
energy security, the most striking aspect of current programmes under the Barcelona
process is the way that they avoid specific reference to the depth of the EU-Algerian
energy relationship. The programmes focus on the creation of a generally much more
liberalised economy in Algeria rather than on the attainment of any specific
cooperative relationship in energy. This is quite natural, since major EU companies
such as BP, Total, Repsol and ENI are all substantial players in Algerian energy
development and it can be argued that all three sides in this triangle – the EU, the
companies and the Algerian authorities – understand both the need and benefits of
continued close cooperation.
Because of its partnership with international energy companies, which means
that foreign companies provide much of the investment capital for development of its
oil and gas, Algeria should prove less susceptible than most OPEC producers to the
prospect of deferred investment. 
Greater liberalisation of the Algerian economy, coupled with the attainment of free
trade between Algeria and the EU should further incorporate Algeria into what might
be termed the broader European common market. But over the next five to ten years,
great care will have to be exercised to ensure that other aspects of integration, notably
where employment is concerned, are clearly seen to benefit ordinary Algerians. There
may well be scope for an approach based on the concept that EU companies would be
encouraged to take care of much of the fresh investment Algeria requires to increase
its gas production and to limit the decline in its oil production, leaving the Algerian
government with a relatively free hand to dispense actual revenues as it – and the
Algerian people – see fit. In this regard, EU training programmes that promote
understanding of how mixed economies work may prove far more important in terms
of encouraging both responsible and responsive governance, and thus enhancing
energy security by improving overall stability in Algeria, than any specific focus on
increased access to, or direction of, Algeria’s energy resources.
6.9. Investment opportunities
One result of the Russia-Ukraine gas imbroglio at the turn of 2005/2006 is likely
to be a fresh look at overall EU energy infrastructure, particularly with regard to gas
supply. In terms of gas supply, there will be specific prospects for investment in
developing:
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• The Nabucco pipeline intended to convey gas from Turkey via Bulgaria,
Romania and Hungary to an Austrian hub at Baumgarten (Turkey does not
produce gas, but would be a collection point for gas coming from an arc of
countries, including Azerbaijan, Iran, and Egypt, and which could, eventually,
extend to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iraq and Arab Gulf state
producers). The Nabucco project developers – the leading gas companies in the
five states – hope to be able to start shipping gas through such a line in 2011.
Strong EU support could bring this date forwards. Ukraine has expressed
interest in the project, and an extension from Romania to Ukraine would ease
pressures on both Ukraine and Moldova, which also suffered a cutoff of Russian
supplies in the December 2005-January 2006 gas pricing dispute.
• The Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector. The underwater section from Greece to
Italy has yet to be finalised.
• A possible gas line from Greece through the western Balkans to central Europe.
This is a long shot. But such a line might be developed as part of a diversification
strategy by the EU, in conjunction with the development of new delivery sources
of gas to the EU market.
• New LNG terminals in the Mediterranean.
• New delivery systems: Further pipelines to expand gas deliveries from North Africa,
incorporating new lines to bring West African gas to the EU via North Africa.
6.9.1. Specific prospects in Russia
EU energy companies would love to be able to invest in both the Russian
upstream (both oil and gas) and in new pipelines to carry Russian oil and gas to
market. In practice, in the absence of major Russian reforms covering foreign
ownership and creation of a competitive internal market, this is not likely to happen
in any general manner. There will be specific exceptions, notably for new
infrastructure linking Russia with the EU – such as the North European gas pipeline
through the Baltic to Germany in which BASF and E.ON each have 24.5% stakes –
with Gazprom holding the remaining 51%.
General future prospects for direct investment may prove limited, unless there is a
change in the Russian approach. What there will be, however, is considerable
opportunity for provision of equipment and services for both upstream and infrastructure
projects. Russian energy companies will be looking for high-tech skills and equipment,
especially for use in arctic conditions. In this regard, the corporate structures for
developing the Shtockman gas condensate field are already in place, but there should be
considerable scope for EU corporate participation and contracts in the Yamal Peninsula.
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6.9.2. Specific prospects in Ukraine
Ukraine’s transit pipeline system needs upgrading. Whether this will be open to EU
investment will remain dependent on the Ukraine’s privatisation policy for the energy
sector. The Ukraine’s opposition to genuine involvement of foreign companies may be
partly due to fears of loosing control on the pipeline network, the key leverage in the
disputes with Russia. Such fears are unfortunate but they cannot be deemed
unjustified. One of Russia’s goals in the series of disputes with Ukraine appears to be
Gazprom control of Ukraine’s gas trunkline system in much the same way that it is now
negotiating with Belarus for joint ownership of the Soviet-era transit pipeline system
across Belarus and its outright ownership of the newer Yamal peninsula – Northern
Europe gas line. As mentioned above, new infrastructure capable of delivering non-
Russian gas supplies to Ukraine also constitutes a possible investment opportunity.
There are also potentially interesting opportunities related to future reform of the
country’s coal industry. Introduction of clean coal technology, rationalisation of
existing mining operations and, longer-term, the possible development of plants to
convert coal to liquid fuels all offer considerable scope for EU investors. The Ukraine
is particularly looking at ways to reduce energy usage in mining. It believes it can save
up to 5 bcm of gas per year.
Exploration and production also offer interesting prospects. Shell is exploring
onshore for gas, including exploration of strata below existing gas in the Dniepr-
Donetsk Basin, while there is increasing interest in offshore Black Sea prospects.
One specific oil project is worth mentioning, ensuring that the newly constructed
oil pipeline between the Black Sea port of Odessa and the inland refinery of Brody
carries Caspian and/or Russian oil northwards to European markets rather than, as
at present, carrying Russian crude southwards into the Black Sea would help the EU
diversify its oil supply sources. Various ways of tying this line into existing pipeline
systems within the EU have been suggested, notably extensions to Gdansk in Poland
and Wilhelmshavn in Germany (although the delays in the project kick-off suggest that
its economic rationale has not been perceived as guaranteed by potential investors).
Both offer scope for EU investment, and while the Wilhelmshavn project would be
more expensive – $2bn as against upwards of $500m for an extension to Gdansk – it
also opens up the prospect of securing US as well as EU investment.
6.9.3. Specific prospects in Algeria
Algeria is open to external energy investment across the board, including
competition for supply to domestic oil and gas markets. EU majors are already well-
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established, as are suppliers and service companies. The issue is not one of specific
new opportunities for EU companies, but the security conditions in the country.
The Algerians want to increase oil production by 43% and gas product exports by
87% over the next five years, including the expansion of LNG capacity to 60 mt/y.
Although many of the projects required to achieve these targets are already tendered,
other new projects or expansions of existing activities can be expected over the next
several years. While the EU obviously remains a prime market, much of the
expansion, particularly in LNG, will be directed at North American markets, and US
investment will also be sought.
6.10. Conclusion: The balance: who is more important to whom?
The problem with the various EU programmes is that while they lay out a set of
highly laudable goals that the EU and partner countries should jointly strive to attain,
and promote a whole series of aims indeed to boost political, economic and social
stability, they tend to shy away from detailed specific programmes for actual
implementation of such goals. 
For example, the Five Year Work Plan adopted by the EuroMed Partnership in
Barcelona on 27 November 2005 states that the 35 member states of the Euro-
Mediterranean partnership – which includes all the EU member states and,
amongst a cluster of Mediterranean states, both Algeria and Egypt – will:
“Implement sub-regional energy projects to promote a Euro-Mediterranean energy
market, including the progressive integration of Mashrek-Maghreb electricity
networks with the EU electricity network; the integration of Middle East gas
networks, energy co-operation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority; and
several important pipeline connections.”
The impact that the various EU programmes has had, or will have, on the key
issue of energy cooperation remains hard to assess, not least because the term energy
cooperation can embrace anything from technical workshops to full scale contractual
supply agreements between producers and consumers. The EU programmes may be
helping to create a climate within which a new generation of Russians, Ukrainians
and Algerians have a better grasp of, and faith in, the principles of the free market.
But while this means they should be able to ensure that in a mixed-economy world the
technocrats of all three countries will have a better understanding of EU business
concerns and practises, they cannot, in and of themselves, ensure that key decision-
makers will make EU import requirements their main priority. As ever, that will
remain a subject for essentially political argument. 
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Nonetheless, creation of a business friendly climate is important for several
reasons, notably promotion of transparency. This is particularly important in terms of
the investment requirements of energy producers and the transit tariff arrangements
in transit countries. Agreement to work towards a “consolidated macro-economic
stability and improved public finance management” – one of the goals of the Five Year
Work Programme unveiled at the EuroMed summit in Barcelona on 27 November
2005, would contribute to the overall environment within which regional oil operate.
Economic integration, by which is meant moves towards development of a free
trade area including any or all of the three countries under consideration, should
clearly promote energy security in that it would strengthen conditions in all three
countries for inward EU investment in general, and thus for energy sector
investments in particular. But economic integration should not be divorced from
social and even political integration. The more these partner countries are
economically integrated into the EU, the greater the aspirations of their populations
for real benefits. Economic integration has to be a two-way street; it has to be seen
to be benefiting the partner countries; if not, it may provoke rather than prevent
political discontent. In Algeria, with 36% of GDP deriving from oil and gas,
ensuring that the EU (or anybody else) is not simply seen as a power seeking to
secure control of the country’s principal source of wealth is obviously crucial. A
similar concern arises with respect to Russia, although practical problems with
transmitting a message on EU objectives to ordinary Russians will be substantial. 
It may well prove necessary to balance EU concerns over investment – the energy
security issue – with partner country concerns about access to the EU labour market
– one of their biggest social security issues. This, of course, is not only relevant to EU
relations with Algeria, but also to the Union’s relations with Egypt and, in a transit
role, Jordan and Syria as well. 
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• The budget for the European Neighbourhood Policy ENP budget will be nearly
doubled and will be close to 15 billion EUR in 2007-2013.
• The EU generic priority interest is that Neighbouring countries build as
hospitable business and political environments as possible. Thus, any assistance
supporting better investment climate and harmonisation of different areas with
the EU regulations should bring positive results for EU business.
It is envisaged that future European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
(ENPI) will determine technical assistance in the EU priority areas for the next
financial perspective of 2007-2013. This is to say, that the ENP budget will be nearly
doubled and will be close to 15 billion EUR39. Also, it is foreseen that together with
the higher budget, the ENPI will take over some of the priorities supported for
bilateral assistance funds. Taking this into account, it is desirable to analyse what has
been the EU financial assistance for analysed ENP economies to date. Based on these,
EU member states can form positions on prioritisation of the new instrument.
Table 7.1 shows EU expenditures on programs in selected fields such as development
of transport infrastructure, financial intermediation and telecommunication, together
with energy sectors, water management and waste treatment in the EU Neighbourhood.
Up to the end of 2006, nearly half of the overall EU financial assistance was directed to
these sectors in the three Mediterranean countries. National Indicative Programmes
predict that during 2005-2006 from 30% of the overall EU Indicative Programmes budget
in Morocco to nearly 50% of the total budget in Algeria will be directed to cover these
areas. In contrast, these areas have played a less important role in 2004-2006 EU
assistance directed to Eastern partners (9% in Ukraine and around 20% in Russia of the
NIPs total). However, the total EU support for private sector reform (covering also such
spheres as local development and policy dialogue) in both Russia and Ukraine accounts
for around 30% of the total EU funds. This broad support for private sector reform should
have also beneficial effects for EU economic actors, although the influence will be indirect.
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39 If one looks at the two existing instruments, TACIS and MEDA: it shall actually be a little more, as the ENPI
will not cover Central Asian countries now covered by TACIS, those will be dealt now by the EDI –European
Development Instrument.
7. Future EU financial assistance
The effectiveness of EU financial assistance in ENP countries lies beyond the scope
of this report. This will depend on the constellation of factors, including the
institutional solutions and priorities of ENP, absorption capacity of the ENP countries,
etc. Even ex-post evaluation of financial assistance programs is a difficult exercise,
though the lessons from past programs should certainly be studied in thinking about
potential future impact. The experience of TACIS and MEDA is particularly relevant
and recent evaluations can be found in ECORYS-NEI (2005) and DRN (2005).
More generally, the EU generic priority interest is that these Neighbouring
countries create as hospitable business and political environments as possible. Thus,
any assistance supporting better investment climate and harmonisation of different
areas with the EU regulations should bring positive results for EU business.
More detailed recommendations regarding ENPI can be found in section 8.2.
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Notes:
* – transport, telecommunication, energy dialogue
** – technical assistance in implementing AA's provisions. Among others, in the transport and energy sector
(regulatory reform)
*** – technical assistance in implementing PCA, among other in aligning environmental regulations to that
of the EU
Source: National Indicative Programmes.
Table 7.1. EU programmes in selected areas, committed funds, EUR million, 2004-2006
Russia Ukraine Algeria Egypt Morocco
budgeted for 2004-2006 2004-2006 2005-2006 2005-2006 2005-2006
  Transport 30* 20+10** 25** 34 + 15**
  Financial intermediation 30 8
  Telecommunication
other sectors of interest:
     support to energy sector reform 30* 12 10** 25** 15**
     water management 2 0 80 30
     waste treatment/environment 45*** 10
Memorandum item:
NIPs total 392 212 106 243 275
This section draws from earlier analysis to formulate two sets of recommendations.
Firstly, we suggest areas that could be prioritised in the existing or future action plans.
Secondly, we highlight areas where good business opportunities are likely to open up
for EU partners. 
In discussing specific economic integration policies and the gains that EU
countries can secure one should not lose sight of the broader picture. The difference
in economic weight between the EU and ENP countries implies that direct economic
gains from integration are unlikely to be comparable to what the EU can achieve by
pursuing domestic policies aimed at deepening integration within the EU or in
relations with major current and potential future trade partners, primarily the US, as
well as China and India. 
The economic importance of the countries covered in this report rests in that they
are direct EU neighbours, and thus the EU will be directly affected by developments
there in the next few years and decades. This is most dramatically illustrated in the
case of negative scenarios, such as internal conflict. The Balkan wars of the early
1990s had a strong and lasting impact on the EU, with large migrations ensuing,
crime (arms smuggling and human trafficking), etc. However, a similarly strong
impact could result from the realisation of positive scenarios in this regard. Examples
are provided by the history of economic transition leading to the 2004 EU accession
of 8 Central and Eastern European countries, and developments in current EU
accession countries, for instance.
The implication of this is that EU policies towards the ENP countries should be
primarily oriented towards securing sustainable economic and social development in
this region, rather than realisation of any short-term gains. It is in the EU’s interest to
ensure that its direct neighbourhood gradually becomes a sphere of security and well-
being, not only in economic terms but also in assuring basic freedoms to the
populations. There may be some short-term trade-offs between such goals and the
economic interests of EU partners (for instance linked to the allocation of EU budget
resources, liberalisation of trade in “sensitive” sectors, etc.). However, in the long-run
such trade-offs disappear and the EU’s long term economic objectives coincide with
the development objectives of the ENP region.
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8. Conclusions and recommendations
8.1. Priority areas for EU politics – lessons for the Action Plans
This section reviews the elements of the European Neighbourhood Policy that have
either already been agreed on or may be agreed on in the near future and makes
recommendations as to the priorities that would help in pursuing economic integration
between the EU and ENP countries in a manner most advantageous to both sides.
8.1.1. Russia
With Russia not formally part of the ENP, on one hand it would appear there is
more room for manoeuvre in terms of possible policy options. But on the other hand
the lack of a familiar framework could make working out a policy more difficult. 
The first important observation is that a focus on the economic dimension of
relations appears too narrow to formulate workable recommendations. The economic
dimension should be better thought of as just one element of the complex relations,
where general political and security issues play a major role. Recent trends in Russia’s
development, particularly as concerns the growth of authoritarianism, human rights
situation, freedom of the media, freedom of economic activity and Russia’s relations
with its neighbour states have been a source of concern among several EU member
states and EU institutions. While the situation at present may still be better than in some
of the North African or Middle East countries, the direction of changes is worrying. It
is a matter of debate whether advantages can be obtained by trying to link economic
integration to progress in other spheres where the EU sees its interests (which are
normally believed to coincide with the long-term interests of Russian society). The
“values gap” between Russia’s political elite and the EU is evidently wide. On the other
hand the Putin regime enjoys undoubted political legitimacy at home, and most Russian
people seem to largely support the idea that their country is only governable with a
strong hand (still, when one looks at the other countries neighbouring the EU, Russian
society appears closer to the EU in terms of values, basic social structures, etc.). 
Russia’s high human, economic and military potential clearly distinguishes the
country from other states participating in the ENP. Russia has already secured its
special status in relations with the EU and it is unlikely that attempts to change this
situation could be productive for either of the sides. The real challenge is how to fill
high-level declarations with some practical content that could lead to meaningful
progress in bilateral relations. The risk with the strategy that has been pursued so far
is that special relations and various initiatives that have been agreed upon will retain
their largely facade character, while real progress will lag behind what can be achieved
by the EU’s dialogue with the ENP countries. One implication of this would be that the
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relevance of EU-Russia dialogue would diminish further, while all matters would be
settled via Russia’s bilateral relations with individual EU member states. This appears
a suboptimal scenario as the divergent interests of EU member states might easily lead
to deals that create conflicts within the EU. The recent clash between Germany and
Poland and Baltic States over the Baltic gas pipeline provides a good example. 
While Russia and the EU may be willing and able to fruitfully co-operate in
several fields, some areas of conflict will likely arise. In this case the bargaining power
of member states acting separately is much weaker than that of the EU as a whole,
due to the EU’s variegated human and economic potential (Russia has a much larger
population than any of the member states and its GDP (at market exchange rates) is
roughly equal to that of the Netherlands). Thus, the chances for securing any of the
EU’s joint objectives in its relations with Russia (e.g. related to security or human
rights issues) would be slim.
In order to be effective EU policies need to address various concerns articulated
by Russian society that has in recent years supported the policy line set by the current
presidential administration. Although such a task is very difficult. There is a need to
ensure wider availability of information about the EU, its objectives and policy
towards Russia. This dimension should not be overlooked in shaping economic
relations between the two sides if the EU wants to have a chance of eventually being
perceived (by some of the population) as a friendly partner rather than as an
antagonist trying to secure its interests in relation to energy commodities.
In thinking about the development of economic relations over the next five to ten
years one should remember that political relations between Russia and the EU have
actually worsened in the last few years compared to the situation in the 1990s. The
divergence of views on the Yukos case, elections in Belarus, Ukraine and Azerbaijan,
the situation in Chechnya, or the conflict with Ukraine over gas deliveries and the
British “spy scandal” have prompted several observers to shift to a very negative
assessment of President Putin’s regime40. The major change in assessment may be
partly due to earlier overly optimistic perceptions of Putin’s initial commitment to
democratic values and the free market and overly pessimistic view of the most recent
developments, but certainly the style and tone of the dialogue has changed and “the
West wind in Moscow today is a lot frostier than just a few years ago” (Kuchins, 2005).
In the short-term perspective several political developments will be taking place
offering opportunities for promotion of the economic aspects of EU-Russia relations,
among other issues. Firstly, several new strategic policy documents will need to be
worked out in the near future. With the current PCA expiring in 2007 there will be
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40 As an example, commentator of the British The Times did not hesitate to note that “Russia’s idea of democracy
and an independent media is very different from the West’s”; J. Page, Analysis: a shot across Western bows,
The Times, 23 January 2006.
scope for in-depth thinking on a new agreement. Planning for the new financial co-
operation/assistance instrument (ENPI) will need to be finalised in 2006 before it
replaces TACIS in 2007. This will include working out a Country Strategy Paper and a
National Indicative Programme. Additionally, a new political framework reshaping the
Northern Dimension will be agreed in 2006. Thus, a window of opportunity will be
open for substantial revival of co-operation in several fields. 
The experience of the previous strategic documents and their implementation
suggests that grand words and ideas should not be overused, while co-operation
should concentrate on practical issues that are relevant for both sides. In the
economic sphere, the dialogue will continue to be concentrated on energy issues. 
WTO accession will be an important step for Russia that should bring more
stability and predictability to EU-Russia economic relations. Trade dispute
settlements should be easier, their impact less harming and the scope of introducing
numerous unexpected trade restrictions reduced (recall the recent Russian bans on
imports of selected commodities from several member states, described elsewhere in
the report). To this end, the EU should continue supporting Russia in trying to ensure
early membership, although the very nature of the WTO sets clear limits as to what
the EU can do in this regard. 
8.1.2. Ukraine
Ukraine belongs to the group of countries that are relatively advanced in their
dialogue with the EU in the ENP framework. The Country Report had already been
accepted in May 2004 and Action Plan was agreed at the end of 2004. The Action Plan
already clearly identifies priorities for action, but its monitoring section explicitly allows
for changes and evolution of priorities. The first review of the Action Plan should be
undertaken not later than two years after its adoption, that is by the turn of 2006/2007.
An important factor is that Ukraine has declared its interest in eventual
membership of the EU. Poland, Sweden, and the Baltic States have declared their
support for this, while several other member states have raised concerns that it may
not be realistic. The idea is certainly controversial, but even if eventually implemented
it will not happen earlier than 15-20 years from now. Thus, we do not discuss this
issue in the report.
In thinking about the EU’s strategy for strengthening economic integration with
Ukraine in a manner that would be most beneficial to both sides one should take into
account some of Ukraine’s characteristics. Ukraine’s foreign policy in recent years has
been characterised by attempts to balance the objectives of integration with the EU
(or the “West” in general) and Russia, which were perceived as opposing rather than
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complementing each other (at least in the political sphere). President Yuschenko
appears to be more committed to the “European” dimension of Ukrainian policy,
though he also clearly understands the need for close economic and political co-
operation with Russia. Ukrainian society is strongly divided on what should be the
country’s optimal economic and foreign policy. The broadly defined “Eastern option”
appears to have stronger support than a “Western option” and the level of basic
knowledge about the EU is alarmingly low (Konieczna, 2006).
Deepening economic integration between the EU and Ukraine could be treated as
a way to reduce the relevance of a strategic choice between “the East” and “the West”
as mutually excluding options. If economic gains from such co-operation are visible to
Ukrainian society and the political elite they could provide a strong impetus for deeper
integration with Europe by overcoming negative stereotypes about the EU. At the same
time, membership in the WTO and the strength of economic links with the EU could
improve the negotiation climate in talks on Ukraine’s relations with Russia that in turn
could help in building closer links between the two countries, to the benefit of both.
Ukraine’s commitment to European economic integration could also became stronger
on the back of recent Russian moves, aimed at heavily reducing subsidisation of energy
resources sold to Ukraine. Higher domestic production costs can be expected to make
integration with more developed EU countries more attractive.
The commitments listed in the EU-Ukraine Action Plans regarding economic
issues by and large properly address major priorities for the EU, and the vast majority
of them remain relevant today and worth pursuing. Nevertheless, we have identified
the most important broad categories for action. Among the issues listed we see the
following as offering the greatest potential for the benefit of both sides.
WTO accession should remain a short-term priority, as it may force some
liberalisation, deregulation, and more equal treatment of economic agents. Although
it seems that what remains to be done is largely on the Ukrainian side, as the bilateral
negotiations with the EU are already completed. Still, the EU should extend its
support where possible.
Then, if economic integration is to be pursued, an EU-Ukraine FTA should be
forwarded. The existence of such an FTA would not only enhance trade and FDI in less
protected sectors. It would also lay the groundwork for deeper integration in the sphere
of agricultural trade and investment in agribusiness (where Ukraine is believed to possess
a comparative advantage). Given the history of EU integration, such liberalisation is
unlikely to occur before liberalising trade in manufacturing. Also, the conclusion of an
FTA would lock-in reforms, such as completing legislation guaranteeing competition
(especially regarding state aid, where foreign investors are disadvantaged).
Further approximation of Ukrainian standards and procedures to those of the EU
would be beneficial to both the EU and Ukraine. It would help Ukrainian producers
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get better access to the EU market (even if “access to the EU internal market” is not
granted immediately, adoption of common standards will facilitate trade). It would
also foster the realisation of gains from the future FTA. Such a process is underway
in the industrial sector, but it is agriculture that has great potential.
The priorities regarding deepening and widening of financial intermediation are
worth pursuing, as they not only create windows of opportunity for EU investors, but also
lower various transaction and operating costs. From the points mentioned in the Action
Plan the following are of particular relevance: strengthening banking and non-banking
financial sector regulation and supervision, intensification of financial sector reform and
taking measures aimed at increasing stock market capitalisation and turnover.
Any measures that support the improvement of the broadly understood investment
climate are also worth pursuing. These include: easing restrictions on land ownership
by foreign entities, facilitating rights of establishment, tax reform, implementation of
the law on state aid and enhancing the independence of the competition authority and
other regulators.
As our analysis suggests, incorporation of neighbours into pan-European
networks does not pose major obstacles in terms of institutions (unlike participation
in the internal market). Therefore, networks provide a good opportunity to offer
neighbours a sense of inclusiveness. Common networks will also bring economic
benefits, such as cost reduction and better security of supplies. Ukraine is a transit
country, therefore by including it in its networks (and, thus, acquiring powers to
influence Ukraine’s transit policies) the EU could improve security of supply of some
important products (mainly energy). Ukraine would also benefit greatly, as
improvement of its transit capacity and compatibility of its networks with EU
standards would make feasible an improving of transit services and, thus, play a more
important role and earn more from transit.
The Action Plan is very cautious with regard to facilitation of movement of people
between the EU and Ukraine, although some recent developments have opened
prospects for a more ambitious agenda in this field. Abolition of visa requirements for
EU citizens introduced by the Ukrainian President in 2005 gave a new impetus to
discussions about a reciprocal move from the EU side. In November 2005, the parties
conducted the first round of negotiations on visa facilitation and discussions of the
draft agreement on readmission of persons (a necessary condition for liberalisation of
the visa regime), where they agreed on the need to simplify visa procedures and agreed
a list of categories of persons to get visa-free entry into the EU41. Given the costs of the
readmission agreement some EU support for a functioning system for detention and
deportation of illegal migrants might be needed. A more ambitious approach to the visa
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41 See http://www.ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/eu/en/news/detail/1293.htm
regime may be beneficial to the EU mainly via the impact of foreign travel on the
attitudes of ordinary Ukrainians. Konieczna (2006) provides evidence that foreign
travel (proxied by possessing a passport) emerges as a strong determinant of basic
knowledge about the EU and tends to be connected with higher human capital.
8.1.3. Morocco
Morocco is the second of the two analysed countries that have concluded an
Action Plan with the EU (in 2004). At the same time, its trade links with the EU are
the strongest among all the analysed countries.
Therefore, the prioritisation of the Action Plan should focus on closer trade
integration with the EU and on measures that would support the implementation of
the EU-Morocco FTA in manufacturing, as it is a precondition for deeper integration
in other spheres. The implementation phase has already started and it is envisaged
that FTA in industrial goods will be formed by 2013. Among the supporting measures
listed in the Action Plan the following are of particular importance: implementation
of Combined Nomenclature of products, modernisation and strengthening of capacity
of customs, harmonisation of customs law with that of the EU, harmonisation of
norms, standards and procedures wherever necessary.
Along with these, the conclusion of FTAs with other Southern Mediterranean
countries will speed up the process of integration. The benefits for the ENP
Mediterranean countries will materialise in the form of cumulative rules of origins,
while on the EU side the treatment of the whole group of countries will be easier and
integration should proceed more smoothly.
The next priority would be the creation of coherent agricultural policy in Morocco
that would serve as a basis for the creation of free trade in agricultural products
between the EU and Morocco, which in turn would allow for a full harvesting of the
benefits of trade integration, as explained in section 5.1 of this report. The action
should go in two broad directions. Firstly, the quality of agricultural products should
be gradually improved, and secondly, coherent rural development policy should be
pursued. This latter point, i.e. rural development policy, will also be needed in order
to prevent large scale exodus to the cities and possibly excessive migration to the EU.
With potential large scale Moroccan migration in mind, the EU should give
priority to support for social development (e.g. via strengthening the education
system) in Morocco. As for the flow of people, information about the possibilities of
legal migration as well as the consequences of illegal migration should be
disseminated to the general public. The dialogue on the treatment of migrant workers
should be reinforced and the Moroccan authorities should engage (possibly with the
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EU’s assistance) in the prevention of illegal transit migration and cooperate with the
EU on the readmission issue and on visa facilitation.
In general, any points of the Action Plan that address either the development of
the business climate in Morocco or the development of the SME sector or promotion
of education are also worth pursuing, as they will tend to limit illegal migration and
support the overall development of the country. 
8.1.4. Egypt
The recommendations for the future EU-Egypt Action Plan are based on the
country report that was released in 2005.
Following the implementation phase of the EU-Egypt FTA that started in 2004,
the monitoring of the timing of tariff dismantling and of the implementation of
supporting measures should be the main focus. During the first three years Egypt is
supposed to gradually phase out tariffs on about half of all imports from the EU. As
the consumer goods sector in Egypt will remain protected for a considerable length
of time, a focus on the implementation of other trade liberalisation and reform
measures is also of particular importance. It should also be noted that the Egyptian
economy, after being relatively open in the 1970s and 1980s, was heavily protected
through the 1990s and export-orientation has received a boost only since 2001. The
adherence of the Egyptian government to the objective of opening the economy should
receive international support. 
Among various measures supporting trade liberalisation the enactment of a new
customs code (to replace the outdated 1963 one) and work on further restructuring of
the customs administration appear worthy of receiving priority attention.
It is also important to carefully monitoring whether the bilateral preferences in
agricultural trade between the EU and Egypt are granted as scheduled. As regards
domestic policy, the EU could extend its assistance to Egypt in the sphere of
coordination of foodstuff requirements, in order to simplify respective requirements so
that these are coordinated by a single agency only and can indeed be met by producers.
Due to its large oil and gas resources, Egypt is an important EU partner in energy
sector cooperation. Thanks to the sizeable discoveries of gas Egypt is becoming an
important gas producer. Egypt also plays an important role in energy transit, with the
Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean pipeline serving as major transit routes for
Persian energy resources. Therefore, cooperation in the field of pipeline transport
should be of particular importance from the point of view of EU energy security. The
regional Arab gas pipeline could at some future stage of development be connected
not only to Cyprus and Turkey, but also to Greece and Central Europe. This is a rather
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long-term goal, but cooperation in the planning and even early development stage
with the EU would appear beneficial.
Given the domestic political situation in Egypt, gradually falling public support
for the presidential “dynasty”, and hence uncertainty about future commitments to
further reforms, promotion of openness, transparency, etc., political dialogue with the
EU should support strengthening of Egypt’s economic ties with the EU that could
benefit the general public.
8.1.5. Algeria
Relations with Algeria will most likely be dominated by energy issues and support for
the general development of the country. Among the three Mediterranean ENP states
considered here, Algeria’s relations with the EU within the ENP framework are at the
least advanced stage. The sides concluded the AA only in 2005. The country report, which
will create the basis for the Action Plan, is to be prepared some time in 2006-2007. 
In the field of energy, large oil and gas extraction potential, existing demand
especially from the European market, and the investment needs of the country create
fields for EU-Algerian cooperation. For the EU the development of an attractive
investment climate for international energy companies remains crucial. The major EU
extracting companies are already well-established in Algeria, as are suppliers and
service companies. The issue therefore is not one of specific new opportunities for EU
companies, but the development of existing relations and the improvement of security
conditions in the country.
Given the political situation in Algeria, the challenge for the EU remains helping
in the improvement the political climate without jeopardising the economic recovery.
Thus, any future actions that would support general economic development should
support building prosperity and stability in Algeria as well as in the neighbourhood.
8.2. Approaches to ENPI
This section seeks to draw some broad lessons for the way in which the European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) can be applied in the ENP
countries starting from 2007. 
The general and rather obvious observation is that the ENPI should build upon
experience gathered during the operations of previous EU financial assistance operations
targeted at the countries concerned. In particular the experience in implementation of
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TACIS and MEDA should be carefully analysed. Recent evaluation reports on these two
programmes are particularly useful (ECORYS-NEI, 2005; DRN, 2005).
With regard to the EU-ENP partners bilateral relations, greater reliance on
incentive schemes, where additional financial assistance could be linked to progress
in domestic liberalisation of financial services and telecommunication could be
beneficial for both sides including business communities. Such actions could boost
services trade and create investment opportunities.
Greater synergy between ENPI, European Investment Bank, EBRD and World
Bank financial flows to the neighbouring countries is needed. Both technical
assistance funds and development loans should be more closely related to the
priorities and commitments expressed in Action Plans. This in particular relates to
financing of infrastructure development (ports, roads etc.). More “inter-programme”
coherence should help in addressing at least part of the concerns related to weak
effectiveness of the TACIS and MEDA programmes. At present, a widespread
criticism is that the constraints on the process of contracting and financial control
imposed upon the Commission by the Council and European Parliament make it
extremely difficult to devise timely and user-friendly projects. As a result, the EU’s
private sector may best rely on its own resources for using consultancy services. 
8.3. Business opportunities for EU actors
The successful economic and social development of the ENP countries and closer
economic co-operation with the EU would not only expand the zone of security and
stability to Europe’s borders and beyond, improving the standard of living of local
populations, but could also create business opportunities for the EU economic actors. This
section outlines some such potential opportunities, although, given the geographic and
sectoral scope of this report, the discussion necessarily remains rather general in nature.
Business opportunities for EU enterprises arising from market integration
between the EU and ENP countries will depend on the timing and specific solutions
within agreed forms of market integration. Thus, while discussing particular options
we explicitly refer to market integration models. 
The energy sector is one where there has already been substantial involvement of
EU companies and where realisation of a positive political scenario would create
more lucrative options. The scope of new opportunities will be primarily determined
by liberalisation of energy FDI rules and practice and overall improvement in the
investment climate in Russia, progress of reforms in the energy sector in Ukraine, and
security developments in Algeria. Thus, the link to chosen forms of economic
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integration is indirect, but at the same time there are obvious lessons as to what
elements of co-operation agreements the EU could try to promote to improve business
opportunities in the energy sector.
In terms of gas supply, there will be specific prospects for investment in
developing gas transport infrastructure. This mainly refers to the completion of the
Nabucco pipeline (by 2011) intended to convey gas from Turkey via Bulgaria,
Romania and Hungary to the Austrian hub, the Turkey-Greece-Italy Interconnector,
and in the longer term a possible gas line from Greece through the western Balkans
to Central Europe, new LNG terminals in the Mediterranean area and further
pipelines to expand gas deliveries from North Africa.
With regard to specific prospects in Russia, direct investment opportunities may
prove limited unless there is a change in Russia’s approach. It is expected that
cooperation will be exceptional, as was the case with the North European gas pipeline
under the Baltic Sea to Germany. In the absence of major Russian reforms covering
foreign ownership and the creation of a competitive internal market, this is not likely to
happen in any general manner. What there will be, however, is considerable opportunity
for provision of equipment and services for both upstream and infrastructure projects.
Russian energy companies will be looking for high-tech skills and equipment.
In Ukraine, reforms of the energy sector should create opportunities in particular
in equipment purchases, ensuring energy effectiveness, developing Ukraine’s
traditional and alternative sources of energy and modernising the pipeline system.
For instance, Shell was one of the first larger oil companies to sign a contract with
Naftogas of Ukraine to invest in gas exploration. While the progress of energy reforms
has been problematic in the past, the very recent conflict with Russia on the price of
imported gas (and resulting increase in imported gas prices) might provide a stimulus
for a more coherent approach to reforming the sector. 
The further development of the investment climate and overall stability in Algeria will
provide a window of opportunity to broaden investment in the oil and gas sector there.
Another important sector with potentially large potential for fruitful business co-
operation, foreign trade and investment is agriculture and food processing. Here, the
nature of emerging opportunities will be determined by specific solutions leading to
partial liberalisation of trade in agricultural goods. 
In all five countries, food processing has been developing rapidly over the last few
years and this trend is expected to continue. This, firstly, creates opportunities for
producers of food processing equipment as new high-tech equipment purchases are a
necessary element of quality improvement processes and indeed demand for such
equipment appears strong, at least in Russia and Ukraine42. An additional advantage
comes from the fact that EU companies currently dominate this market (at least in
Russia) (BISNIS, 2005). 
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Investments in food processing could ensure taking some of the gains from this
rapid expansion. Investments oriented towards the domestic market and markets
of neighbouring states may already be attractive, though given the still low
purchasing power of the populations of the ENP countries only ensuring that food
processed in particular ENP countries can eventually access EU markets would
make investments much less risky43. There is therefore an important and
potentially difficult policy issue of lifting some of the EU’s import restrictions for
food products from the ENP countries. This should be linked to ensuring that
essential quality standards and in particular food safety standards are not
compromised. This will be a challenge for Russia and Ukraine and perhaps even
more so for three North African countries, where standards need to become an
element of FTAs. There is therefore scope for EU support in strengthening the
national quality control systems, possibly making them more coherent with EU
quality regulations44. Bearing the costs of introduction of standards would most
usefully be shared between EU and ENP countries as the subject can be considered
as being a joint responsibility of both sides. While introduction of standards and
quality control systems is costly some countries may opt for this if promised
reasonable access to the EU market once the system is functional and the EU’s
support for systems implementation. The latter would in itself create opportunities
for companies with know-how in quality control and management. 
The experience of the new EU member states can be instructive in thinking about
options for the food sector. The boom in food exports from new member states to
more developed EU countries could on the one hand indicate the great potential of the
sector (stemming from cheaper labour, favourable natural conditions, etc.). On the
other hand the fact that when the moment of EU accession arrived trade patterns
changed substantially, even after years of FTAs, clearly illustrates the importance of
various trade barriers that countries from outside the EU face. Thus, the prospects for
deeper co-operation between the EU and ENP countries and business opportunities
that may emerge are determined not only by the institutional character of the co-
operation option that will be chosen but also, or primarily so, by the effective level of
market protection that the EU will be maintaining. 
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42 See for example regional and sectoral reports available at http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/isa/isa-food.cfm. 
43 Local markets, while expanding dynamically, are still quite shallow. Most consumers in North African
countries still cannot afford imported food products. For instance, recent estimates suggest that only some
10% of Moroccans buy imported food products (Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, 2005).
44 Examples of such initiatives include the “Improvement of logistics services and marketing channels for SMEs
in agriculture” project organised jointly by TACIS and the Ukrainian Ministry of Agriculture and targeted at
improving food safety on Ukraine’s livestock market (http://www.agrilogistics.com.ua/?lang=eng) and
another project in Ukraine: “The establishment of an Agricultural Standards Certification and Control
Mechanisms in Line with WTO-SPS Requirements”, that is focused on preparation of proposals for legislative
and regulatory changes in the areas of food safety and production in line with WTO-SPS requirements. One
of its outcomes was a creation of the WTO-SPS Information Centre (http://www.sps-info.org.ua/en/home/).
There are very interesting potential opportunities that may open up in the services
sector. Within the financial intermediation sector these will depend on the
development of prudential and other regulation at the national level. An effective
domestic prudential regulation is a pre-requisite for cross-border integration. In view
of the above the most appropriate method for the integration of financial services is a
path of domestic reforms.
Some opportunities for investment in the financial sector will open in Russia, as
it is expected that the efficiency, performance, transparency and credibility of the
sector will have improved by 2007. The Russian government is supposed to
approximate its relevant legislation to that of the EU, and domestic demand for
financial intermediation will steadily expand. The opportunities may arise in
expanding existing operations or potential greenfield investment, as the Russian
central bank’s strategy does not envisage any large privatisation before 2008.
The Ukrainian market, although much smaller, may offer relatively more
opportunities. These will primarily stem from expected entries of some international
players, increased competition, further easing of capital restrictions, increased
efficiency of supervisory authorities, both in the banking and in the insurance sector.
The opportunities for financial services development in Morocco and in Egypt will
be conditional on the realisation of its commitments concerning independent
regulators, easing restrictions on the capital account and privatisation efforts.
Within the transport sector, the opportunities will gradually expand in the ENP
countries in air transportation, together with liberalisation of services, adoption of
European and international standards and commitments and opening possibilities for
new connections. Morocco and Ukraine are expected to be the most promising
markets in this sphere. With respect to cooperation with Russia, royalties from flying
over Siberia are expected to be gradually eliminated and disappear by 2013.
There are plans for investment in road transportation, developing national road
networks as part of Pan-European transport corridors, improvement of road safety
etc., which will open possibilities for logistics companies. Again, here Morocco and
Ukraine are currently perceived as frontrunners. However, given the high costs of
road infrastructure to be borne, these will happen in a gradual way and can deliver
rather longer-term gains.
Within the sphere of development of water transport infrastructure, new
opportunities are likely to open up in Morocco, as can be judged from declarations of
granting easier access to port services and privatisation and approximation of
Moroccan regulations to EU law. Also, the opportunities are apparently arising in
river transport in Russia, on the back of the need for investment in infrastructure and
declarations about easier access. In the future, Ukraine might also be an interesting
place in this regard. 
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More generally, the EU’s generic priority interest is that its neighbour countries
(and the five countries covered in this report in particular) create as hospitable
business and political environments as possible, by European standards. This means
that the EU should give a high priority to its political and economic investment in the
neighbourhood policy concept. While this might seem obvious, actually some member
states have their reasons (poorly conceived in our view) to treat the ENP as a token
piece of inexpensive diplomacy to placate the neighbours for not being offered a
membership perspective. To counter this “placebo diplomacy’” in the Council is an
important task for those member states who take a more serious pro-active view. In
fact the EU has unique advantages: an attractive normative reputation with its
neighbours – from multiple angles – such as honest business methods, technical
modernity, political ideals for Europe, etc. This makes it plausible for the EU to work
hard at leveraging into these neighbouring states its technical and normative
standards, which if done successfully will effectively extend the EU’s sphere of
economic influence and privileged market area.
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Annex 1. NAFTA and labour mobility
There are various categories of temporary entry for business persons among the NAFTA
member states: business visitors, traders and investors, intra-company transferees and
professionals. The basic principles for the temporary entry for businesspersons in NAFTA are
transparent criteria and procedures, reciprocity and recognition of the preferential trading
relationship. There are no conditions – such as labour certification tests, prior approval
procedures, petition, or other procedures of similar effect – and with one broad exception related
to professional services there are no numerical quota restrictions.
The definition of a ‘business visitor’ is a citizen of a party who is engaged in the trade of
goods, the provision of services or the conduct of investment activities. ‘Temporary’ is defined as
having no intent to establish permanent residence. NAFTA grants temporary entry visas to
business visitors seeking to engage in a business activity without requiring that person to obtain
an employment authorisation from the host country. Visitors must ensure that their primary
source of remuneration for the proposed business activity is their home country, not the territory
of the party granting temporary entry; their principal place of business and actual place of
accrual of profits must, at least predominantly, remain outside such territory. Instead of defining
what kind of persons or professions may move, the NAFTA agreement defines the business
activities in which such persons engage. Business activities include: research and design; growth,
manufacture and production; agriculture (harvester-owner supervising a harvesting crew
admitted under the applicable law); marketing (market researchers and analysts conducting
research); sales, distribution, after-sales services and general service including tourism. Under
the category of sales, for example, Mexican sales representatives and agents are allowed to enter
Canada to take orders or negotiate contracts for goods or services for the Mexican firm. They are
not, however, allowed to deliver goods or provide services to the public in Canada. Relatively
low-skilled workers, such as transportation operators (tour-bus operators) are allowed to move
across countries to provide services under the auspices of their domestic companies.
The second NAFTA category under the temporary entry of businesspersons is for traders and
investors. Traders, who carry on substantial trade in goods and services between member states are
granted temporary entry. Investors are those who are seeking to establish, develop, administer or
provide advice or key technical services to the operation of an investment. The investment does not
have to be owned by the person who is seeking the temporary entry nor does it have to be committed,
but can rather be in the process of commitment. The agreement indicates that the investment should
involve a ‘substantial’ amount of capital, but without spelling out how much this would be.
Under the category of intra-company transferees, the person involved must have been
employed continuously by the enterprise for one year in the previous three-year period. He/she
must work in the capacity of manager or executive, or be the repository of special knowledge. As
with all the other categories, there are no numerical quotas imposed on the intra-companies
transferees between NAFTA members.
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Under the category of professionals, NAFTA encourages the mutual recognition of
accreditation, licensing and certification requirements. A person seeking to engage in a business
activity at a competent level in a profession is permitted temporary entry. Unlike the other
categories, however, this category allows the US to impose annual numerical limits on Mexico.
Initially, the US approved up to 5,500 professional Mexicans per annum seeking temporary entry
to the US; NAFTA requires that the US should, in consultation with Mexico, increase its annual
quota each year. The US and Mexico agreed that the US would phase out the annual quotas if it
grants a better treatment to a third party (a most-favoured nation clause) or ten years after
signing the agreement, whichever is sooner. In defining ‘professionals’, most require a university
degree or equivalent qualification.
Compiled from (Winters et. al, 2002)
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Statistical A
nnex
Table 3.1A. Geographical and commodity structure of Algerian, Egyptian, Moroccan, Russian and Ukrainian trade, 2003
Source: WTO trade statistics.
Russia   Algeria   Egypt   Morocco   Ukraine  
Exports   Exports   Exports   Exports   Exports  
  By commodity     By commodity     By commodity     By commodity     By commodity  
Agricultural products 7.5 Agricultural products 0.2 Agricultural products 14.3 Agricultural products 19.1 Agricultural products 12
Fuels and mining
products
59.9
Fuels and mining
products
97.9
Fuels and mining
products
50.8
Fuels and mining
products
12.6
Fuels and mining
products
17.3
Manufactures 27.5 Manufactures 1.2 Manufactures 27 Manufactures 68.2 Manufactures 69.4
                   
  By main destination     By main destination     By main destination     By main destination     By main destination  
1. European Union (25) 40.3 1. European Union (25) 54 1. European Union (25) 34 1. European Union (25) 73.9 1. European Union (25) 33
2. Belarus 5.7 2. United States 23.6 2. United States 8.5 2. United States 4.1 2. Russian Federation 17.6
3. Ukraine 5 3. Canada 5.9 3. India 7.5 3. India 3.5 3. Turkey 6.9
4. China 4.6 4. Brazil 5.6 4. Saudi Arabia 3 4. Brazil 2.8 4. China 3.7
5. Turkey 3.1     5. Turkey 2.3 5. Switzerland 1.1 5. United States 2.8
    Other 18         Other 15.5     Other 1.1    
                   
Imports   Imports   Imports   Imports   Imports  
  By commodity     By commodity     By commodity     By commodity     By commodity  
Agricultural products 16.8 Agricultural products 24 Agricultural products 27.4 Agricultural products 14.2 Agricultural products 7.7
Fuels and mining
products
5.1 Fuels and mining
products
2.2 Fuels and mining
products
12.2 Fuels and mining
products
19.3 Fuels and mining
products
38.6
Manufactures 77.6 Manufactures 73.8 Manufactures 51.8 Manufactures 66.4 Manufactures 52.4
             
  By main origin     By main origin     By main origin     By main origin     By main origin  
1. European Union (25) 45 1. European Union (25) 54.8 1. European Union (25) 27.8 1. European Union (25) 55.7 1. Russian Federation 37.1
2. Ukraine 8.1 2. United States 5.9 2. United States 11.7 2. Russian Federation 5.7 2. European Union (25) 32.2
3. Belarus 7.9 3. China 5 3. China 4.9 3. Saudi Arabia 5.4 3. Turkmenistan 11.1
4. China 6.3 4. Japan 3.6 4. Russian Federation 3.4 4. China 4.2 4. United States 2.7
5. Japan 5.2     5. Brazil 3.4 5. United States 4.1 5. Kazakhstan 2.3
    Other 1.1         Other 14.1     Other 0.3    
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Table 3.2A. Composition of EU trade with 5 countries, in percent, 2004
Note : * – total is less than 100% because of some unclassified transactions.
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.
EU imports from EU exports to
HS Description
ALGERIA EGYPT MOROCCO RUSSIA UKRAINE ALGERIA EGYPT MOROCCO RUSSIA UKRAINE
I-XXI Total* 78.2 99.4 99.1 88.1 98.1 99.2 97.9 98.6 97.2 98.7
I-IV Agricultural products 0.3 8.5 22.4 0.9 7.9 12.6 8.3 6.2 10.0 6.4
V-XXI Non-agricultural products 77.9 90.9 76.7 87.2 90.2 86.6 89.6 92.4 87.2 92.2
I Live animals and animal products 0.1 1.1 6.0 0.4 0.2 3.9 2.4 2.0 3.0 1.4
II Vegetable products 0.1 6.6 10.6 0.3 4.1 5.5 3.3 2.3 2.5 1.2
III Fats and oils 0.0 0.8 0.0 1.9 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.3
IV Processed foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 0.1 0.7 5.0 0.1 1.8 2.4 2.2 1.4 4.1 3.5
V Mineral products 73.4 45.3 5.2 63.4 25.0 1.6 2.0 7.5 0.7 1.4
VI Chemical products 3.9 5.1 3.8 7.2 11.8 13.4 7.9 10.2 11.5
VII Plastics, rubber and related products 0.0 2.3 0.4 0.4 0.9 3.2 4.5 4.2 4.9 7.3
VIII Leather, skin and related products 0.1 1.4 0.7 0.2 1.7 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.9 0.7
IX Timber and timber products 0.1 0.9 2.2 4.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.8 1.2
X Wood pulp, paper and board 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.3 2.4 3.5 2.5 3.9 3.8
XI Fabrics and fabric products 0.0 15.5 38.9 0.3 7.0 1.2 2.6 18.0 4.4 7.9
XII Shoes, hats, and cups 0.3 2.9 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.1 0.8 1.1 1.2
XIII Glass, stone products, cement 0.0 1.4 0.7 0.1 0.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.9 2.2
XIV Pearls, precious stones 0.0 0.3 0.1 2.7 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.8
XV Non-precious metals 10.7 2.9 11.4 32.0 7.1 7.5 7.5 5.0 6.1
XVI Machinery and equipment 0.3 3.9 15.8 0.8 4.6 32.1 33.3 29.2 36.4 31.2
XVII Transport equipment 3.7 1.1 0.7 3.3 19.6 15.4 8.3 10.3 11.7
XVIII Measure and controlling equipment 0.0 0.7 0.4 0.1 0.3 2.9 3.6 1.9 3.1 2.1
XIX Arms and ammunition 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1
XX Various manufactures 0.0 0.7 0.9 0.2 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.5 3.1 3.0
XXI Works of art 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0
  Other 0.0 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.5
  Memorandum:                    
  Total, EUR mln 15250 4192 6549 80708 7277 9451 7398 8877 45832 10460
0.0
1.2
0.1
0.0
0.8
2.0
132
Małgorzata Jakubiak, Wojciech Paczyński
CASE Reports No. 71/2007
Source: World Bank (2005).
Table 4.1A. Selected indicators of starting a business in the ENP countries
Starting a Business
Country Procedures
(number)
Time (days)
Cost
(% of income
per capita)
Min. capital
(% of income
per capita)
AVERAGE (2005) 10.4 27.6 31.6 336.5
Algeria 14 26 25.3 55.1
Egypt 10 34 104.9 739.8
Morocco 5 11 12 700.3
Russian Federation 8 33 5 4.4
Ukraine 15 34 10.6 183
Source: World Bank (2005).
Table 4.2A Selected indicators of starting hiring and firing workers in the ENP countries
Hiring and Firing WorkersCountry
Difficulty
of Hiring
Index
Rigidity
of Hours 
Index
Difficulty
of Firing
Index
Rigidity
of Employment
Index
Hiring cost
(% of salary)
Firing costs
(weeks
of wages)
AVERAGE (2005) 37.6 60 56 51 28.7 59.1
Algeria 44 60 50 51 27.5 16.9
Egypt 0 80 80 53 26 162.3
Morocco 100 40 40 60 17.7 83.3
Russian Federation 0 60 30 30 35.8 16.6
Ukraine 44 60 80 61 36.4 16.6
Source: World Bank (2005).
Table 4.3A. Selected indicators of trading across borders in the ENP countries
Trading Across Borders
Country Documents
for export
(number)
Signatures
for export
(number)
Time for
export
(days)
Documents
for import
(number)
Signatures
for import
(number)
Time for
import
(days)
AVERAGE (2005) 7.4 9.8 30 9.2 11.4 38.8
Algeria 8 8 29 8 12 51
Egypt 8 11 27 9 8 29
Morocco 7 13 31 11 17 33
Russian Federation 8 8 29 8 10 35
Ukraine 6 9 34 10 10 46
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Table 5.1A. EU25 trade in services with selected countries in 2003 in millions of euro
Note: no data for Algeria available. North Africa covers data from Algeria, Egypt, Libyan (Arab Jamahiriya), Tunisia.
Source: BoP data from Eurostat.
Extra EU Russian Federation Ukraine Northern Africa Egypt Morocco
credit debit credit debit credit debit credit debit credit debit credit debit
Services - total 330 649 295 030 6 727 5 152 754 812 6 500 9 632 1 383 3 279 1 364 2 272
Transportation 78 502 70 447 1 799 2 004 179 398 1 554 2 958 423 1 062 376 535
   Sea transport 38 280 33 702 : : 61 102 695 1 096 164 430 161 125
   Air transport 28 260 24 534 : : 75 59 668 1 633 235 601 145 337
   Other transport 11 963 27 910 : : 42 237 192 228 23 32 71 71
Travel 63 682 75 722 2 052 1 388 299 162 1 448 4 970 237 1 870 156 1 269
Communications services 5 960 6 870 : : 15 21 199 359 16 38 35 136
Construction services 10 567 5 985 : : 46 13 545 182 67 27 40 25
Insurance services 15 227 5 478 : : 5 6 116 50 18 4 13 16
Financial services 21 482 10 160 : : 25 6 77 25 32 9 8 6
Computer and information services 15 922 7 284 : : 43 14 143 19 34 5 40 4
Royalties and license fees 15 094 24 291 : : 4 2 44 15 19 2 14 4
Other business services 88 481 74 145 : : 83 132 2 159 868 484 204 623 238
Personal, cultural and recreational
services
3 981 5 271 : : 2 7 21 17 1 5 11 4
Government services, n.i.e. 9 286 6 444 : : 17 18 150 164 28 48 41 30
Percent of Extra-EU trade .. .. 2% 2% 0% 0% 2% 3% 0% 1% 0% 1%
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Table 5.2A. EU15 trade in services with selected countries in 2003 in millions of euro
Note: no data for Algeria available. North Africa covers data from Algeria, Egypt, Libyan (Arab Jamahiriya), Tunisia.
Source: BoP data from Eurostat.
Extra EU Russian Federation Ukraine Northern Africa Egypt Morocco
credit debit credit debit credit debit credit debit credit debit credit debit
Services - total 313 650 280 635 4 922 4 626 575 566 6 475 9 483 1 374 3 226 1 357 2 265
Transportation 73 228 67 180 493 1 425 689 2 091 775 2 197 668 1 786 0 :
   Sea transport 36 573 32 699 220 929 268 1 471 : : : : 0 :
   Air transport 27 163 23 629 169 257 271 375 : : : : 0 :
   Other transport 9 492 10 851 104 240 149 243 : : : : 0 :
Travel 57 326 72 058 1 535 1 249 185 154 1 443 4 858 235 1 837 154 1 267
Communications services 5 742 6 404 : : 14 19 199 357 16 36 35 136
Construction services 9 971 5 386 : : 41 10 545 182 67 27 40 25
Insurance services 15 062 5 283 : : 5 5 115 50 18 3 13 16
Financial services 21 083 9 514 : : 24 3 77 25 32 9 8 6
Computer and information services 15 610 6 989 : : 40 14 142 18 34 4 40 4
Royalties and license fees 14 965 23 558 : : 3 1 44 15 19 1 14 4
Other business services 85 765 70 738 : : 64 106 2 153 864 482 202 620 237
Personal, cultural and recreational
services
3 378 4 506 : : 1 6 20 17 1 4 11 4
Government services, n.i.e. 9 068 6 092 : : 15 14 148 158 25 45 40 30
Percent of Extra-EU trade .. .. 2% 1% 0% 0% 2% 3% 0% 1% 0% 1%
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Table 5.3A. Selected transport infrastructure indicators 5 ENP economies, 1997-2003
Note: no data for Algeria available. North Africa covers data from Algeria, Egypt, Libyan (Arab Jamahiriya), Tunisia.
Source: BoP data from Eurostat.
Roads Air
Total road
network
Paved
roads
Passengers
carried
passenger
km
Goods
hauled
ton-km
Rail
lines
total
Passengers
carried 
passenger
-km
Goods
hauled
ton-km
Container
traffic
Aircraft
departures
Passenger
carried
Air
freight
ton-km
km % millions millions millions millions
TEU
thousands thousands thousands millions
1997- 2002a 1997- 2002a 1997- 2002a 1997- 2002a 2000-03a 2000-03a 2000-03a 2003 2003 2003 2003
Algeria 104,000 68.9 .. .. 3,572 954 2,246 311.1 44 3,293 19
Egypt, Arab Rep. 64,000 78.1 .. .. 5,150 40,837 4,188 1,458.0 42 4,172 229
Morocco 57,694 56.4 3 2,952 1,907 2,145 4,974 346.7 35 2,565 51
Russian Federation 537,289 67.4 164 139 85,542 152,900
1,510,20
0 946.6 351 22,723 1,113
Ukraine 169,679 96.8 36,612 20,593 22,079 50,544 193,141 .. 33 1,477 18
comparators:
 Turkey 354,421 41.6 163,327 150,912 8,671 5,204 7,169 2,773.9 104 10,701 379
 Poland 364,697 68.3 30,997 74,403 20,223 17,310 46,560 261.4 73 3,252 71
 Slovak Republic 42,970 87.3 33,234 22,347 3,657 2,682 10,679 .. 7 208 0
 Europe EMU 99.5 76,186 32,700 120,432 8,415 9,664 48,491.9 3,507 281,684 24,960
 France 893,100 100 .. 245,400 29,352 73,227 50,036 3,553.5 696 47,259 5,067
 Netherlands 116,500 90 193,900 32,700 2,806 14,288 3,685 7,232.4 248 23,455 4,331
Railways Ports
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Source: WB WDI database.
Table 5.4A. Selected telecommunication infrastructure indicators in 5 ENP economies,
2000 and 2003
Algeria Egypt Morocco
Russian
Federation
Ukraine
2000 2003 2000 2003 2000 2003 2000 2003 2000 2003
Fixed lines and mobile
telephones
(per 1,000 people) 
60.8 114.8 107.8 211.7 131.2 283.9 240.5 .. 222.7 ..
Internet users
(per 1,000 people)
4.9 .. 7.1 39.3 7 33.2 19.7 .. 6.9 ..
ADB (2005), Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Progress, Prospects, and Challenges, Asian
Development Bank.
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2005), ‘Agri-Food. Past, Present and Future Report: Morocco’,
November, Government of Canada. Available at http://atn-riae.agr.ca/africa/4077_e.htm.
Aslund, Anders and Andrew Warner (2003), ‘The Enlargement of the European Union: Consequences
for the CIS Countries’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Paper No. 36.
Augier, Patricia and Michael Gasiorek (2001), ‘Trade Liberalisation between the Southern
Mediterranean and the EU: The Sectoral Impact’, Discussion Paper No 79, University of Sussex.
Balassa, Bela 1961 ”Towards a Theory of Economic Integration.” Kyklos. 
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Commission on International Migration, available at www.gcim.org.
Baldwin, Richard (2004), ‘Stepping stones or building blocs? Regional and multilateral integration’,
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, September.
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The Banker (2005), ‘Oil revenues aid recovery’, 07 November 2005. Available at www.thebanker.com.
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BISNIS (2005), “Russian Food Processing Equipment Overview”, August. Available at
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